Report [on] the strategy and tactics of world communism

United States.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1948.

https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357



Public Domain, Google-digitized

http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

We have determined this work to be in the public domain, meaning that it is not subject to copyright. Users are free to copy, use, and redistribute the work in part or in whole. It is possible that current copyright holders, heirs or the estate of the authors of individual portions of the work, such as illustrations or photographs, assert copyrights over these portions. Depending on the nature of subsequent use that is made, additional rights may need to be obtained independently of anything we can address. The digital images and OCR of this work were produced by Google, Inc. (indicated by a watermark on each page in the PageTurner). Google requests that the images and OCR not be re-hosted, redistributed or used commercially. The images are provided for educational, scholarly, non-commercial purposes.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

HARVARD LAW LIBRARY
3 2044 057 331 357

U.S. CONGRESS. HOUSE. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REPORT ON THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

SUPPLEMENT 3, COUNTRY STUDIES

C. COMMUNISM IN CHINA

1948

HARVARD LAW LIBRARY

HD

54
5280.
1.5

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Digitized by Google

Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Digitized by Google

Original from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

U. S. Congress. House...

[SUBCOMMITTEE PRINT]

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

54
52701.5

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5

Hon. FRANCES P. BOLTON, Chairman

REPORT

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM

SUPPLEMENT III

COUNTRY STUDIES

C. COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

UNITED STATES
80261 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1948

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5—NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

FRANCES P. BOLTON, Ohio, *Chairman*

CHESTER E. MERROW, New Hampshire
DONALD L. JACKSON, California
FRANKLIN J. MALONEY, Pennsylvania
WIRT COURTNEY, Tennessee
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania

Report—The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism.
Supplement I—One Hundred Years of Communism, 1848–1948 (a collection of Communist documents).
Supplement II—Official Protests of the United States Government Against Communist Policies or Actions, and Related Correspondence (July 1945–December 1947).
Supplement III—Country Studies:
A. The Coup D'Etat in Prague.
B. Communism in the Near East.
C. Communism in China.
(Others in preparation.)
Supplement IV—Five Hundred Leading Communists (biographical data on leading Communists in the Eastern Hemisphere, excluding the U. S. S. R.).

NOTE.—The report of the subcommittee, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, has been printed, together with supplements I and II, as House Document No. 619. Supplement IV has also been printed as House Document No. 707.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

1. *Chinese communism is regular communism.* Its doctrines follow those of Lenin and Stalin. Its leaders are Moscow-trained. Its policies and actions, its strategy and tactics, are Communist. *The Chinese Communists have followed faithfully every zigzag of the Kremlin's line for a generation.*

The character and significance of communism in China has been subject to more controversy in the United States than has communism in any other country in the world. The controversy has raged among scholars and commentators, and has been reflected in public opinion and in the policies of the United States Government. But the evidence is clear enough today, if not before, so that there is no need for the controversy to continue.

2. China itself has been one of the world's great centers of human civilization for 3,000 years. It has been a very large country, for its high civilization made it powerful, able to conquer its neighbors, and to swallow up its occasional conquerors. It is the one great country that never was politically submerged by the west. Today it is facing the impact of western science and technology, not as Europe did, gradually, in the 400 years since the Renaissance, but suddenly and all at once. Chinese politics until recently were more like medieval politics than like those of the modern western nations, and the Chinese are forced to attempt modern democracy without centuries of preparation in the development of constitutionalism and of legislative authority. *China has never yet known peace as a modern nation.*

3. Communism first appeared in China soon after the Russian Revolution. Comintern advisers followed soon after the first beginnings, and initiated the work of developing and adapting communism for the conditions in a nonindustrial country. Since that time there have been four great periods or phases in the history of Chinese communism.

The first united front, 1923–27.
The first civil war, 1927–37.
The second united front, 1937–46.
The second civil war, 1946– ——.

4. China has been an experimental center for the development of the modern Leninist Communism. Communism, since the Russian Revolution, has faced what is best regarded as two worlds. On the one hand, to the west, lie the leading industrial nations, for which Marx's "Kapital" was intended as a diagnosis and a prophecy. Among these Germany was formerly thought to offer the greatest opportunity for communism, and before the days of Hitler the German Communist Party ranked as the senior party in the world outside the Soviet Union. On the other hand, to the east and south, in most of the land masses of Asia and Africa and South America, live three-fourths of the people of the earth. They are industrially backward, low in literacy, poor in material wealth, and predemocratic in politics.

672837
Prof. Wilson
Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Toward these the Kremlin has progressively turned its face; in these countries it has found many of its most easy opportunities. *As in Russia itself in 1917 the absence of old and solid democratic institutions has proved a more favorable circumstance for communism in these countries than has the presence of highly developed industry in the west.* For the Communist drive in this three-fourths of the world China has served as the laboratory and proving ground. The Chinese Communist Party has, for this second world, assumed the place of the eldest daughter of the Kremlin.

5. *In China from the first, communism has been able to take advantage of the upsurge of national patriotism and of the anti-imperialist movement.* The earliest Communists in China also had the initial advantage that the nationalist movement in China had, at first, no experience or example by which to judge the consequences of Communist collaboration. It was not until the Communists saw victory and national unity for China assured in 1927, and thereupon revealed their own intent to Bolshevize China, that the Kuomintang broke with them and the first civil war began.

6. During the 10 years of the first civil war the Communists succeeded in gathering themselves together in one region, set up a Soviet system, and defended themselves in bitter warfare against repeated campaigns of the national forces. Finally, in 1935, they migrated to Shensi Province, in the remote northwest, where they secured an area and established a sort of government.

7. The second "united front" came when the rise of Hitler and the turning of Japan toward aggression made it urgent for Moscow that Japan become as fully engaged in China as possible. The Chinese Communists, following their familiar pseudo-patriotic progaganda line, demanded ever more emphatically a renewed united national front against invasion. *By 1937 Chiang Kai-shek was forced to accept this renewed united front, beginning the 8 years of war that sapped the strength of national China while granting a respite to the Communists.*

8. The Communist theoretical and propaganda line for the period of the second united front is embodied in the pamphlet by Mao Tse-tung on China's New Democracy, published in 1940. This pamphlet was designed to serve a double purpose, *first, to explain with perfect clarity to Chinese Communists how to maintain the drive for dictatorial power, second, to put the story into such language that it would seem patriotic to patriots, moderate to moderates, and liberal to liberals.* Since any good Communist knows that "democracy" if used in official communist documents, means the dictatorship of the proletariat, and most liberals do not know this, the double task is not as difficult as it sounds. While the period for which this pamphlet was written has now passed, it served Communist purposes most effectively for many years.

9. The second united front did not end formally until the beginning of the second civil war, but before this there was a brief transition period of great importance. *The Russian entry into the war in the Far East accomplished what had never been possible before, that is, a massive intervention by Russia in the Chinese situation.* The occupation of North China and Manchuria by the forces of the Chinese National Government were frustrated by the combination of transport difficulties and Communist and Russian interference, while the stocks of Japanese weapons passed more or less covertly into the hands of the Chinese Communists. By the time that the United States abandoned

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

its efforts to secure a truce in China, and (misguidedly) to persuade the National Government to accept a coalition with the Communists, the Communists were ready to renew the civil war with many times their former resources. *Thus Russia was enabled to move in under the auspices of the wartime alliance, to reverse quickly the balance of forces in China, and to step out again in time to renew the propaganda line of anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism against the United States.*

10. Communism in China has enjoyed several advantages or assets. It has at all times been able to play upon emergent nationalism. It has also, at least since 1926, had the advantage of the turmoil of war. It has had, since 1927, the control of territory without any corresponding national responsibility. It has had its own Red Army. These conditions have shaped the tactics and policies of Chinese communism on all economic and political issues. Its approach to the land problem in particular illustrates the speciousness with which it can "solve" problems under these conditions. The Communists, whose control of any rural area is tied up with the cutting off of the countryside from the cities, can find an easy way to appeal to the poorer peasants by giving them the land of the rich peasants, without facing the consequences of reduced production. They do not have to face the problem whole, with food for the cities as a necessary part, since they have so far merely looted or destroyed cities and machinery. *They have never had to face the genuine responsibilities of Chinese government, and have fattened on the conditions of war and ruin.*

11. *Chinese communism has weaknesses as well as assets.* In 20 years it has found no means that can attract wide support in the cities of China. It has practiced its irresponsible remedies for the economic ills of the countryside until the inadequacy of these remedies has become apparent. The stubborn refusal of the National Government to accept a coalition with the Communists, together with the necessities imposed upon the Communists in eastern Europe, have at length stripped the camouflage of the "new democracy" from the drive for a Red dictatorship. But most important of all, *China presents a problem which is simply not manageable for the methods applied by the Bolsheviks in Russia.* The population problem, without opportunity to colonize open territory, sets limits to the economic and political means, limits within which the Communists cannot operate. This does not prevent them from gaining and holding power, but it imposes catastrophic costs.

12. American mediation based on the assumption of harmony between democracy and communism was the basis of efforts to work out a coalition government in China after the Second World War. This was accompanied by the assumption that the word "democracy" when used by Communists has the same meaning that it has to us. It has been revealed in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia that "democracy" to them means only the "Trojan horse" approach to the "dictatorship of the proletariat." *Coalition government under the cover of "new democracy" merely makes the task of seizing power easy.* But before this became as clear as it is today the effort of the United States to arrange a coalition in China was carried to extreme lengths, beyond any historical parallel. Since that time, Communist membership in coalition cabinets has been tried in many countries; in some it ended in Communist dictatorship, in some it ended in the exclusion of the

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Communists. The Chinese National Government was clearly right in refusing to meet the Communist terms.

13. *There are signs in China itself of latent resources out of which Chinese salvation can be built.* Aside from the deep resistance of the cities to Communist influence, the efforts to extend literacy and the efforts for local economic and social reform by James Yen and Hu Shih and many other experimental movements have explored the way to evoke and develop popular vitality in the right direction. The recent efforts of Gen. Fy Tso-yi in Peiping have illustrated how elements of several of these ideas be combined into a practical program with very promising results.

14. *China is, for the forces of democracy and peace as well as for world communism, a proving ground where the way forward for one and a half billions of people must be developed and tested.* There are technological and industrial problems to solve, economic problems, social problems, the problem of internal political order and the problem of external political security, and finally the problem of how to become a genuine democracy. China cannot solve her economic problem without aid. She cannot solve the problem of internal order in face of civil war abetted by Soviet aid to Chinese Communists without military aid. And she cannot be endowed with external political security without the backing of the United States and the United Nations. Chinese Communists and international Communists have worked together for a generation to devise the way to make China a Communist dictatorship. If the problem of how to make China a modern democracy is to be solved at all, it can be solved best by China and the United States working together. The fate of China will go far to settle the fate of all southern and eastern Asia, and of the world.

(Acknowledgments: A partial draft of this study was prepared for the committee by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. The Honorable Walter H. Judd, who is a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but not of Subcommittee 5, examined the report in draft and gave most helpful advice and criticism. Advice and information was also given by a number of other persons whose helpfulness is appreciated. The Chinese News Service granted permission to use the biographical data contained in their China Handbook, and this information is a large part of that contained in appendix D.)

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	III
1. China and communism	1
A. Is it Communist or Chinese?	1
B. China through Communist eyes	2
C. China itself	3
2. Birth and growth of Chinese communism	6
A. Origins of Chinese communism	6
B. The first united front	8
C. The U. S. S. R. and China	10
D. The first civil war against communism	11
E. The Communist line on the open issues	13
F. The assets of Chinese communism	16
3. The second united front	21
A. Japanese expansion	21
B. The agreement of 1937	23
C. The new democracy	27
4. The second civil war	35
A. Soviet intervention	35
B. Chinese communism in the cold war	36
C. World communism on a new tack	40
D. The United States debates the problem	43
E. American mediation and aid	45
F. The weaknesses of communism in China	47
5. The significance of China	50
A. China in world strategy	50
B. The Chinese problem	52

APPENDIX

A. Chronology, 1945–48	63
B. Mao Tse-tung, China's New Democracy	67
C. Leading political figures, Communists	91
D. Leading political figures, non-Communists	98
E. Map—Communist-controlled areas, 1945–47	at end.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY



Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Digitized by Google

Original from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

COMMUNISM IN CHINA

1. China and Communism

A. Is it communist or chinese?

Communism in any country in the world is in some sense native to that country. Most of the Communists in any country are natives of the country; they speak the language of the country; they read the papers of the country, live their lives in the country, cook and eat the national dishes, and play the national sports. *Chinese Communists are Chinese, and Chinese communism is Chinese.*

Communism in any country is also communism. There is a plain and familiar sense in which Mohammedanism in any country is Mohammedan. So is the Methodist Church in any country Methodist, so is Roman law in any country still Roman law, so is chemistry still chemistry. After all, such elements common to the life of man in more than one country, above national character, are commonplace. They rest on common derivation from common origins, and their endurance over generations or centuries rests upon their preservation in books, and their renewal through teaching. Those who live by them are those who have learned them, and are in turn their carriers. Chinese Communists are thus Communists as well as Chinese. Their leaders are steeped in the lore of Marx and Lenin and Stalin. They are saturated with the analysis of the present state of civilization as taught by Moscow, in the prophecies for the future that shape Communist strategy, and in the commands for present action that guide Communists everywhere.

For many years the most important single test of unqualified Communist discipline has been the following of zig-zags in the world-wide party line. This has been the test that has distinguished heretics against world communism from its loyal followers. It is the test that has combed out the present tried and proven leaders. In 1935, when the Comintern adopted the popular-front line, the Chinese Communists followed it. From 1937 to 1939 Moscow supported the Chinese National Government against Japan, and the Chinese Communists loyally played their part in the united front. From 1939 to 1941 Moscow referred to the war in Europe as an imperialist war and adopted an isolationist position, while the Chinese Communists slackened their efforts against Japan and intensified their efforts to secure their own power. After June 22, 1941, the imperialist war became the war for freedom and democracy, both in Moscow and in Yenan. After Stalingrad the Chinese Communists resumed their independent drive for power in China. In 1945, when Moscow made a treaty of friendship with China, the Communists became quite docile for a few months, and in 1946 when it became clear that the United States would not, for the time being, underwrite the National Government, the Communists moved promptly into open civil war. *No Communists in the world have better standing.*

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The contacts between Chinese communism and Moscow were seriously hampered by difficult communications until 1945. Yet the Chinese party always managed to keep in close touch with world communism. Several hundred of the leading members of the Chinese party have been to Moscow at one time or another, and most of them have had serious advanced training there. Of the 31 Chinese Communist leaders for whom biographical data is given in the appendix, 17 have spent periods in Moscow, and these 17 include graduates of all of the most important staff schools of world communism. At the seventh world congress of the Comintern in 1935 there were three Chinese Communists named to the executive committee out of 47 members. This committee was important enough so that Stalin himself, and Zhdanov also, were members. One Chinese was on the International Control Commission, out of 20 members. The presidium of the executive committee, which had 19 members and 12 alternates, had one representative of the Chinese party in each category. Stalin himself was a member of the presidium also. The Chinese Communist Party is as much a branch of world communism as any other Communist Party in the world. This is written across the record of both the Chinese party and the Comintern, in doctrine and policy, in organization, in personnel, in activity. Later parts of this study will show that the record is unbroken by any evidence of change. *The mystery is not, Are they really Communist? It is only how the question can be raised by any informed and sincere person. It has never been raised by Communists.*

In any country the doctrine, the prophecies, and the commands, have to be adapted to the conditions of the local scene. Even an engineer will not do everything in the same way in the Congo as in Iowa. Even an infantryman trained in the same army will not do everything in the same way in the New Guinea jungle as on a peak in the Apennines. Communists in China act like Communists in China, not like Communists in France. But the diversity does not contradict the uniformity, however perplexing it may seem to some observers.

B. CHINA THROUGH COMMUNIST EYES

Lenin in 1913 had written interesting short articles on the importance of China and the development of the revolutionary movement throughout Asia that might be expected to follow after a revolution in Russia, but his colleagues had little time to think of China in the first few years after the Russian revolution of 1917. The civil wars in Russia itself, the foreign intervention, and the hopes of spreading revolution in Europe kept them occupied until their drive for Warsaw was stopped in 1921. The situation in the west was no sooner stabilized however, than they turned their eyes toward China. China had launched out upon uncharted seas of revolution in 1911, and it was plain that the Chinese revolution was by no means finished and over. The Leninist exploit of seizing the opportunity to jump from middle-class revolution in a backward country straight to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in 1 year encouraged speculative dreams about possibilities in the other backward or colonial areas of the earth. China appeared to be a prime opportunity.

The importance of China to world communism may be measured very easily. China is so important to communism that it became

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

the leading issue in the greatest internal crisis that world communism has ever faced, the break between Stalin and Trotsky in 1927. Second, China is the only country that is big enough, and where communism is strong enough, so that the Communists can maintain more or less permanent control over a large area, without a national government, but with an organized army of their own. Third, communism has been finding its best opportunities more and more in the relatively backward areas and less and less in the advanced industrial countries. *China, as the only great area that is both industrially backward and politically independent, is also for the Communists the pilot plant and proving ground for the development of Communist theory and strategy and tactics for all of the industrially backward areas of the world. These areas happen to include about three-fourths of the world's population.* To understand these points more fully we have to look briefly at the relevant characteristics of China as a country.

C. CHINA ITSELF

China is a broad land of great rivers, of intensive agriculture, of hundreds of millions of peasants diligent in working the land, innocent of hygiene, humorous and tragic, humane and brutal. China has great traditions, and these traditions have been maintained through long ages by the learning and patient care of scholars and artists. It is a land where the dissolving of the old and the crystallizing of the new are proceeding apace. For our present purposes, however, we are interested in China as a land where world issues are at stake, where the options of political and economic progress offered by the west are being tested.

China, first of all, has been for 3,000 years one of the three greatest centers of human culture and civilization. The others have been India and Europe. This Chinese culture was relatively slow to change until this century. The rate of change in China has been more like the pace of the middle ages in Europe than like Europe since the Renaissance. Chinese economics, Chinese government, Chinese religion and law have all reflected this in direct ways. Secondly, China is vast. This is placed second, because it was the high level of Chinese culture for long centuries that supported the power of China and made her vast, and permitted China, though conquered by outsiders in periods of Chinese weakness or decadence, always to swallow her conquerors.

Thirdly, China did not begin to move in terms of techniques, the use of industrial power, and production and organization, until the nineteenth century, about 400 years later than the time when the Renaissance enlivened Europe. This meant that the Western World had several centuries in which to develop a system of politics adapted to continuing change or progress, but that China, receiving its new technology from the west, had to face the product of several centuries of development on the technical side, without having had as much time for political adjustments. Europe faced sixteenth century progress with sixteenth century politics, and eithteenth century progress with eighteenth century politics. China had to face nineteenth century progress with fifteenth century politics. Even in Europe the rate of progress generated forces as explosive as those of the great religious wars and the French Revolution. For China the problems

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

of adjustment, and the strains, and the forces produced, are far more difficult and the tensions far more acute.

What Europe developed in the art of government in the three centuries between the end of the Middle Ages and the rise of modern democracy is well known but often forgotten. But as a task which has to be undertaken and completed in China, this political evolution which preceded democracy and laid the foundations upon which democracy could arise is no less important than what we call democracy, and therefore it is necessary to define it briefly. In medieval Europe, before the growth of the modern state and modern politics, law was based upon immemorial custom. *Ipso facto,* it could be taken that "the truth" in matters of law and government was known, for past, present and future. Government as an organization of officials executing the law was hardly known. Government as a legislature making new law for new conditions, law that nobody knew before it was made, law that would change continually in the future, was unknown. The shift from custom functioning as law to law made by a legislature means a tremendous change from the domination of ideas, doctrine, tradition, toward the authority of command, of organization, of what we call bureaucracy. It is a change in the nature of everything that holds society together and makes a human community into what we call a nation or a state. The condition of domestic peace, the condition whose violation is a "breach of peace," or the idea of "law and order," is not the same in the modern western state as in the Middle Ages, and the Chinese are familiar with conditions far more like the medieval than the modern.

Law and order in the west is something the Chinese are only beginning to understand, something as foreign to them a generation ago as it would have been to William the Conqueror. Medieval western man agreed or consented to the substance of known and constant law. Modern western man has never fully known his future law, for it is always still to be made. Agreement or consent is given not to the substance, but to the authoritative source that has the right to make it. In order to establish democracy, one has to establish not only free choice of representatives; one has first to establish the legislative function that representatives are to exercise. The implanting of democracy in custom-ruled societies requires simultaneous performance of two great tasks which, in the west, were carried out in sequence.

The evolution of constitutional government, of the modern legislature, of parties, of rule by a changeable majority, and of national unity, was the work of three centuries in the West *before* the great expansion of democracy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. In China all this earlier work has yet to be done, and has to be done at the same time with all that has been later work for us.

Meanwhile Chinese society remains one where ideas in everybody's mind still have a greater role, and organized government a smaller one, than in the west. This is a favorable condition for communism, with its elaborate and ambitious theoretical doctrine, ready for sale to anyone shopping for new doctrine to replace the old.

The fourth important fact about China is that it was never submerged by western civilization. Only a few smaller countries have also remained politically and legally independent of Europe throughout the last 4 centuries. China is the only great mass of humanity of

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

which this is true. It is true because China is more remote, and also because it always was stronger. No Cortez could have brought China to heel as he did the Empire of the Aztecs. No Clive had the opportunity to divide and rule in China as in India. No colonists could settle in China, and multiply, and displace the natives as the English did where the United States now lies.

It was not until after the industrial revolution in Europe had well begun that Europe could have conquered China. Europe then made a start, and cut off pieces, demanded concessions, took extra-territorial rights. Hongkong and Shanghai and Dairen are the little monuments to this process. But it was interrupted by several factors: First, the balance of power among the imperial nations until the First World War created a stand-off between Britain, France, Russia, and Germany, watching each other over the prey to which none had title; second, the rise of Japan introduced a new Asiatic element; third, the reaction against imperialism began to gather force around the turn of the century following the Spanish-American War and the South African War; and fourth, the United States, quick to adopt an anti-imperialist attitude itself, also appreciated the significance of China and sought to preserve the territorial integrity of China. Thus the outward independence of China has been preserved up to the present.

The fifth significant condition in Chinese life is the general impact of science. The discoveries of Galileo and Newton and Boyle and Pasteur and Einstein came to the west spread out over three centuries. Their practical economic impact in the hands of Watt and Fulton and Edison and Henry Ford was spread over a century and a half. But the machine gun reached China almost as soon as Europe, the radio at the same time, and American heavy bombers came to China as to Europe to impress with their roaring beauty, to command conversion of farm slopes into flat bases, to destroy here and there with contemptuous majesty. China has radios before she has telephones. She has busses before she has rails. She has penicillin before her people have been vaccinated. Her thinkers seek modernism, but find themselves pursuing an object that seems to recede as they pursue it, while exercising an ever more compelling attraction.

China, in brief, is plunging through changes which in Europe were difficult enough, though in Europe they were stretched out over five times as much time and in a sequence that seems orderly in retrospect. A society accustomed to the government of tradition is striving to create organs of initiative and command. A society unfamiliar with early science is choking down late science. A society that never had a Cromwell or a Washington is wrestling with Jefferson and Wilson and the New Deal. It is indispensable to her that she decide somehow what to do and how to do it. The long experimental processes that produced modern government in the west are too slow, and cannot be directly copied or shortened. China has to replace the authority of tradition, to replace even the traditional faith in tradition.

A handbook is offered by communism. It is not an attractive handbook as long as there is hope of an easier way, or a less costly way. But when no clear and cogent alternative is in sight it provides at least a straw for the swimmer to grasp. We in the west have some faith in our own ability to go forward without a handbook, to find the unpredictable solution of a problem by working it out,

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

because we have done so for several centuries. That is not a readily transmissible faith, it has not been packaged like Marxism.

Aside from Marxism, the West offers a philosophy of history, or a theory of present world developments only in such relatively indigestible lumps as Spengler's Decline of the West or Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History. These do not have the Marxist quality of combining a grand diagram of the modern fate with a specific set of practical guides to present politics. Whatever their value as philosophy they remain to a great degree "caviar to the general." And communism, whatever faults it may have, at least strives to reach the bread-and-butter level.

Thus far we have spoken of China. But what is true of China must be true in another way of the Chinese man. The qualities of a man are not quite the same as those of his nation; his desires are only vaguely the same. He loves peace even when his country makes war. He cares little for the great aims that historians find by hindsight as the motives of great events. In China generally he is a peasant. He knows that crazy city people get excited about politics. He knows that for a generation taxes and conscription and invasion have come like disturbances as blind as drought or flood. He knows, as an Italian peasant living among Roman ruins knows, that if you build an empire it will fall down some day. He knows from his legends that heroes are not all good nor all bad. He does not read. He is against anything that is both disturbing and malicious, of which foreigners come first.

Or he is a city man, a ricksha man or shopkeeper or mechanic. He can read a few dozen or a few hundred characters. He owes his job, his status, and his security to his family and guild, or to his association of co-provincials, men born in the same province as himself. He feels the impact of inflation and of regulations, and is resourceful in adapting himself to both. He has little reason to trust the political future.

In either case he is not for anything especial; national unity is an abstraction. He is practical, and judges the Kuomintang or the Communists as the people who requisition grain or conscript his son for obscure reasons. He is the man whose qualities and limitations lie beneath the statement that China is not yet a national community in the western sense. He is the citizen whose limitations lie beneath the statement that China cannot resort yet to rule by a freely chosen and freely changeable majority. He is the man who has never learned that law can be based upon legislative decision instead of upon immemorial custom. And he is the man stirred to sporadic guerrilla violence, or resigned to a soldier's life when a peasant's life has become impossible, helping to shape a nation by his reactions to irritation, by his patient reluctance to change until he must, by his plunge into a new faith when he finds himself unsheltered by his old one.

2. The Birth and Growth of Chinese Communism

A. ORIGINS OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

Communism came to China first as news. The Russian revolution was the fall of the greatest antidemocratic power in the world, the old Czarism that had built Muscovy into the Russian Empire. It

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

came in the year when the war "to make the world safe for democracy" was announced by Wilson. The Bolshevik Government denounced imperialism, published the secret treaties, and called upon the masses of all countries to turn the imperialist war into a world revolution. This was impressive to radical groups everywhere, and especially in the countries where budding nationalism was beginning to make headway against imperialism. Close behind the news, communism came to China as men and as books.

It came to a China that had overthrown its own old Manchu dynasty in 1911. That naively hopeful Chinese revolution had suffered the fate that befell so many democratic revolutions in unprepared countries, it found itself quite unable to make a modern political society out of the population of China. The Chinese land had fallen into a series of regions ruled over by so-called war lords, quasi-military politicians who were able to maintain an army, collect some taxes, and operate a rudimentary local government. There was a National Government of sorts at Peiping (then called Peking) and that was the Government to which foreign countries sent their ambassadors. But it exercised little or no authority over much of the country.

Sun Yat-sen had become the intellectual leader of the movement for modernism in general and for nationalism and democracy in particular in China. Under his leadership a small republican government had been able to secure Canton, in the far south of China. It had a dominant party, the Kuomintang (National People's Party). It had an army, which gradually became the most effective army in China, better organized and trained, with far better morale than the irresolute levies of the war lords. The political principles of the Kuomintang represented a more realistic version of the optimistic dream of 1911.

The "Three Principles of the People" or San Min Chu I, is the very brief and simple heart of the doctrines put forward by Sun Yat-sen and followed, more or less, by the Kuomintang Party which he led as long as he lived. The first version of these principles was put forth in 1905, the final and most authoritative version in 1924. The three principles are:

1. Racial nationalism (Min Tsu): That is, the abolition of racial inequality and the unification of the Chinese Nation.
2. People's democracy (Min Ch'üan): This meant the evolution of democracy through, first, national unification, second, a period of tutelage under party control, and third, constitutional democracy developing from the local level of the county or hsien.
3. The people's livelihood (Min-sheng): This meant a rejection of capitalism and a sort of experimental collectivism or socialism on the purely economic plane. "Historical dialectics," according to Sun should be based on human fellow-feeling, not on property relationships.

Sun explicitly rejected Marxist communism, maintaining that Marxian "dialectic materialism" was a false concept of history. Except for this rejection of communism, the "Three Principles" are easy to twist for Communist purposes, and the Chinese Communists have at all times endorsed them, with, of course, their own interpretation. They need only read the Communist principle of "democratic central-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ism," or party dictatorship, into the term "tutelage" in order to accommodate the principles of Sun to their own line, and to pretend that they are more loyal to the principles than any other party in China.

Communism came into a China that had only one viable center of modern thinking and modern politics, and that a very small area in a very big country. At the same time there was a rising nationalism, and a new ferment of interest in reform. European and American books were being translated and published. The ideals of Wilson were giving place to disillusionment, but were leaving a legacy as goals to seek in the future. And Russia was offering the Bolshevik dogma in action as a new blueprint for progress.

In the early months of 1920 seven persons calling themselves Communists grouped around Professor Ch'en Tu-hsiu in Shanghai, started a proletarian newspaper, and set to work forming trade unions.[1] Similar organizations appeared later in the year in Peking, Hankow, and other Chinese cities.

The First Congress of Chinese Marxists was held in Shanghai in July 1921, and a Communist Party was officially formed.[2] The new party grew rapidly. Within a year its identity was well enough established to permit affiliation with the Third International (Comintern). Agents of the new Bolshevik government of Russia were in China following the situation very closely. The Bolsheviks fully expected the next great wave of world uprisings to occur in the Far East.

Michael Borodin was sent to Canton from Moscow in September 1923. He advised Moscow that the Kuomintang Party under Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the most promising vehicle of the revolutionary forces in China, and Moscow therefore decided to throw Soviet and Communist support behind this party.[3] In support of this decision, the Chinese Communist Party, "under the guidance and with the aid of the Comintern,"[4] adopted a political and tactical line of national united front with the Kuomintang.

B. THE FIRST UNITED FRONT, 1924–27

In 1924 the Kuomintang reorganized along Communist lines, committed itself to cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party, and agreed to permit Communists as individuals to join the Kuomintang. The United National Front, engineered by Borodin and Sun Yat-sen, became a reality. It was an alliance for the purpose of attaining national unity, the indispensable first step toward the further objectives of either. It involved problems for both, and was experimental for both.

The problem of when to collaborate with non-Communists, and when to maintain isolation, is an acute problem for communism in all countries where it is a minority movement. It is a cardinal point of Bolshevik doctrine that all other Socialists are merely "reformers." "Reform" in their sense carries a derogatory meaning that outsiders seldom grasp. "Reform" is the throwing of a bone to the noisy dog to

[1] Pavel A. Mif, Heroic China, New York, Workers Library Publishers [1937]; p. 15. See also Paul Simon. Le Mouvement Communiste en Chine des Origines a Nos Jours, Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey [1937], p. 61;

[2] Mif, p. 19; also, Summary of Chinese Communist Problems, Chungking, 1945, p. 1.

[3] Dr. Sun sent Chiang Kai-shek to Soviet Russia in August 1923 to study Soviet organization. Borodin and a staff of Soviet advisers came to Canton to assist in reorganization of the Kuomintang.

[4] Mao Tse-tung. China, The March Toward Unity, New York, Workers Library, 1937, p. 92.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

quiet him; it is the leading of the revolutionary masses away from essential objectives toward inadequate palliatives; it is the corruption of the revolutionary movement. "Reformism" is one of the great sins. And according to Lenin, almost any gains reached without securing dictatorial power are mere reforms. They are not to be rejected, but they are not to be accepted as true objectives.

This identification of reformism as an error and an evil led to a further identification of collaboration with reformists as a form of the same error. It was against this extension of the principle that Lenin wrote his "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" (selections from this are given in supplement I, at p. 34). This work of Lenin's occupies a very high place among the classic writings of world communism. In it, Lenin laid down the rule that Communists must not isolate themselves from reform movements, they must take part in them, and learn to do so without compromising their ultimate objectives. Thus Lenin defined the Communist way as a narrow line between the errors of "reformism" on the one hand and "leftism" on the other. This is the basis of the Communist tactics of united fronts, and of infiltration.

The choice of collaborators is another matter. In the industrial nations, the obvious other party with which to collaborate is the Socialists. In the nonindustrial nations it is the rising nationalist movement. In Europe the leading issues on which to collaborate with or to oppose the Socialists have been the issues of labor leadership and industrial control. In China and the colonial countries the dominating issue is anti-imperialism and the development of national government. Thus the problem of when to shift from collaboration to opposition is altogether different in the one case from the other, the mode by which to organize a united front is different, the technique of undermining the competitor is not the same. China has been the crucible in which the strategy and tactics of world communism for all the nonindustrial nations have been worked out. The initial practical decision to work with the Kuomintang was made at a time when communism was in bitter conflict with the Socialist Parties in Europe. It was a crucial step, one that led to most important developments in communism.

Initially, the Chinese Communists and Soviet advisers working inside the ranks of the Kuomintang proved of considerable value to the nationalist-revolutionary movement. But signs of a rupture in the united front began to appear soon after the death of Sun Yat-sen on March 12, 1925. "Old comrades" of Dr. Sun, disgruntled by the expanding influence of younger and more militant elements within the revolutionary movement, met in December in the so-called Western Hills Conference. They demanded the expulsion of Communists from the Kuomintang, the dismissal of Borodin and the other Russian advisers, and the removal of the seat of the party's executive committee from Canton to Shanghai. While denouncing this independent action of the right, the Kuomintang high command, spurred on by Chiang Kai-shek, also took measures to forestall any possible coup by the left. The Kuomintang was about to launch a large-scale campaign against the northern militarists and could not afford to break with the Communists until later.

80261—48——2

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

In China the problem of the united front has been complicated for the Communists by the fact that the ostensible victims of this collaboration have understood its objectives far better than their counterparts in the West. Chiang Kai-shek had the advantage of top level training in Moscow for a year in 1923, and has some former high Communist leaders among his own supporters, although not in high positions, including, for example, a one-time head of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Chang Kuo-tao. The fact that a united front was accepted by the Kuomintang again in 1937 is an indication of the desperation of the times when it was done, not of any ignorance of the danger. The first united front lasted only about 3 years, from 1924 to the break in the summer of 1927. One of its legacies was the Kuomintang's memory of how the adviser and ally strives to become the teacher and master.

C. THE U. S. S. R. AND CHINA

The Government of the U. S. S. R. has played a somewhat anomalous role with regard to China during the past three decades. The devious course which has been followed is perhaps best explained by the fact that the Soviet Union is not only the Mecca of world bolshevism but is also a functioning national state. In the latter character it possesses certain immediate objectives, which from time to time, may be at variance with the long-run objectives of international communism and those of specific Communist parties abroad. Furthermore, if the U. S. S. R. is to operate in a world of national states, there are certain minima of conduct which must be observed.

During the years following the First World War, the Soviet Union sought to reap advantages in the civil disturbances of China, and to demonstrate in China its anti-imperialist principles and practices. In a divided China this meant a complex policy, and at times a contradictory one, with incompatible promises to conflicting elements.

As early as January 26, 1923, Joffe, the Comintern agent to China, issued a joint statement with Sun Yat-sen at Shanghai, which declared:

> Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.

Other parts of the same statement stipulated that Russia gave up all Czarist claims in Manchuria, and that Russia had no desire to separate Outer Mongolia from China. Both of these interests of Russia were reestablished, and accepted by the United States, at the Yalta Conference in 1945.

The meaning of Russian espousal of Chinese unity was demonstrated in the agreement of May 31, 1924, signed with the Peiping government, 16 months later than the agreement reached with Sun Yat-sen. The sixth article of this agreement made the customary provisions that neither side would attempt to undermine the other.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ART. VI. The governments of the two contracting parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit within their respective territories the existence and (or) activities of any organizations, or groups, whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the governments of either contracting party.

The governments of the two contracting parties further pledge themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political or social systems of either contracting party.

This agreement, like the other, also foreswore any interest in annexing Mongolia and certified the surrender of concessions. *The Soviet Union was thus bound by agreements to friendship and loyalty with both sides of a civil war in China.* On both sides it was bound by terms which meant to the Soviet that China would prevent any anti-Bolshevik organization from working in China, but did not mean that Russia would deny the auspices and facilities of the Comintern to Chinese Communists.

In 1927 the new Nationalist Government at Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek did not renew relations with the U. S. S. R. The Soviet Union, however, at no time gave diplomatic endorsement to the Chinese Communists despite the fact that by 1931 they had established a weak but independent government in central China with the direction and approval of the Comintern. On the contrary, the Soviet Union renewed relations with Chiang Kai-shek's government on December 12, 1932, at the very time when the Chinese Reds were denouncing the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang. And when the Generalissimo led China in the war of resistance against the Japanese, the U. S. S. R. sent material aid to the National Government of China and not to Communist China.

D. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR AGAINST COMMUNISM

The great northward drive of the Kuomintang armies from their base area around Canton began in July 1926. Success was immediate and continuous. The advance reached the Yangtse River in the spring of 1927, taking Nanking in March and Shanghai soon after.

Up to the time of the capture of Nanking the discipline of the national armies had been remarkable. By that time however, victory was assured; and it was at Nanking that certain divisions, in which Communist influence was strong, broke discipline and sacked the city, with excesses against foreigners and against upper-class elements. This was the first instance after the establishment of the United Front when the Communist aims and methods were clearly revealed. At this point the United Front dissolved.

The world situation and the situation in Moscow were involved in this as well as the situation in China itself. In China, the Canton government, which was under very strong Communist influence, moved to Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek, commanding the armies in the north, set up an independent headquarters first at Nanchang, then at Nanking, and presently denounced the Wuhan government. In April he struck against the Communists in Shanghai and in all other areas under his control. The suppression was swift and bloody but incomplete.

In Moscow, Lenin was dead, and the struggle for survival among his heirs was in its critical phase. Trotsky was demanding a direct thrust for revolution in China. Stalin was maintaining the line of the united

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

front. This controversy did not add anything to the trust of the conservative Kuomintang in the alliance. It was a part of the conditions when Chiang decided to crush the Communists. It became the fulcrum also of the great Stalin-Trotsky split that ended in Trotsky's exile from Russia.

The advance of the Communist-influenced national forces to central and northern China caused a severe flurry in the dove cotes of international business interests. British interests, appreciating the difference between the Kuomintang and the Communists shifted from opposition to support of Chiang's government at Nanking.

The position of the Wuhan government rapidly grew weaker, and the Communists turned their backs on it in July. The surviving Communists from the Yangtse and the north fled southward and were joined by those from Wuhan. The Russian advisers left China.

The Communists seeking survival for the moment gathered together, took control of a small area, organized an army, and thus stumbled upon the most distinctive feature of Chinese communism, the complete control of a region in advance of national success. They set up a Soviet system at first, and undertook radical measures of socialization. From 1928 to 1930 they recuperated their strength. Their army was only about 10,000 in 1928, and by 1930 was reported to number 62,000. In 1931 they were able to hold a congress of soviets and adopt a constitution for Soviet China.

The National Government at Nanking was busy at this time completing its conquest of north China. It was not until 1930 that it was able to undertake an offensive against the Soviets that had risen in Kiangsi Province. The first offensive was only the first of many. It was the sixth one, in 1934, that dislodged the Communists. In November 1934 the Communists started their famous "long march" from Kiangsi Province in south central China. Their objective was to unite with other islands of Chinese communism and to reach a new, remote, and secure area. A year later they had reached Shensi Province in the northwest where they settled down and where the city of Yenan became their capital.

The war between the Kuomintang and the Communists is one of the most obscure episodes of modern history. The Communists were harried from pillar to post but never decisively defeated. They had no such thing as a base of vital importance. Their logistics were so simple and rudimentary that their entire system of supply, recruitment, and subsistence could migrate. Fighting at times was heavy, and economic disruption to the areas fought over was severe. Kiangsi, a populous Province that saw much of the worst of it, had about 25,000,000 people before, and only about half as many afterward. That gives a measure of the unknown savagery and bitterness of some phases of this war. The casualties to the population of China outnumbered by many times the ostensible number of all the soldiers ever engaged.

This unparalleled savagery was introduced into Chinese domestic warfare by the Communists. It was customary in the old wars of China for any local population to welcome any incoming army, present gifts of rice, and equally readily welcome the next invaders in the same manner. It was the Communists who changed this. They were welcomed in some parts of Kiangsi when they first appeared,

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

were then driven out, and later returned once more. Upon their return they massacred the people wholesale for "treacherously" welcoming the Kuomintang forces.

The Kuomintang at the time had German military advisers, first Seeckt, famous as the founder of the postwar Reichswehr, then Falkenhausen, rated as one of the most brilliant of German soldiers and later numbered among the anti-Nazi opposition in Germany. There were times when the National forces herded the Red army into and through the territory of a refractory war lord, thus disposing of the war lord with finality, and driving the Communists on to a new area.

Such warfare as this is evidence of many things that even experts on China do not always notice. The Communists could migrate, remain a force in being, and make any new community their temporary base; most of the war lords could not. We know by this alone that the Communists had doctrine and organization in a sense in which the war lords had none. The fighting was between fairly small armies, yet the aggregate human losses were tremendous. We know by this that the war was savage. The Communists were free of dependence on any fixed base. We know by this that the weapons were simple. The Communists when divided succeeded in regrouping. We know by this that their discipline and loyalty was superior to the temptation to quit when quitting was possible. The Communists maintained the civil war on regional lines of division for years, with the region changing. We know by this better than by anything else how thin is the crust of national order in China, how local is Chinese economic life. Nothing like this has occurred in Europe since Charles Martel stopped the Saracens at Tours in the eighth century.

By 1936 one full cycle of peace and war between communism and the Kuomintang had been completed. Communism had become a force too great to be suppressed by any means available to the National Government. It had transferred the base of its power from the southeast to the northwest. Non-Communist China had been unified, but the old disunion of the regional war lords had been replaced by the far more threatening disunion represented by Yenan. In the meantime other clouds had risen on the Asiatic skies, as the world depression brought weakness to some powers, short-lived experiments in deflationary economics, dissolution of old forces, and the rise of aggressive efforts to solve by the sword all those problems that were being solved too slowly by the mind. In 1931 Japan began to move into Manchuria. The turning of events toward the Second World War had begun, and China was one of the places where the focus was sharpest.

E. THE COMMUNIST LINE ON THE OPEN ISSUES

The factors that distinguish the problem of the united front in such a country as China from the same problem in Europe shape the dominant issues on which the Communists chose to base their appeal. The lack of industry means that the proletariat is small at best. The relative importance of the peasants in such a country is far greater than in Europe. The whole class structure is remote from the conditions predicted by Marxist theory. The Nationalist movement is the nearest thing to a major force moving toward the Communist revolution. The Communists could make no headway if they opposed

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

it. They may be outmaneuvered if they permit it to grow too strong. So they must use the appeals that will attract the most support to themselves, no matter how irrelevant these may be to the classical issues of economic capitalism that most concerned Karl Marx.

Among the domestic problems of China the Communists make much, in their propaganda, of the land problem, and this sometimes causes exaggerated impressions outside China as to the character of this problem. Actually in China more than half of the peasants own their own land, and only about a quarter are outright tenants. There are few very large estates, most of the landlords owning relatively little land themselves and landlordism is declining rather than increasing. The situation is not at all analogous to some countries in Europe, for example, where the major part of the land was until recently, and in some of which it still is, in a few very large holdings. In China the problem is more the simple shortage of land in relation to population. In some areas the problem of tenancy is more acute than in others, and there are even some areas where serfdom can be found, that is, the bondage of peasants to the soil owned by landlords. Such matters as inheritance laws, and provision of seeds, fertilizer, equipment, taxation, roads, and other matters enter into the relations between landlords and tenants as well as land tenure itself. The problem is not by any means so negligible as to make it worthless as a propaganda and political issue to the Communists, but neither must it be judged by any familiar western analog. The promises of the Chinese Communists to break up and distribute the large estates have probably had as much effect in misleading foreign opinion as they have had in attracting native support.[5] The Communists in March 1948 adopted a new statement of their policy on the land problem, providing in particular that no more than 3 percent of the families in any district should be treated as landlords and no more than 5 percent as Kulaks (rich peasants) in order to restrict the overenthusiastic liquidation practices sometimes followed.

This does not mean however, that those observers have been right who have held that the Chinese Communists have solutions for the most pressing economic and social problems of China. There are two fallacies about this view. First, the Communists have never faced the food problem straight, with the cities to feed as well as the land to distribute. Their solution for the land problem is a demagogic trick under these conditions making future trouble for the sake of immediate advantage. Second, the Communist solution under conditions where they have not full power, when they are eager to win adherents and allies through popular-front tactics, are not in fact the real Communist solutions. They distribute land as a first measure. But they did this in Russia in 1918, they did it in the Balkans in 1946. They move on to the collectivization of agriculture with ruthless force as soon as their power, on a military basis, is secured. This means that the Communist policy cannot be measured as moderate in any real sense by its moderation in a particular phase. It also means that its economic success in building Communist power for world revolution must not be measured by any particular phase. And it finally means that Communist solutions, however effective for the strategy

[5] Dr. John Lossing Buck has done more than any other American to explain the facts of the land situation in China.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

of the world revolution, do not regard humanity as anything but means to be used in the drive for universal power. Their land policy, as an appeal to the poorer peasants in a backward country, is a parallel for their policy on higher wages in industrial countries. They pursue the latter without regard to economic realities or the danger of inflation, for economic chaos is no peril to them. The same logic exactly applies to their land policy in China.

Aside from land holdings, other private property, provided it is not large, is ostensibly free from interference. This tolerance of small private business is reminiscent of the new economic policy adopted by Lenin as a necessary transition step for Russia in 1921. It also is in harmony with the doctrine of the new democracy as a similar transition step in politics. And it permits the Communists to maintain an uncompromised line on socialism, while at the same time holding out the promise of no immediate disturbance to as many as possible, and splitting the commercial and industrial groups to be swallowed in installments instead of all at once.

The other Chinese issue of which the Communists make much is imperialism. Modern nationalism in China has always had strong overtones of militant antiforeignism, easily arousable to the riot pitch. From the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century, through the post-World War I student riots and the northward march of the Kuomintang, to the anti-Russian, anti-British, and anti-American riots of the last 3 years, the same note of fear and disdain of foreign imperialism is evident. Chinese Communists are fully aware of this fact. Although they now ignore the presence of Soviet control in Dairen and Port Arthur, they have tried to exploit the relationship between the United States and the Central Government. They attach a stigma to the fact that the United States is aiding President Chiang, labeling him "the running dog of American imperialism," and they stress repeatedly that American forces in China are training Chinese to kill Chinese with American weapons.

In exploiting this issue they demonstrate how easy it is to use an established body of opinion for a twisted purpose. It is natural today that foreign capital is not attracted by the conditions of risk in China except on terms of a high premium in the shape of possible windfall profit. The Communist line takes any reluctance to invest in China at low interest or without interest as greedy capitalism, demands free aid, and interprets free aid as political domination. In the complexity of the situation such a tactic of "playing both ends against the middle" is both facile and effective.

Imperialism is an outwardly simple matter, typified in western eyes by the ambitions of Cecil Rhodes and the British conquest of the Boer Republics in 1902. In Communist thinking it is a more involved matter, developed by Lenin in his "Imperialism" into an analysis of the economic conditions of advanced capitalism, drifting toward monopoly and toward ever sharpening competition for world markets, leading to political imperialism in order to secure larger market areas. This leads into the Marxist habit of interpreting any and all influence by an advanced industrial country in a colonial or nonindustrial country as imperialism, willy-nilly. The Marxist pretense that their own analysis is more sophisticated than any other is protected from debunking by the simple fact that the subject is actually very complex.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

They are thus left free to assert the imperialist character of every foreign influence except that of the Soviet, which is ipso facto the opposite by its sloganized use in their vocabulary.

This leads them to support rising movements of national consciousness in the backward countries. On the one hand, such movements seem to be a necessary step in the advance of backward countries. On the other hand, they exert a most convenient leverage for upsetting the stability of the non-Soviet world, and for weakening the leading non-Communist countries of Europe. In either way they affect the balance of power in a manner that serves Soviet interest.

F. THE ASSETS OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

The Communist Party in China has grown from nothing to become one of the half dozen strongest Communist Parties in the world. It started as a few intellectual groups, and now numbers 2,000,000 by its own account. It now has an effective army, and rules over an area with as many people as the United States.

Its stand on the domestic economic and social issues of China is scarcely an explanation of this growth. But the rise of Chinese communism is far from inexplicable. It rests on five main elements, first, the aid and leadership of world communism; second, the Chinese Red Army; third, the control of territory; fourth, the propaganda value of any general doctrine in the absence of any clear and concise competitor; and fifth, the advantages accruing from the conditions of war.

The aid given by world communism to Chinese communism before World War II was in ideas and leadership and advice rather than in substantial material form. In the early years, before the break of the united front in 1927, the little material aid that came from Russia went to the Canton Government dominated by the Kuomintang. During the first Communist civil war, from 1927 to 1935, the Chinese Communists had no means of communication with Russia that could carry substantial aid. Even during the Second World War material aid by Russia to China, when there was any, was to the National Government rather than to Yenan. Not until 1945 when the Soviet Union entered the far eastern war and occupied Manchuria did this change, and by then the growth of Chinese communism had already gone far.

The significance of Russia to the native communism of any other country depends very much on the character of the country concerned. It is not at all the same to America on the one hand and to China on the other. Russia is a symbol of nearly opposite meaning in the two cases. To the Chinese, Russia is a far more powerful nation today than their own. It has faced problems of modern technical progress similar to their own, setting out to advance as rapidly as possible and proving that it has a workable solution, though a rough one. The difference between the Russian record in the First World War and the Second is a crude but unescapable measure of advance that no sophistication can discount. Russia for the greater part, shares with China the pell-mell impact of modern science out of the sequence in which the West has developed it. Russia like China is getting busses before rails, using oil for energy before developing a full-fledged coal-burning economy, is using radios before telephones become general, is familiar

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

with the airplane before most of her people have seen plumbing. Russia has faced the greatest of Chinese problems, the problem of rapid shift of population from subsistence agriculture to urbanized industry. Nehru of India has voiced the deep impression that the U. S. S. R. makes on even a non-Communist Asiatic, puzzled and pessimistic at the inevitable task of fusing the science of the West in the culture of the Orient. To a billion human souls in the East, Russia is not just what she seems to western eyes: the projection into modern times of the prototype of the police state, with a terrorism as unblanching as that of Ivan the Terrible; nor does she seem to be, in her technical progress, just the copyist and pursuer of the advanced nations; Russia is to many eastern eyes the leader, the demonstrator of how one of the backward can meet the problem. *The prestige value of Russia as a symbol of achievement to such a country as China must not be looked at through American eyes. We do not wear the same glasses.*

The undemocratic character of communism also makes it, in ways which we seldom realize, a more readily receivable innovation for countries that have never known democracy than the more advanced political goods offered by the west. It is sometimes forgotten that communism originated as the bitter observations of Marx and Engels upon society in western European countries in the mid-nineteenth century, a time when railroads were growing from their first beginnings, when illiteracy was still high, when universal education was still a thing of the future, and when Britain had had its first great reform bill extending the suffrage, in 1832, but had not yet had its second one, in 1867. There are many ways in which the peoples of Asia and parts of other continents are in about the same sort of stage of economic and political development. Communism has progressively shifted its main interest toward these countries, and has progressively found in them its most productive fields of activity. It is as if to pass through the stage at which western Europe found itself in 1850 necessarily involves the risks of finding Marxism more pertinent, more applicable, and more dangerous than at any earlier or later stage.

The contribution of Moscow to Chinese communism, then, was its ideology, the system of planning for strategy and tactics, the schooling supplied in Moscow to the leading cadres of young Chinese Communists. This provided the skill, the art, the technique by which to exploit the motives of progressive movements, the black art of having a military force without a formal government, the turning of collaboration with larger groups into the use of those groups for Communist ends, the finesse by which to espouse what many desire without compromising the drive for power. In short it was the modern technique of revolution, the know-how of the politics of violence, made adaptable to China partly by Moscow and partly by native Chinese Communists like Mao Tse-tung.

The maintenance of the Red Army of China has been indispensable to the practice of these arts. This army was founded in 1926 to 1928, when Chinese communism was driven into the back areas, and tried the experiment of setting up a Soviet republic. It was thus originated in connection with an attempt to set up a full-fledged government. The device of a government was found inconvenient, because it required a responsible national policy for city and country

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

alike, accepted civil war as a condition until final victory, and made it impossible to use democratic slogans misleading to the world. So the attempt to maintain a Soviet republic was abandoned. But having an army, they kept the army.

The Chinese Red Army has proved very effective. The core of the force has possessed a high degree of loyalty and revolutionary consciousness. Its tactics have been well devised for the role of military underdog, in regions with poor communications, using simple if not primitive arms, making the most of guerrilla operations and counting heavily upon well-indoctrinated leadership. Foreign journalists have often been very impressed by what they took to be its "democratic" character, and its close ties of sympathy with the people. But there has been another side, not only reported by others but acknowledged by the Communists, the reflection of the realistic attraction of loot, livelihood and brigandage to leaderless men in a torn society. Toward the end of the recent war Mao Tse-tung found it necessary to point out that—

> The influence of militaristic habits of the troops of Chinese war lords still exist among our troops. * * * In 1945, all bad phenomena in relations between officers and men such as beating, cursing, neglecting food supplies * * * and even such evil habits * * * as insulting and shooting deserters, etc.; should be fundamentally rooted out.[6]

The army is the necessary basis for the greatest element in Chinese Communist strength, the control of territory. No area in China has become Communist since 1928 otherwise than through military occupation. No Communist area has been lost otherwise than by driving them out. In spite of the relatively rudimentary nature of the central Communist agencies, their uniformly indoctrinated local leaders and their army are able to insure control of any area they get their hands on, and to count its population as part of the population of Communist China.

That this territorial control based on an army is not the only element in their strength is clear from the fact that they won enough converts before they controlled any territory to take over an area when brought together. But that it is the main feature of their rise since 1927 is equally clear. In the areas of its control it enjoys a monopoly of propaganda and controls the schools. It brings to bear the massive factors that make all men, regardless of opinion, dependent upon the continuity of elementary order, the police, the fire department, the roads, the money, and the law by which one does the daily shopping. Communism wins few converts in areas of open competition. It has never in history won a majority in that way. But it acquires millions of involuntary followers of a sort when it controls a region. By merely trying to go on living as best they can, the people who are most indifferent contribute to the strength of the society they live in, and to the power of those who control it. Their income is part of the "national income" of the area, and whatever part of the "national income" can be peeled off for taxes or for any organized social or political action is larger because they are there.

Within this area they are stronger, like any government, in proportion to the appeal that their policies and propaganda make to the people. They are also stronger insofar as they appeal to others out-

[6] Mao Tse-tung, Our Task in 1945, pp. 6–7.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

side the closed area of control. In this connection the strength given by the propagation of ideas rests in part, but only in slight part, upon the direct practicality of their solutions for concrete problems. It rests far more on the general cogency of the whole system of thought, with its broad frame of reference extending over the past, present, and future and rationalizing world relations. The Communist solution of a labor problem in Tientsin may close up an industry instead of gaining higher wages, as Communist-led labor struggles did in New Bedford and Fall River in the 1920's. Their attack on the land problem may cut rather than raise the productivity of the land and cut off food to the cities. Chinese communism has proved itself more adept to destroy cities than to govern them. But the Chinese people are faced with an apocalypse, and almost any rationalization of their situation makes life a little more bearable. Their ancient doctrines no longer offer any practical guidance in many of the new problems they face. They have not developed the western habit of faith in a legislative process, in future majority decisions to solve problems not yet solved, in ways that cannot, but need not, be foreseen. They cannot wait to muddle through, and have no experience in their own past that would prepare them to believe in it. The problems may transcend the Communist solutions, but seem to transcend all solutions yet offered.

Many observers take Communist influence as a surprising thing, as if the Chinese should reject Communist pretenses because we know that the pretenses are false. There is another side. Communism comes to Chinese people with at least pretended solutions to all problems. Some of its impact may be gathered from the remarks of Vincent Sheean:

> In my first meeting with the Bolshevik philosophy in action * * * I was disturbed by the precision with which it answered the questions I had begun to think unanswerable—the questions of a sensible relationship between the one life and the many. Whether the Bolshevik solutions were the correct ones was another matter.[7]

Sheean's first close contact with bolshevism was through Borodin in China in the early twenties, which makes his testimony all the more pertinent.

Communism gained great general prestige in the early years of the depression for it had taught that world capitalism was unstable, and the collapse had come. During the thirties the Communists recognized some issues, as in Spain or at the time of Munich, rightly or wrongly, as one may choose, but at any rate far more clearly than much of world opinion. Communism claims to know infallibly where we are, whence we come, and where we are going. The little man migrating before Japanese invasion, or striking for higher pay, or evading his taxes, likes to feel in his conscience that the action makes sense, and the Communists tell him that it does and how it does.

Finally, the conditions of civil and international war in an agrarian country work to Communist advantage in many direct and indirect ways. When the Japanese held the great cities of China, and trade between city and country was dislocated anyhow, it could cause little further economic loss if the Communists undertook redistribution of land and ended the production of a salable surplus in the process.

[7] Vincent Sheean, Personal History, p. 191.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

When the Communists seize all the larger farms and distribute them among the poor peasants, while the Japanese hold the cities it makes little trouble. The normal transport of food to the cities is cut off, the food-producing area might as well eat it up, the consumption of food can rise even if the production declines. The Japanese had the burden of care for feeding the cities. The same is true where the National Government holds the cities. Communism, pretending that it has no formal government, is immune to charges of irresponsibility for national welfare.

The wars have also torn up Chinese society as if with a plow and a harrow. Where hundreds of millions had lived and died without traveling 10 miles away from the ancestral graves, armies have marched and countermarched, weary millions have trekked away from their homes and back again. War itself has become the custom, and communism does not bear the onus of starting it.

Long-drawn-out war, frequently reaching the brink of total defeat, has a deeply corrosive and disintegrating effect upon the morale of many of the groups that are most important in the strength of a community. The wars in China have brought severe inflation. They have threatened the basic political continuity of China for a decade at least. The Chinese have not, for much longer than a decade, been able to take for granted, as Americans take for granted, that the basic political order of the present is stable, and that all private calculations can be based on such an assumption. Thus the Chinese commercial class cannot make long-term contracts with confidence that the Chinese state will endure as long as the contract. They cannot lend on the assumption that money will retain any calculable value when repayment is due. The intellectual classes cannot look forward to reasonable security on a moderate salary for the economic aspects of professional status are wholly insecure. Business deals beyond a narrow local area are inhibited by the uncertainties of the ever-shifting fronts of the variety of wars. Corruption thrives on these conditions, but corruption is but one aspect of the consequences. The tendency to milk the soil instead of conserving it, to spend before money loses value instead of saving, to reap a quick profit instead of engaging in long-term constructive efforts, to maintain what the monetary economists call "liquidity of assets" but in easily salable goods rather than money—all these underlie the corruption. Corruption is only the froth and foam on the crest of this massive ground swell of civic demoralization.

War, as long as it was international as well as civil, also offered the Chinese Communists remarkable opportunities to gain strength while arranging that their opponents would be weakened. But this is more fully discussed in connection with the united front of 1937 to 1945 at a later point. It also, and most of all, provided the easy and cheap opportunity for intervention in the Far East by the U. S. S. R., bringing the Red Army of the Soviet Union into Manchuria and Korea. This meant the more or less clandestine transfer of surrendered Japanese war material to the Chinese Red Army, the gutting of Manchurian industry, and with it the gutting of any early chance for a sound Chinese economy under the Chinese National Government, and the facilitation of Chinese Communist expansion in the northeast. The consequence, whatever the intentions of all concerned, was a massive shift in the relative strength and prospects of the two great groups in China in favor of the Communists.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

3. The Second United Front

A. JAPANESE EXPANSION

On September 17, 1931, a bomb exploded on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden. This bomb became the incident that started a train of events ending only in the Japanese surrender in 1945. First the Japanese moved into Manchuria and set up Manchukuo, the government that served as the early model for what we know as satellites. By November 19 the Japanese had captured the city of Tsitsihar, and by the end of the year the Chinese forces in the area had withdrawn south of the Great Wall.

In the following spring, on March 20, 1932, the Japanese attacked at Shanghai, on the excuse of what they took to be provocative incidents. The Chinese Nineteenth Route Army put up a stout defense, but was defeated after about 2 weeks of bloody fighting. By May 5, the Japanese, under pressure from the world signed a truce, and agreed to move out again.

This Shanghai incident was an important milestone. It marked the fact that Chinese nationalism was still only half-grown. Had it been full-grown in the habitual sentiments of the Chinese people a formal war with Japan would have been as automatic as it was for the United States after Pearl Harbor. It also marked the fact that Japanese aggression was still unsure of itself, still experimental, still ready to back down from a false start.

In the early months of 1933 the Japanese resumed the offensive, moving into the Chinese Provinces just below Manchuria and across the Great Wall. Again the fighting was localized, the Chinese national troops in the area fighting a futile defense, while the National Government did not accept war. The Japanese pressure remained constant from then on, and ever more threatening. The Chinese Communists seized upon this, "declared war" on the Japanese, and brought all possible pressure through propaganda to make the National Government do the same. The effectiveness of the Communist line increased steadily, as Japanese pressure rose and Chinese nationalism also grew stronger. In 1933 Wang Ming advised the Comintern in Moscow that—

> the armed national defense against the division of China by the imperialists became the axis around which all political questions of present-day China turn. Whoever comes out victorious in this question will be the master of the situation in China. This is known not only to us, but also to our enemies, to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.

But Generalissimo Chiang had to bear the responsibility for the conduct of China's foreign affairs, while the Communists were free not only to declare war on Japan but to embarrass the Government's effort to avoid a precipitous break with the Japanese. They organized anti-Japanese mass movements, presented the Kuomintang with demands to arm the masses, encouraged coalitions of non-Communist groups and military factions opposing Japan, and generally sought to arouse popular hatred of Japan to a fever pitch. The Central Government was faced finally with the alternatives of either resisting Japan immediately or suppressing patriotic resentment against Japanese aggression. Until Chinese patriotism became a dominant force it had to choose the latter course. Whereupon the Chinese Communists were

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

able to accuse Chiang Kai-shek of pro-Japanese sentiment and contend that—

> the Soviet Government and the Red army were the only consistent fighters of the national-revolutionary war.

At the same time, of course, Moscow was doing everything possible in the face of repeated Japanese provocations to avoid giving the Japanese any excuse for declaring war on the U. S. S. R. The Chinese Communist line thus served the interests of the U. S. S. R. at the expense of China.

By the middle of the thirties, the potentially antagonistic strength of Germany and Japan on the flanks of the U. S. S. R. had reached alarming proportions. To meet this threat, the strategy of world communism was revised in 1935, and in the summer of that year the Comintern advised all Communist Parties to follow a line of promoting and participating in united-front governments with other political groups opposed to fascism.

In China, the Communist Party which prior to this order had sought to brand the Kuomintang leaders as traitors now reversed its tactics. In a 1936 report to the Comintern, Wang Ming suggested that—

> The Communists should not place the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek in the same category as the Japanese plunderers * * *.

He went on to explain that the Chinese Communists were trying to win over the Kuomintang or a decisive majority of that organization to a unified resistance,

> just as our brother Communist Parties in France and Spain have already achieved the United People's Front.

Meanwhile the western world was also drifting toward the Third World War through the rise of Hitler to control of Germany in 1933, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936, the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the Spanish Civil War. Britain and France, preoccupied with fruitless shifts of appeasement and resistance in Europe, and with depression problems, gave little support to the efforts of the United States to mobilize world pressure, in 1931 and later, and the United States showed no steady hand itself.

The rising power of nazism in Europe brought the "popular front" policy of the middle thirties by the Communists in France and elsewhere, and a renewed stimulus to the "united front" policy in China. But it was not until after the "Sian incident" in December 1936, and the Marco Polo Bridge incident in the summer of 1937 that a united front was formed again in China.

In 1936, the Manchurian General Chang Hsueh-liang was at Sian in Shensi Province in charge of Communist suppression. The Red slogans for ending the civil war and resisting Japan had been particularly effective among his troops since they had been driven out of their homeland by the Japanese. As a result, the suppressive campaign had come practically to a standstill. Chang Hsueh-liang, himself, was in contact with the Communist high command. The Communist line at this time was all-out for fighting the Japanese first and dealing with the problem of national unity afterward. Chiang was insisting upon unity first, under the National Government, as the necessary first step toward effective resistance to Japan.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The Communist line was designed to serve Soviet interests first, by causing the Japanese the most immediate trouble, thus relieving the threat to the Soviet Far Eastern province at a time when the Soviet fear of Germany was acute, and at the same time exerting maximum leverage toward a Communist victory out of the general disorder and break-down.

When Chiang Kai-shek hurried to Sian in December 1936 to view the situation first-hand, he was seized by Chang and other high-ranking Manchurian officers. He was held prisoner for a fortnight, and his life and the fate of the nation hung in balance. Conferences went on incessantly between Communists, Nationalists, and Manchurians. When Chiang was returned to Nanking unharmed, the country rejoiced. Although the Generalissimo had made no public commitment, the people—quite correctly—took his release to signify that the end of the civil war had come and that a united China would face Japan. *Thus was brought on the war against Japan, the war that Chiang had striven to avoid or to postpone. And so did China with her blistered fingers start pulling the Soviet's chestnuts from the fire, 8 years before the time when Japan could be defeated.*

The tentative united front and truce arranged at Sian was confirmed in September 1937 under new circumstances. The Sino-Japanese war started on July 7, 1937, when the Japanese moved again and the National Government of China this time accepted war. This eliminated the issue that the Communists had made predominant in their propaganda, and provided both the need for unity and the basis of a program. The war went badly from the start; the Japanese quickly taking Peiping and Shanghai, and reaching Nanking in December. The National Government had to move from Nanking, eventually to Chungking. Thus began the second experiment in cooperation by the Kuomintang with Chinese communism, an experiment that was to last through 8 years.

B. THE AGREEMENT OF 1937

The united front, informally established at Sian in December 1936, and made the subject of detailed Communist proposals in February 1937, was made a matter of agreement through announcements of both sides on September 22 and 23, 1937, a little more than 2 months after the war with Japan began.

At this time the Communists entered into a united-front agreement with the National Government, and issued a statement on September 22, 1937, pledging the following four points:

(1) The Communist Party shall strive for the realization of Sun Yat-sen's three principles of the people, which answer the present-day need of China.

(2) It shall abandon the policy of armed insurrection against the Kuomintang regime, the policy of Red propaganda, and the policy of land confiscation.

(3) It shall abolish the Soviet Government and institute a system of democracy, so that the nation may be politically united.

(4) It shall abolish the Red army as such, and allow it to be incorporated into the National army and placed under the command of the National Military Council. The Red army, thus recognized, shall await orders to proceed to fight on any front.

The comments attributed to Mao Tse-tung, and certainly expressive of the party line, shortly afterward explained the meaning of this agree-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ment so that the leading groups of Chinese Communists would understand it.

The war between China and Japan is an excellent opportunity for the development of our party. Our determined policy is 70 percent self-development, 20 percent compromise, and 10 percent fight the Japanese. For the sake of familiarizing our comrades in their work, so that even when they are cut off from headquarters they can still strive toward the common goal, I like to point out to our comrades the above policy.

He further explained that the policy laid down would be followed in three stages.

The first stage is to compromise with the Kuomintang, with the view of maintaining our existence. The second stage is to fight for a balance of power vis-à-vis the Kuomintang to achieve an equilibrium. The third stage is to infiltrate deeply into central China, to establish bases there, in order to launch counter offensives against the Kuomintang, with the view of taking away from the Kuomintang its leading position.

In October 1937 the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution on "The future of the war of resistance and the policies of the Chinese Communist Party." This also made statements explaining the policy of the united front:

If the war results in victory, the Kuomintang Army will have been reduced to the minimum, and the Red army will have been unceasingly expanded. Thus, victory would lead directly to the victory of the "October revolution." If the war is lost, China would be divided into three parts; Japan in Manchuria and north China; Kuomintang in southwestern China; the Communist Party in northwestern China. If the war is totally lost, the Kuomintang would be completely liquidated, and the Communist Party would become an underground party. * * * In Chinese politics, armed force is the determining factor; we must therefore, during the war, do our very best to expand our armed might so that we may lay the foundation upon which we could seize revolutionary leadership.

The same interpretation that was given to the leading cadres in the statements already quoted was laid out in more explicit terms for the rank and file.

The Chinese Communist Party at the present anti-Japanese stage, in its agreement and cooperation with the Kuomintang, was not to surrender or to sell itself out, but:

(1) To abandon the past unwalkable road and to find out another walkable way which would lead to the proletariat revolution.

(2) To protect the development of secret activities in order to gain strength among the great masses.

(3) To give the revolution a time of rest, to conserve strength, and to prepare for new kinds of work.

(4) To abandon the openly aggressive strategy for the present and to change to a strategy of retreat.

(5) The battle fatigue demands the preservation of the revolutionary strength; therefore, to abandon the external name temporarily and to preserve the essence in order to achieve future greater victory.

(6) The reorganization of the Red army into the national revolutionary army was merely the change of an insignia; it was not a reorganization. The soviet government was abolished and it was changed to a "special zone government," but its substance still remains unchanged.

(7) The temporary agreement now is to obtain the party's emancipation, freedom of speech, freedom of social gatherings, and the improvement of the people's living.[8]

One may think that this Communist calculation of the value of the united front of 1937 is too fancy to be realistic. But the consequences

[8] From The Strategic Road of the Chinese Communist Party, by Chang Hao (Lin Yu-yin), 1938.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

have been clear, and have been as the Communists anticipated. In 1935 and 1936 the Chinese Communists were in control of a small area in three provinces, and had only 50,000 troops or so. This they have stated themselves. Before the end of the war they had expanded to control of more than a hundred million people, and had half a million more or less armed troops. Now they have a million and a half troops with ample arms. The National Government was forced in 1937, to surrender to them the sole claim to patriotic resistance to the Japanese or exercise the claim itself. The fighting at Shanghai, the defense of Jehol, and the long-drawn-out disruption of invasion reaching Canton and Hankow and Changsha ruined the national economy and finances, made the army the first charge for a decade, stopped all projects for reform, and played the whole process of Chinese history to Communist advantage.

In the first stages of the war the superficial unity was well maintained. Late in 1937 the Communists organized a border government in north China with the consent of the Generalissimo. By 1940 they had control of parts of Shensi, Hopei, and Chahar about equal to Italy in size. Within this area they established strong bases from which to operate their guerrilla tactics, across and behind Japanese lines. During this period the Communists played down their violent social and economic measures, but in no way abandoned their basic Communist policies. Under the banner of nationalism and resistance they intensified their mass educational work, and sought to rally patriotic feeling in support of the Red army under its new name of Eighth Route Army.

The problem of how to utilize a united front with other parties and at the same time to maintain the identity and character of a strictly Communist army, was thus posed for the Chinese Communists several years before any parallel situation arose in any of the "resistance" movements in Europe. The continuity of existence of the Chinese Red Army, before, during, and after its abolition and incorporation into the national army is proof that the problem was successfully solved. This also measures the superficiality of the unity involved. It should stand as the foremost illustration of the meaning that Communists give to collaboration, just as it stands in Communist eyes as the archetype of the tactics that worked so successfully in Yugoslavia and many other countries.

The nature of the so-called border government set up in the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia is well indicated by the annual report of its chairman, made on January 6, 1944. The most interesting passage reads as follows:

> Before last year serious defects existed in the working style of the Government. This was first shown by the lack of coherence and the tendency to be "independent" in the various departments of the Government, with the result that there were confusion and disorder regarding the issue of orders and decrees and differences in the system of administration, and the lower ranks did not know what to do. Last year we persisted in the democratic-centralized system of administration and realized the principle of unification in leadership. Second were the various tendencies of copying or following unconditionally the standards and practices of the old society that were not consistent with the actual conditions of the Border Region or were contrary to its actual needs. They mechanically applied in the Border Region what was being practiced in other parts of the country, thus "cutting the toes to fit the shoes." Last year, we firmly persisted in creating new ways of our own based on actual conditions of the Border Region,

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

and have reaped some harvests. The departments most seriously affected by this tendency, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice, began to have improvement. Third was the tendency of bureaucracy, which isolates us from the masses and is contrary to the interests of the masses. Some responsible members of the Government were even accused of being "like mandarins," and the secretaries "like bosses." However, after we firmly persisted in the policy that "responsible members should work with their own hands" and that "we should start from the masses and return to the masses," the tendency was corrected. Fourth was the tendency of liberalism, which found its expression in the nominal obedience of Government policies, in the neglect of discipline, in the indifference to the mistakes of other fellow workers, and in the want of alertness against bad elements. Last year, this tendency was corrected after the continued movement for purging non-Marxist ideology and for examining cadres. On the other hand, we had improvements in the mastery and thorough execution of policies. This should be accredited first to the ideology-purging movement, then to the struggle against the above-mentioned erroneous tendencies in our working style, and above all to the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung who acted as our helmsman, and of the Northwest Bureau of the C. C. P. headed by Comrade Kao Kang." [9]

To anyone who has read many of the annual reports to executive committees or soviets which make up an important part of basic Communist literature, this passage is an absolutely typical piece of Communist "self-criticism." Beyond this, the selection of the points to be criticized is pure communism. Sympathetic liberals may note with interest that liberalism is one of the great faults to be overcome. They may also note that "democratic centralism" [10] is accepted and familiar, with all its implications of iron party rule, made more explicit by the "movement for purging non-Marxist ideology."

As the Communist forces expanded, taking more and more men into their ranks, they moved outside the areas originally assigned them. Clashes with Chungking-recognized local authorities began to occur. In 1940 suspicions and tensions mounted rapidly and in December 1940 a large-scale armed conflict took place between the Communist-led New Fourth Army and Nationalist forces in the Yangtze Valley. The Central Government ordered the arrest of the commander of the New Fourth and the disbanding of the army.

Although further serious clashes were avoided, relations deteriorated steadily between the two principal cores of Free China's power, Nationalist Chungking and Communist Yenan. Several attempts to promote a political settlement proved unsuccessful. The New Fourth was not disbanded as had been ordered by the Central Government. On the contrary, both that army and the Eighth Route continued to grow in size and power. The Chinese Communists spread their military and political influence over large areas of China north of the Yangtze and in the rear of the Japanese lines.

Throughout the war with Japan the publicity from Communist China was excellent. The Communists were almost entirely remote from direct observation by the foreign press, and made the most of the opportunity to issue a stream of accounts of heroic exploits. Actually the story seems rather different. The Communists filled any vacuum of control that they could reach, behind or beyond the Jap lines. They avoided battle with the diligence they had learned in years of guerrilla warfare. The Japanese according to their own account suffered nearly a million casualties in the whole of the war in China,

[9] Annual Report of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government for the Year 1943, by Lin Tsu-han, Chairman, January 6, 1944, printed in English, August 1944, pp. 21–22.

[10] This point is discussed briefly in our report on The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, at p. 13.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

and less than 10 percent of these occurred in fighting the Communists. The Japanese consciously used their operations against the Communists as a sort of advanced training, accustoming troops to fire under arduous but not too dangerous conditions. *The art of playing two opponents against each other, subjecting them both to serious losses while building one's own strength, was practiced more effectively by Chinese communism than by any other country or group in the Second World War.*

C. THE NEW DEMOCRACY

Early in 1940 Mao Tse-tung, the chairman of the Politbureau of the Chinese Communist Party, produced a pamphlet called China's New Democracy. This pamphlet is the most important document for the understanding of world communism produced outside of Moscow since 1917. In it Mao was primarily concerned to develop a clear statement of Communist policy for the conditions presented by the second united front in China. He succeeded so well that he also provided the Kremlin with a formula applicable to many other areas as well, a formula that has had practical and effective application in Europe as well as in Asia.

This pamphlet has been available to students of Chinese communism for 8 years. Its meaning might have been thoroughly appreciated by anyone familiar with the historical development of Communist thinking and Communist strategy. Yet up to now it has had little effect on the varying opinions held as to the nature of Chinese communism. Non-Communist opinion on Chinese communism has varied widely, one school holding that it is merely Chinese agrarian liberalism while another holds that it is authentic Stalinism, while other schools of thought have adopted every shading in between these two positions. Each of these has found it possible to accommodate Mao's pamphlet to its own preconceptions. Those who hold Chinese communism to be moderate have found the pamphlet moderate, and vice versa. It is therefore important that the meaning of this pamphlet be given very close and rigorous consideration.

In order to arrive at a definition of what Mao's pamphlet means we should consider the various possibilities and arrive at a judgment between them. In order to do this we must first give a summary of what the pamphlet says and of Communist political policy based on it; then summarize the moderate interpretation, then endeavor to show what it would mean to a trained Communist, then try to judge what it should mean to us.

Mao writes like a lifelong Communist, with the directness, the hammering repetition, the simple sentence structure, and the abstract technicality of vocabulary familiar to readers of Lenin. His text is burdened with the terms of general sociology, painting a broad and at the same time brief outline of the position of China today in the whole course of world history in this age. Much of this can be neglected in order to concentrate upon the conclusions that he draws for Communist strategy in China.

First, he develops the idea that the Chinese revolution can be of a new type. Nineteenth century Marxism in Europe held that one revolution must mark the transition from feudalism to capitalist

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

democracy, to be followed later by a revolution marking the transition from capitalism to socialism. Mao accepts the same two steps for China. He holds however that the two steps need not be altogether separate, that they can be blended or fused into a continuous process, though with some sort of lull between them.

Second, he holds that the combined two-stage revolution will be conducted by a coalition of all progressive classes, excluding only the imperialist, feudal, and bureaucratic elements that comprise the Kuomintang. There will be—

> * * * a new type of revolution, wholly or partly led by the proletariat, the first stage of which aims at setting up a new democratic society, a new state of the combined dictatorship of all revolutionary classes.

This coalition "of all revolutionary classes," according to Mao, is made possible in such a situation as the one in China by the rapid and mixed development of the country, arriving at more advanced stages of economic and political development in some respects before the first phase has been passed in other respects. The Communists, or the "proletariat," according to this theory, therefore have a more important role to play in the development of democracy than in, let us say, nineteenth century Germany or France. They will be indispensable allies of the other classes and parties in the first phase of revolution, and will more rapidly assume a predominant role as the revolution proceeds to its second phase, turning from the class coalition into the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

This calls for, first, a sharp break in the pattern of class power to get rid of the anti-Communist elements, followed by a gradual shifting of power to the proletariat and the ultimate abolition of classes. Since by Communist definition all government represents a class dictatorship, this requires that the government between the two stages of the revolution be regarded as the dictatorship of the class coalition, based more on the non-Communist progressives at first and shifting more to the Communists later, but ostensibly at least, without any sharp revolutionary break.

Third, Mao calls for a relatively moderate brand of socialism for the interim period. The economic system of the "new democracy" will include state ownership of banks, industries, and commercial establishments "too large for private efforts." The landless and poor peasants, as usual, will receive adequate land from the confiscated estates of the large landlords. Most other private holdings and enterprises, provided they are not too large, will be permitted to continue. Full socialization will not be attempted immediately because—

> socialism is out of the question before the tasks of the present [democratic] revolution, the tasks of anti-imperialism and antifeudalism are fulfilled.

Fourth, this stage of coalition dictatorship and moderate socialism will be, according to Mao, in perfect accord with the "three principles" of Sun Yat-sen. The coalition will undertake a militant program to put the "three principles" into effect. It is only in the second stage of the new revolution that socialism will progress beyond the "three principles," and there is no indication given as to how soon this may occur.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Fifth, the Chinese people under the new revolution will firmly maintain a policy—

Taking the hand of friendship offered by the Socialist country, the Soviet Union, and the international proletariat.

The Chinese Communists have given practical meaning to the class coalition put forward by Mao. At their seventh national congress in Yenan early in 1945, they called on the National Government to relinquish one-party control and to put into effect a government of the "new democracy." This meant the formation of a cabinet which would include all groups, including the Communists. After many negotiations with the National Government all efforts to establish a cabinet with Communist membership at last failed, because the Communists never accepted terms which would have impaired their hope of seizing full power later. In spite of failure to attain the immediate political objectives of the "new democracy," it has nevertheless remained the political line and basis of propaganda of Chinese communism.

Such is the literal and superficial skeleton of the "new democracy." What has moderate opinion made of it?

In examining what moderate opinion has made out of the "new democracy" one must, to some extent, try to recapture the atmosphere of times past. From 1935 to 1939 the sense of danger from the Nazi menace drove anti-Nazi elements together, made them emotionally addicted to wishful hopes about the anti-Nazi coalition, emotionally impatient with the long drawn-out series of disappointments and nearly frantic at the towering cumulus of Nazi successes. The hopes that communism and western democracy could cooperate rose high at times in Spain, were clouded by the Soviet purges of 1937–38, rose again with the endeavors of Britain and France after Munich to organize the opposition to nazism, fell to the floor with the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, but burgeoned again as Nazi-Soviet relations deteriorated, and blossomed into full flower when Germany attacked Russia in 1941. The years of apparently effective cooperation between the Soviet and the west strengthened this hope into a faith for many, who could see all good things brought closer by it, and who could not imagine a peace for the world without it.

To interpret any evidence in accordance with this faith in the harmony between communism and democracy is therefor a habit as well as an inclination. It has become a developed system of thinking, not a mere improvization. If we look at the "new democracy" through this kind of viewpoint, try to put on the kind of glasses that these people wear, what would we see in the line laid down by Mao Tse-tung?

The "soft" or favorable interpretation of the "new democracy" held by those who took it at face value, was generally as follows:

> The Communists (in this wishful dream) have learned much from experience, especially from their mistakes in Germany that assisted Hitler's rise. They have changed many of their views, and they are not as revolutionary as they once were. They are working for reform in our sense of reform. They are too realistic to keep striving toward a remote revolution that is only a far-off goal. They like to cling to the term "revolution," but the revolution they now work for is a slow and gradual one, conducted

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

by reform in alliance with other progressives who learned the lessons of the world depression and whose reform programs are substantial.

The revolution on this hypothesis can be as unhurried as that of a British Fabian Socialist, and as democratic. Since 1935, in particular, the Communists have fully understood the difference between fascism and democracy. They no longer class democracy as a fraud designed to cover the dictatorship of the capitalist class until the need for open dictatorship brings fascism. They realize that democracy is not a fraud, and they support it.

They are (according to this brand of opinion) loyal allies of any "new deal," or of any effort to extend democracy against a conservative *status quo*. They are ready and willing to take things in due order, to postpone their revolution and work for reform now. If we "liberals" can, with their help, make our reforms really adequate we can postpone their revolution forever, and make our more optimistic hope of peaceful reform come true against their more pessimistic belief that revolution will be necessary. Further, when they use the word "democracy" they mean the same thing that we mean when we use it.

Still further (this school maintains) communism is not a uniform thing, it varies from country to country, and the Chinese Communists are moderate agrarian reformers even if European Communists are not. So even if all the above might not be true of all Communists it might still be true of Chinese Communists.

This way of thinking has a calm and thoughtful surface appearance. But it is motivated by most powerful emotions. Those who hold it are fewer than they were, but many have been committed to it for years, and must accept a serious loss of face if they repudiate it. It is founded on their deepest hopes and fears, as well as on their failure to appreciate the harsh fundamentals of Leninist Communism, and many cling to it because they feel that the world situation would be altogether hopeless if it was admitted to be fallacious. Yet further, some of those who hold to it have been or still are in official positions where they have shaped policies of the United States Government on China or have taken actions in relation to China, and their policies and actions are justified by the interpretation of Chinese communism expressed above. If the interpretation is wrong, then their policies have been wrong.

So much for those who find sweetness and light in the "new democracy." What does a trained Communist find in it? Only if we penetrate its meaning to Communists can it shed light on their intentions. The premises and the logic in Mao's argument are not new ones, they are familiar in the writings of the leaders of modern communism. What they mean in Mao's writing can be explained by the fuller meaning given more explicitly by Lenin or Stalin. Anyone who has read widely in the Communist classics will find Mao familiar going. China's New Democracy is not a simple Chinese text, by a progressive who is only a so-called Communist. It is within the narrow tradition of dogmatic Marxism in style, thought, and content. It is understandable in the terms of this tradition, and meaningless in any other terms.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mao's pamphlet, first of all, is the party line for a particular situation, not for all situations. The situation to which it applies is the nonindustrial countries, in the period of the alliance of communism with the democracies in the Second World War and *before* the Communists attain power. This is not a narrow situation, it is a very broad one, but it is not the whole world and it is not for an indefinite time. Whenever the Communist line changes from one of its great strategic phases, from the offensive to the defensive or back again, the basic principles of the drive for dictatorial power must be restated, the directives that control party life and tactics must be revised to serve the purposes of the new strategy. The new line must be worked out in variations, tailored to the problems of advanced industrial countries and their economic problems on the one hand, and to the backward countries on the other. For a defensive period, when Communists plan to "collaborate" with liberal and other democratic forces, the definition of the line to be followed must be put into a form that is difficult to achieve. It must be clear to Communists, permitting no errors or deviations from Leninist principles, and at the same time it must, so far as possible, convince the non-Communist forces of Communist moderation and good faith. Deception of the intended victim without confusion of one's own followers is a difficult matter. This was the task that Mao set himself, and this is the task in which he achieved a remarkable success, purely from the Communist point of view:

No well-trained Marxist would ever state publicly and candidly just what the significance of Mao's pamphlet was. One need not expect a genuinely open confession of the good points in a great feat of camouflage from the side that is using it or has used it. Even if no longer useful for the moment, it may be needed again. To expose what it means to Communists one must analyze its contents against the background of Communist theory, the main problems of Communist tactics, the Communist tricks of political maneuver. This is not too difficult, for the Communists have emphasized in the classic writings of Lenin and Stalin just what are the problems that require the sharpest emphasis, and it is in relation to these problems, well-known to all good Communists, that Mao's treatment must be judged. *What a well-trained Communist would find in Mao, and what he would say if to say it openly were not to give the game away,* is as follows:

> Mao has found a marvelously effective device by which to split the opposition. He attracts as much non-Communist support as possible to help do the things that Communists wish to accomplish, and isolates the few clearly anti-Communist elements.
>
> He capitalizes to the fullest all overlapping elements between communism and every kind of progressive reform movement.
>
> He reconciles the old doctrine of Marx and Engels that there must be two revolutions, one against feudalism and one against capitalism, with the doctrine of "permanent revolution" which fused them, and provides for Communists a new and flexible restatement of the basic Leninist principle that such an opportunity as the one in Russia in 1917 permits a very rapid evolution from one stage into the next. This is a real addition to the art of seizing power, thoroughly Marxist and Leninist, in no respect heretical, but yet an advance and an important one. It is the first

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

clear generalization of Lenin's feat of combining the two stages, applicable not only to the Russian experience, but applicable to China or any other country, according to circumstances. In order to fuse these stages the conception of a coalition of several classes had to be introduced into the formerly simpler Communist theory that any government at any time is the dictatorship of a single class. This picks up the Leninist recognition of the role of the Soviets in Russia in 1917, between the February and October revolutions, when the Soviets included all left-wing parties. It makes of it a new and more effective tactical instrument for the transition to full Communist control.

At the same time Mao retains, though under camouflage, the important principle of "the hegemony of the proletariat" as the character of the revolutionary coalition in which the proletariat (that is to say, the Communist Party) will play a leading but not an exclusive role, until the stage is reached at which the dictatorship of the proletariat can be introduced. The term "hegemony of the proletariat" for the coalition phase of revolution in colonial countries was accepted and made an essential of Communist doctrine in the resolution on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928. This is the foundation from which Mao proceeds.

Lenin's successful exploit of bringing the "proletarian revolution" in backward Russia, in the same year as the "bourgeois democratic" revolution, was also an exploit in the shifting of the revolution away from dependence upon a spontaneous mass rising of the whole nation. It substituted the technical conduct and timing of minority insurrection as worked out by the military revolutionary committee of the Petrograd Soviet under the direction of Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin had to engineer a transfer of power from the Constituent Assembly in Russia, which the Bolsheviks could not control, to the soviets which they could. Mao Tse-tung, through the New Democracy, has devised the regular means and technique for preparing this seizure of power in advance, of arranging that it can take place through the regular institutions without shifting from one to another. Thus the transfer of power that initiates the "dictatorship of the proletariat" may occur in no more violent form than in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. This is the first fully developed version of the lessons of the October 1917 revolution in Russia, applied to the tactics of preparation for revolution.

In his discussion of economic policy Mao has picked up the basic features of the New Economic Policy adopted by Lenin in 1921. This means that he has adapted to the phase that occurs between the two stages of the revolution some policies that had to be applied in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. By this means he accepts the necessity of some private enterprise in order to develop the country, just as Lenin accepted it in 1921. But he rearranges the order and combines the NEP with capitalist development before the Socialist revolution and the proletarian dictatorship. At the same time he advances the beginnings of collectivization to overlap with capitalist development, and thus both smooths the transition and accelerates it.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

He has refined the doctrine of Lenin on participation by Communists in non-Communist government. Lenin stated only that Communists should not avoid taking seats in parliaments if they could get them. In Lenin's time the idea of Communists taking cabinet posts in coalition governments was too remote for practical discussion. The international collaboration between the Soviet and the United States, and the collaboration of Communists and non-Communists within nations during the war changed this, and posed the problem of accepting cabinet responsibility while avoiding commitments that would compromise the drive for dictatorship. Mao offers a clear rule on what to do and how to do it, a corollary of Lenin's principle that can be used in the new conditions. He shows the way to Communist participation in a coalition cabinet based, not on proportionate voting strength but on a straight deal between the parties. This affords the opportunity to maximize the share of Communists in the power of government while minimizing Communist responsibility for the state of the nation. It permits the use of key agencies of modern government in Communist hands to disrupt policy, press for reforms through demagogic propaganda tactics, and to infiltrate rank-and-file Communists into the personnel of any agency they can control.

The formation of a cabinet through a party deal without regard to democratic processes contains within it the best explanation of how a "new democracy" in the usual perverted language of Communists can also be the "dictatorship" of a coalition of classes. It is democratic because it is against capitalist sin, and because it uses elections and a popularly elected legislative body. It is a dictatorship because, after all, in Communist eyes any government is a dictatorship, based on unprincipled manipulation of public feeling and control of elections, and there is no use pretending that it is not.

Mao has found a brilliant solution of all of the most serious problems of communism. It reconciles the idea of revolution in two stages with the idea of "permanent revolution." It solves the problem of avoiding both "reformism" and "leftism." It reduces the strains involved in the zigzag line of strategy. It utilizes and integrates into the tactical system the lessons of Lenin's performance in 1917. It uses and applies the lessons of the new economic policy of 1921. It extends Lenin's doctrine on Communist participation in parliaments to participation in cabinets.

Mao has modernized and clarified the basic principles of Leninism. He plotted the curve of further development with greater precision than anyone before him. He derived from the older basic texts newer and more pertinent practical rules for circumstances of a new kind. He satisfied three different standards: First, the standard of Communist orthodoxy; second, the standard of maximum practical value in telling how to use the assets available to Communists in the struggle for political power; and third, the standard of arousing the anti-Communists as little as possible. He enveloped the Communist pill in the

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

sweetest sugar coating ever given it, and redoubled the effectiveness of the dose at the same time.

Communists can now judge the New Democracy not only as a book but also from much practical experience. It has been applied in the formation of cabinets with Communist membership in many countries, including Poland and Hungary and Rumania and Italy and France, though not yet China. It has permitted the work of disintegrating all anti-Communist classes to start in advance of the Communist dictatorship. It has provided the means to secure enough power in the state so that a coup d'état could be used instead of a mass rising, as in the case of Czechoslovakia in February. It has camouflaged the shift of Moscow to an offensive strategy in these postwar years. It has retained the sympathies of many liberals that would have been lost had the new aggressive strategy been more transparent. It has now lost its effectiveness, and this has been marked by the exclusion of Communists from the Cabinets of France and Italy. But for China it played a very great role in promoting and maintaining the policy of the United States that aid would be given to China only after the formation of a coalition of all major elements. This policy has at last been changed by the American Congress, but *the delay in this change of policy was of enormous advantage to Chinese communism.*

Having summarized China's New Democracy and having set forth the moderate interpretation that some observers give it as well as what it means to Communists themselves, what can we say of it? The following observations seem justified.

1. It is the most important Communist writing produced outside of the Soviet Union since before the Russian revolution.

2. Few single Communist documents since the manifesto in 1848 have made greater contributions to the system of Communist thought.

3. It is as remarkable for its deceptive effect as for its Communist orthodoxy.

4. It makes more clear than ever before that Communism excludes any real sympathy for constitutional democracy.

5. It illustrates perfectly the subservience of Communist economic and political analysis to the drive for power and accentuates the evolution away from older Marxism that started with Lenin.

6. It legitimately, from the Communist point of view, plays down the necessity for violent revolution because it finds the means to postpone violence until after securing the monopoly of power. This means is the Trojan-horse technique as practiced in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

7. It contributed greatly to at least one costly error in United States policy.

8. The period for which this doctrine was most useful to the Communists for its deceptive value is now over. But some of its contributions to Communist theory and strategy will remain important as long as the hope of Communist world revolution endures.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

4. The Second Civil War

A. SOVIET INTERVENTION

The Soviet Union entered the far eastern war on August 9, 1945. This was 2 days after the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and 1 week before the end of hostilities. The Soviet armies raced across Manchuria with little difficulty, and thus occupied the greatest coal-producing and industrial areas in Asia outside of Siberia and Japan. They also received the surrender of all the Japanese forces in Manchuria.

It was agreed that the Russians should turn over control of Manchuria to the forces of the National Government of China. It was also agreed that Russia would regain some of her former rights and holdings in the Far East that had been surrendered after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 or later. This meant the recovery by Russia of southern Sakhalin, and the railway rights she once held in Manchuria. It was not agreed that the surrendered Jap arms would not be disposed of to the Chinese Communists, nor that Russia would not remove the bulk of Manchurian industry under claims to war booty. The Soviets accordingly did both, and have also kept the Dairen Peninsula thus far.

On August 14, 1945, the U. S. S. R. had signed a 30-year treaty of friendship with China, and on August 26 the text was published, on the same day that Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking for talks with Chiang on the problem of unification. Thus hopefully did the "peace" begin.

A race developed between the Nationalists and the Communists to secure the weapons, territories, and industries surrendered by the Japanese in north China. This race, on the part of the Communists, was in violation of the order issued by General MacArthur as Allied Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that the Central Government authorities should receive all Japanese surrenders.

The chief means of access between China and Manchuria had been for decades through the key port of Dairen and the network of the South Manchurian Railway which fed chiefly into that port. Denial of the "joint use" of Dairen to the Chinese Government forced all Chinese Government troops either to use the difficult overland detour by way of Shanhaikwan or to use inadequate subsidiary ports. At the time of the Japanese surrender the forces of the National Government were almost wholly in the southwest. Their movement to the north and east was hampered first by the extensive damage to the railroads south of the Yangtse done by the Japanese. The Communists tore up or interrupted many of the lines north of the Yangtse immediately after the Japanese surrender. Thus initial circumstances combined with Chinese Communist and Soviet action to delay the national forces in reaching Manchuria as much as possible.

By November 2 the Soviets announced the beginning of the withdrawal of their troops from Manchuria, while the National Government was not yet ready to move in after them. National troops moving to Manchuria by sea found Chinese Communist troops already in possession at key points. Other forces moving up by land had to fight for Shanhaikwan, the key point on the railroad from China to

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Manchuria. Thus quickly did the second civil war between the Kuomintang and Communist China spring up again. Fighting was general wherever the two forces were in contact in November 1945.

The course of this war has been complex, bloody, and destructive. The Chinese Communists are no longer the weaker party, harried by pursuers. The National forces have been able to seize Yenan, and to gain and hold a few key cities and rail lines. But the Communists have gained in one area as fast as they have lost in another.

The course of the fighting is interesting, but does not directly concern us here. The question is, What was the effect of Soviet intervention in the Far East upon the balance of forces in China? The answer cannot be precise, but it can be remarkably simple. A little before the close of the Second World War the Chinese Red army numbered about half a million men, with not quite enough arms to go around. Now their numbers are just about three times as great, and they have more than enough weapons.

The acquisition of Japanese arms and other material by the Chinese Communists was by covert rather than open or formal transfer, but no less a reality. Because of this they are able to paralyze, if not fully control, Manchuria. They hold industrial assets in Manchuria, which, though but the leavings, are vastly superior to anything they have held before. They have won little of the industry that was there for themselves, but it has been wholly denied to the National China that needed it so badly.

The civil war of China has been resumed now, *but not where it left off. There is a dramatic shift in the balance of power. Survival itself was a triumph for Chinese communism in 1937; today it may be a triumph for the Kuomintang. The intervention of the U. S. S. R. in the eastern war was the greatest factor in this change.*

B. CHINESE COMMUNISM IN THE COLD WAR

The race for Manchuria that started immediately after the surrender of Japan did not expand into open civil war in China until later. It was in the second half of 1946 that the Communists became more confident of their own strength, and at the same time more confident that the United States would withhold its support from the Kuomintang, at least for a time. The revelation of the basic Communist attitude through their propaganda line had taken a strongly anti-American slant in Communist areas almost from the beginning. It was on June 20, 1946, that this line was extended to non-Communist areas. This date may be taken as marking the extension of the second civil war from Manchuria to China proper. On that day Russian radio stations and Chinese-language newspapers in Shanghai opened a campaign of anti-American propaganda. This followed closely on the heels of a Communist military offensive in Shantung, the first open breach in China itself, outside of Manchuria, of the authority of the executive headquarters in which the National Government and the Communists were ostensibly cooperating. It was followed closely by a public demand by Mao Tse-tung that the United States quit all aid to the National Government and withdraw all forces from China.

The opening of the press campaign in Shanghai was followed by parades and demonstrations on June 23, the same day as Mao's state-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ment. Estimates of the number of people who joined in these parades run to between 50 and 100 thousand. This agitation was turned into a Quit China Week campaign over the last week in June.

The propaganda line at this time sought to establish that the Communists wished peace and the United States did not. The efforts of General Marshall were ignored. It was held that every reason for the presence of United States troops in China such as repatriating Japanese, had been completed.

An example of this line is the proclamation put out on July 7, the anniversary of the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. It stated that—

> Were it not for the American reactionaries program to "help China," China would have obtained democracy long ago, and civil war would not have happened and continued.

The Communist-influenced press joined in declaring that—

> The recall of American troops from China is a prerequisite to the elimination of civil war in China.

And slogans in English, for the benefit of American troops and other Americans on the scene asked:

> How would you like to have a war started in your country?

The line of the argument went on to picture the United States as an aggressor in Asia, the imperialist rival and successor to Japan. Appeals to government troops to desert called on them to join in opposing America as they had opposed Japan. Mass propaganda claimed that United States imperialism was more refined and legal than Japanese imperialism only because America was stronger than Japan, and the imperialism was therefore all the more dangerous and deadly.

The old familiar line against the Japanese support of Chinese puppet governments and war lords was revived as a description to fit American support for the National Government, and this government became the puppet of America. According to the posters of the time:

> We should put our hearts together to oppose Chiang Kai-shek, who sells out our country's people's rights, and the United States who is turning China into an American colony.

The other side of the picture drawn showed the Chinese people as devoted to peace, and the Chinese Communists devoted to peace. There simply would be no civil war if the machinations of the United States did not uphold its puppet Chiang, and all peace-loving Chinese must rally to support the peace-loving Communists.

The Chinese people could not have accepted a sudden shift from white to black in the portrayal of the National Government, so long praised for fighting the Japanese, but their resistance is minimized by blaming the United States. Chiang was not personally attacked at this time except as a dupe and stooge of United States policy. It was obvious to the Chinese themselves that as between the National Government and the Communists it was the latter who broke truce agreements and initiated civil war again. Blaming this on the remote and mysterious machinations of the United States made it plausible that the Communists were not the real war makers.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The fact that many Chinese have had some contact with Americans and that many of these Americans have made favorable impressions has made little difficulty for the Communist propagandists. They simply classify Americans as of two kinds, first, the favorably known Americans and the left-wing in America, second, all others. These latter are all classified as fascist-imperialists.

The propaganda of the Communists is a routine assortment of anti-American clichés. American sale of surplus property is called imperialist. American imports compete with and undersell the products of native business. American discussions over a civil air navigation agreement are treated as the entering wedge for domination of air transport. American motor accidents show the recklessness of the American soldiery, and the failure to prosecute showed the servility of the National Government toward the foreigners. Of course, any available American news that can be fitted to the line is also played up, including both reports and rumors of American strikes and statements by any American political figure unfavorable to the National Government. The lynching of Negroes is given heavy emphasis of course, with no reference to its decline and present rarity. The main themes of Communist propaganda against the United States have been followed to a considerable extent in the press of the areas held by the National Government, with "liberal" papers running cartoons in considerable numbers that portray Uncle Sam as the manipulator of puppets, as fishing in troubled waters, as dumping goods in the Chinese market, and as seeking imperialist advantages through commercial agreements.

Such is the face of the Communist propaganda directed to China in general. Its role is not to convert the people to communism that is the task of the Red Army. The task of the propaganda is only to confuse, to create uncertainty, to weaken the will and the loyalty of non-Communist China, to reduce its efficiency and solidarity.

The transformation of any part of non-Communist China into a part of Communist China is a military task, backed up by all the techniques of economic and political warfare. One is tempted to call this sociological warfare, for it fuses economics, psychology, politics, finance, and any other elements that come to hand.

When the Communists take over a district, say in Shantung, there is an exodus. Often as many as one-third of the people depart, sometimes as many as two-thirds. They carry with them what they can, and leave what they must. That they leave as much as they do and yet take flight is better than any Gallup poll as an indication of their opinion of communism.

The incoming Communists set up a temporary military administration, mobilize the riffraff of the locality to loot the houses of those who have left and of anyone else prosperous enough to be fair game. They set up a "people's court" and proceed to try anyone who might make trouble. They draft men, some of whom try to escape the area. They establish a new local currency and call up all National Government money, using the exchange rate to destroy savings and level classes.

The people's courts vary according to circumstances, but in general they proceed without rules of law or evidence, meting out mob rule on any kind of charge and giving judgment as the spirit moves.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The Communist contempt for religion has been shown in the trials and death sentences given to foreign Christian missionaries. In one such case, at Ts'ao-Chow in West Shantung, charges of murder were based on the simple evidence that in the course of medical work some of the patients had died.[10] The trial opened on July 25, 1946, was preceded by a violent press campaign, and was dragged out over several days. Every family in the town was ordered to send a representative to observe the trial. After it closed the local government took the case under consideration for decision on the basis of the charges brought out and the public reaction, the same local government that conducted the propaganda in advance of the trial. More commonly the people render sentence with a prepared answer.

Numerous other instances of interference with established mission activities occurred in 1945 and 1946. These included lootings, fines, shootings, tortures conducted in public, and arrests and disappearances. UNRRA missions were stopped, fired upon, or carefully policed, according to varying conditions. At the same time Communist propaganda was demanding more UNRRA aid for Communist areas, and UNRRA medical supplies were going to exclusively military hospitals.

All such tactics tend to break the economy down to a bare subsistence level. This does not impede communism, for communism does not have to feed the cities it does not hold, nor find markets beyond its lines in "enemy" territory. But it does weaken the National Government everywhere. Communism is ready and willing to reduce the country to complete break-down preliminary to complete power, and it has many ways to promote this. It has no motive for constructive economic effort in any area where its control may be insecure.

As Secretary Marshall stated on January 7, 1947:

> The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved.

The superiority of the military side of communism over the other elements in Communist organization has been noted in other connections, and elsewhere than in China. The regular Red army of China makes the best impression on observers of Chinese communism. Its discipline and morale have declined in the recent years of rapid growth. But its administration of a newly conquered area is generally superior to the civil administration that follows it. Its higher officers are generally able and most of them have had many years of experience in guerilla warfare. Its lower officers are inferior, and its soldiers in many cases ordinary conscripts indistinguishable from those of any army in the Chinese past. Its policy of avoiding battle makes it especially attractive to unprincipled elements seeking the rewards of rapine.

The organization of Communist China bears out the picture given by the activities of the civil war. The top governing organ is the

[10] The confession of Yagoda, former head of the Soviet police, in the course of the great Moscow purge trial of March 1937, that he had caused the deaths of Gorky and his son and of former Soviet officials, through poisoning and through causing their physicians to give them incorrect treatment, suggests that the use of such a charge in the Chinese trials may not be an unrelated local incident.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Central Executive Committee, which has 44 members and 33 alternates. Of the members, 12 are soldiers; of the alternates, at least 5. The Central Executive Committee acts in most cases through its two smaller groups, the Politbureau and the Military Council. The first of these has eight members and is the real executive committee of Communist China; the second has six members. Four men hold membership on both of these small groups, and Mao Tse-tung is chairman of both of them. Thus at the very top the basic division of the Government is between military and civilian, with a very close coordination of the two, and only a slight margin of superior power or influence in the hands of the civilians.

The administrative branches of the central Communist Government are under the authority of the Central Executive Committee, and deal with propaganda, education, economics, finance, etc., as might be expected. The real administration of Communist China is far more localized than centralized, and at all lower levels of administration the division of power between the military and the civil side is so even that it depends almost wholly upon individual cases. The military commander is the real ruler in one district, the political commissar in another, according to their energy and ambition and personal capacity.

To sum up the behavior of Communist China after the Japanese surrender we may refer again to the period of the negotiations for unity conducted under United States auspices. In the early spring they began a drive in Manchuria, violating the truce agreement of January 10, and in July another in Shantung. Throughout the year they maintained the siege of Yung-nien in southern Hopei. *At the end of the year, their commander, Chu Teh, boasted that they had annihilated 45 Kuomintang brigades. The National Government itself reported that when the truce began the Communists controlled 60 hsien (counties) and at the end of the truce had extended their control to 300—all this in a period during which formal negotiations were supposed to be producing cease-fire agreements and seeking a general settlement.*

C. WORLD COMMUNISM ON A NEW TACK

From the end of the war against Germany and Japan world communism has been swinging from one line of strategy to a new one. This is one more of the great shifts of policy that accord with Leninist theory, the sixth such shift or tack from one line of policy to another since the first one in 1921, when the policy of war communism gave way to the so-called new economic policy.[11] Obviously we must consider what this world-wide shift of Communist strategy must mean for China.

Mao Tse-tung maintains in his writings that the situation in China depends in many respects upon the prevailing world situation. Chinese developments could not be the same after the Russian revolution as before it. The political issues in China in the 1930's and during the war were responsive to conditions in Europe and the rest of the world. This is not Mao's idea alone, it is standard mental equipment for Communists, and there is much truth in it.

[11] The Leninist theory of a zigzag line, shifting from offensive to defensive and back again, is outlined and discussed in this committee's report on The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism at pp. 6 to 8.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Accordingly we might expect that the great change in the world situation that has occurred in the last 3 years must be reflected in a reorientation of Chinese communism, though the new lines may not yet be clear. After all, the New Democracy policy for China was synchronous with the period of collaboration by the wartime Allies, and was an extension of the doctrine of the "popular front" initiated in Europe in 1936. The New Democracy was implemented in several countries in eastern Europe in 1945 and 1946 through the establishment of governments in which the Communists had an important share at the Cabinet level, and which they used to secure unshakeable predominance. This changed the New Democracy at once from a future goal into a present reality, stripped it of all pretense of democratic character or interparty harmony, and changed the front-line problems from those of the seizure of power to those of using it after securing it. This change, simply the possession of power by the Communists in several countries, became an important feature of the world-wide transition from the harmony of wartime between communism and the democratic powers to the "cold war" that has replaced it.

It is now apparent that the New Democracy served its most useful purpose for Communist strategy in the period from 1940 to 1948, and that this period has now ended. The reasons why it has ended lie elsewhere than in China, in the other countries of low industrial development where Communist expansion has been even more successful than in China. From 1940 to 1945, for the first 5 years after the appearance of Mao's pamphlet, the Communists had secure power in no country outside the Soviet Union, unless one counts Outer Mongolia. As long as this was true the question, what to do after winning power, could be left to the wishful speculations of the liberal parties. But once they secured power in several countries in eastern Europe they could not delay for very long the revelation of what they would do next. The refusal of the Kuomintang to form a coalition government with the Chinese Communists ended the hope of further gains by the old tactics and thereby permitted an end to waiting longer in eastern Europe. The Marshall plan further forced the pace.

The basic pattern of action after securing power is exhibited in the history of the Soviet Union itself.[12] The great problems faced by communism when it is in power in a country of low industrial development are the following:

1. The rate of industrial development needed to expand war potential for further international struggles.
2. The rate of capital formation necessary for such industrial expansion.
3. The rate of collectivization of agriculture necessary for reducing the portion of the labor force engaged in agriculture in order to permit expansion of industrial labor.
4. The timing of the shift from a sharing of power in a coalition to a monopoly of power by the Communists.
5. The timing of the retrenchment of communism from an overemphasis upon national patriotism.

[12] Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, reviews the essential features of Communist internal policy in the Soviet Union during the interwar period. It is reprinted in Supplement I at p. 168. There is a brief discussion of the speech in the report on the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism at p. 40.

80261—48——4

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

6. The timing of the purification of the Communist Party, and the restoration of a hard or "cadre" party in place of the loose or open party of the "new democracy."

7. The disintegration of all classes and parties except the Communists.

8. The timing of the incorporation of any new Communist area into the Soviet Union.

The problem of communism for the last 3 years might be defined as the redeployment of communism to face these problems. But even to face these problems as matters for immediate action is to foreclose the further use of the tactics of the "new democracy," not only in the countries concerned but also to a great extent elsewhere. This redeployment has therefore required changes in organization, rearrangement of alliances with other groups, changes of leadership within some of the Communist Parties, and changes of strategic approach and tactical doctrine.

The subject is too large a one for detailed discussion at this point. However, there are a few key points of reference which define its outlines with remarkable clarity. Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, outlined the relation between internal economic policy in a backward country and the expectation of future war. The Varga incident of January 1948 involved the repudiation and disciplining of the leading Soviet economist for his wrong stand on some of the issues. The seizure of secure power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 [13] and the condemnation of Tito by the Cominform on June 29 complete the pattern. These make three things clear: First, the severity of the transition going on within world communism from one tactical and strategic line to another, second, the main problems around which this transition is focused; and, third, the general character of the line now regarded as correct.

The element of deception gained by the "new democracy" rested upon the avoidance of discussion of these later issues. Even after the Communists gained full power in such countries as Rumania and Hungary there could still be some delay, permitting liberals to go on assuming that the coalition phase of moderate socialism might be long or even permanent. But this delay could not be long. The coup d'état in Prague by which a Communist minority interest at the Cabinet level of the Czech Government was converted into secure domination showed how quickly the basic political development of the second phase of the revolution might come. The action against Tito in June indicated how quickly the economic measures of the second phase must be undertaken. *These events have stripped all camouflage from the "new democracy" and have confirmed the iron consistency of its Leninist logic.* The coup in Prague was necessary because the democratic situation in which any party might lose its Cabinet seats after a new election still prevailed until February. Tito has been condemned as a Trotskyite and Fascist precisely on the ground that he was too slow in undertaking the all-out development of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the bolshevizing of Yugoslavia. *Thus the need to consolidate their power and commence to exploit its use in eastern Europe has forced the Communists to abandon the advantages of the most deceptive front they ever devised.*

[13] Discussed in supplement III–A, The Coup D'Etat in Prague.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

For Chinese communism the events in eastern Europe fix the end of the present tactical usefulness of the new democracy. This end was apparent for Chinese reasons also, as soon as the effort to form a national cabinet with Communist participation broke down. But Chinese communism could afford this change. It has grown enormously in strength since 1944. It does not face any serious theoretical problems in adopting a new line, for the civil war in China is on, is still far from decision, and absorbs all energies. Communist victory in the Chinese civil war would bring the problems of internal Communist policy that are now uppermost in eastern Europe, and further problems concerning the role of China in promoting communism throughout the remainder of Asia and the Indies. But the Chinese Communists can face those problems when they come to them.

D. THE UNITED STATES DEBATES THE PROBLEM

For the United States the problem presented by China comes down to the problem of aid. This has been widely discussed in the United States ever since the Japanese surrender. The issues are certainly difficult ones. The sheer difficulty of the problem has been reflected in the length of the debate and for a time in the apparent inability to reach any conclusion satisfactory to the bulk of American opinion. The arguments on both sides were fully presented in the hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 in February and March of this year. They can be summarized on each side.

Those who have argued that the United States should not extend aid to China until China establishes her internal unity and peace maintain that—

1. If peace is possible it must be possible to avoid both international wars and major civil wars.
2. If peace is possible, then it must be possible in such a country as China for all parties to join in a coalition to lay the foundations of a democratic commonwealth.
3. Any aid by the United States, otherwise sufficient to settle the issue, would be matched by the Soviet, leading into a morass of competitive intervention without result.
4. Outside powers should not intervene in a primarily domestic civil war.
5. If outside powers intervene in a domestic civil war it violates the right of the people concerned to determine their own destiny.
6. The Kuomintang government is corrupt and ill-organized to such an extent that if the United States gives aid it will be wasted.
7. Much aid has been given in the past few years, by the United States or by UNRRA, and it has been ineffective.
8. If we gave sufficient aid we would in the end have China as a permanent responsibility too great to handle.
9. Chinese communism is an economic reform movement, healthy and vigorous.
10. The "new democracy" is a liberal democratic program.
11. Such considerations as the importance of Chinese independence to the national security of the United States must be

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

excluded from the design for world peace under the United Nations.

12. China is too big for effective aid.

13. The long-range good will of the Chinese people can be retained only by a hands-off policy. Even if not responsible for the civil war, any intervention will make us responsible for the continuation of the war in the eyes of the Chinese people.

Against these arguments, those who favor aid by the United States to China would maintain that—

1. Communism does not mean merely economic reform; it means power politics on an unprecedented level of technical skill.

2. Nonintervention on one side of a civil war does not preserve the right of self-determination if there is intervention on the other side.

3. The U. S. S. R. intervened most skillfully and on a grand scale in the Chinese civil war.

4. The fabric of the China that stands behind the National Government is weak, demoralized, and corrupt because it was overstrained by a quarter century of civil and international war.

5. The so-called new democracy is the technique of approach to the coup d'état and dictatorship, as illustrated in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.

6. A Cabinet coalition introduces all minorities into precisely that level of government at which majority will must prevail.

7. If a Cabinet coalition of the Kuomintang and the Communists is made a requirement, this gives each of them a power of veto, since either one can wreck the coalition.

8. This would substitute the rule of unanimity for majority rule, a method of government known to be hopelessly weak by all historical experience.

9. If we cannot make a coalition with Communists work in Berlin, or in Korea, or in Greece, or in the European Recovery Program, can we demand that the Chinese make it work?

10. World peace based on freedom is not yet so strongly founded that the national security of the United States can be regarded as a negligible consideration.

11. Any increment to Communist power adds to the resources by which they can pursue the tactics of further disruption of the non-Communist world.

12. The genuine independence of China is essential to the security of the United States.

13. China will not be independent for long if aid is not given.

14. China is big, but aid can be much smaller than to Europe and still be effective. China needs technical advisers most of all.

To the arguments presented in summary above each side has a ready reply. Those who favor aid would reply most briefly to those who oppose it:

"You will confront us, to your dismay and our bitter cost, with a Soviet China added to the weight of the side bent on world domination."

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Those who oppose aid would reply to those who favor it:

"You cannot guarantee that your aid will create a free, democratic, and vigorous China, able to stand on its own feet and to assist in building the peace of the world."

To this a final reply may be made by those who favor aid:

"Yes; it may be true that we cannot guarantee success, but without aid the impending loss of China is certain. Until it is irretrievably lost we have time to work, to experiment, and to learn. Solving great problems takes time, always. To surrender the whole problem to the Communists is not the way to peace but to war. If peace is possible it is not because any wishful dream of harmony is true today, it is because we can learn fast enough how to build a stable and unassailable non-Communist world. We cannot win the race by not running. We cannot even prevent the race from occurring. The other side is running, and the prize of peace lies at the end of the track, peace with freedom or peace in the cinders of one Soviet-dominated world."

E. AMERICAN MEDIATION AND AID

At the close of the war the United States was committed to the maintenance of harmony between the democracies and the Soviets. Upon this the hopes of peace were founded. It extended from the level of international cooperation in the United Nations to the Four Power administration of Germany, to the division of Korea into two zones, and into the making of the peace treaties. This harmony proved an illusion. The Truman doctrine, announced on March 12, 1947, may be taken as marking the overt acceptance of disharmony between communism and democracy. The effort to make the dream of harmony come true in China continued for some time longer.

The United States sought to assist the factions in China to reach an agreement for national harmony from the beginning of the "peace." When Mao came to Chungking on August 26, 1945, it was at the urging of Ambassador Hurley. In November Ambassador Hurley resigned, after the new civil war in China had already assumed serious proportions, and General Marshall was sent to China on a special mission, and on December 15, 1945, President Truman issued a statement of United States policy on China. This statement accepted the National Government as the proper government for all China, but called for national unity under it, and announced that the United States would not intervene in a way "to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife."

From August until November 1945, it had appeared that the United States was definitely backing the National Government of China, and that the U. S. S. R. had acquiesced. The negotiations between Chiang and Mao had started well. Ambassador Hurley had been attacked by left groups in the United States, however, and this eliminated his influence and prestige with the Communists. The United States policy announced in December was fair notice that the Chinese Communists could go on with the civil war with all the advantages that they had recently gained, and without immediate fear of equal gains for the Kuomintang.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

In spite of this General Marshall was able, through immense prestige and stubborn skill, to keep negotiations going and to reach the brink of success in appearance. On January 10, 1946, a cease-fire agreement was announced and in the spring an agreement to extend the truce to Manchuria was ready to be signed by the National Government and the Communists. General Marshall left China before the signing was to occur, and it never did occur. On April 15 the communists gave notice of a state of war in Manchuria. General Marshall returned to China a few days later, and persisted in his efforts for domestic peace in China until early in 1947, when he announced the abandonment of the effort and on January 7 issued a statement in which he criticized both sides. From then on the United States accepted the condition of civil war in China. Chiang Kai-shek tried to find ways to satisfy the United States that he had made every legitimate effort to avoid it, and the war itself became more violent. In the summer of 1947 General Wedemeyer proceeded to China to examine the situation once more, but his report has remained unpublished. The policy of refusing aid until unity could be established finally changed, when the Congress voted aid to China in a substantial amount in March 1948.

Throughout all negotiations the Chinese Communists have insisted on two basic conditions of an extraordinary nature. First, they insist on having their own army, and the nearest approach to an agreement for demobilization of both sides provided that they would keep eight divisions. The other was that they should have certain cabinet positions, based on a straight political deal. This is of course the line of the "new democracy," and the line followed in the "broadly based" governments of eastern European countries after the war.

These conditions demanded by the Communists raise very old issues, issues so old that apparently they have been forgotten. *The right of a minority to have its own army is the right of feudal disorder,* the right that delayed the establishment of national political order in Europe at the close of the middle ages and the one Richelieu suppressed in France and Cromwell suppressed in Britain. *It is the condition implied in the "paramilitary" forces of fascism and nazism, designed for the seizure of power.* It is simply an impossible right to grant to any if an organized national life is to be maintained. The possession of cabinet seats regardless of majority or minority status is similarly though not quite so clearly anarchic. It puts definite policy into abeyance, until some majority can control the whole government. It thus gives every advantage to the faction that understand this, and who use their cabinet posts only to prepare the way to their own dictatorship.

The efforts to work out postwar arrangements on the assumption that harmony between communism and democracy must be taken as possible was carried to extraordinary lengths. There is no actual historical parallel for the proposition urged upon the Chinese. One can only try to imagine, for instance, that Britain might have offered aid to the United States in 1862 on the sole condition that Lincoln make Jefferson Davis a member of the Cabinet and that the amalgamation of the Confederate Army with the Union Army be undertaken after the truce. The Communist intentions in the use of Cabinet

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

positions have been exhibited in many countries today. The fate of any subordinate parties in a coalition at the Cabinet level, with a party bent on dictatorship, has been demonstrated in the first Cabinet in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, and in the first Cabinets of Mussolini and Hitler. In all three of these there were representatives of other parties than the dominant one, the dominant one was ruthless, and the outcome was an easy shift to outright dictatorship. From this point of view the occasional expressions of suspicion of American sincerity in promoting the negotiations, or of the sincerity of Chiang in pursuing them, appear strange. *The effort to meet the Chinese Communists was carried much farther than to any halfway point.*

After the demonstrations of the art of converting minority power into party dictatorship that have occurred in Hungary and Rumania, it would be difficult to maintain that the Kuomintang has been wrong in principle or in tactics in refusing to form a coalition on the basis of Communist terms. Nevertheless this issue remained for some time a matter of bitter dispute in the United States. The arguments on each side have been summarized in the preceding section. Only a summary is feasible in this report, for the issues raised include the deepest problems that confront the modern mind. Northrop's famous work, The Meeting of East and West, deals with only a part of the problem, the part that concerns the fusion of oriental and western civilizations. Toynbee's A Study of History is an approach to other aspects of the problem. But to say that the problem is immense in scope and that no perfect solution is known, nor even any precise and certain method of solution, is not to say that no factors are certain and no choices clear.

Two years of efforts at mediation made it clear that no coalition government with Communists on a democratic basis was possible. This was proved around the world and not alone in China. It became clear that the "new democracy" was only a paraphrase for the swift transition from the hegemony of the proletariat into what Wilhelm Pieck, the German Communist leader, once called in a moment of verbose candor "the unrestricted revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat." [14] The effort of the United States to mediate in China while withholding aid ended when the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives committed itself to favor military and economic aid to China in March 1948, and this decision was upheld by the House and the Senate in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as passed.

F. THE WEAKNESSES OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Communism holds important assets in China, and enjoys the benefit of many favoring circumstances. But it also has weaknesses. If it had none, after all, there would be little point in this discussion. Some of its weaknesses relate to its chances of attaining its goal of dictatorial power. Others, and these are the most important, apply to its ability

[14] Report on the Activities of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Seventh World Congress, 1935.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

to do anything constructive if it had power. *The effect of all its weaknesses is not that it can be ignored or neglected, but that it can and must be defeated.*

The opposition to American aid to China in recent years has been based upon a curious melange of ideas. Some writers, ascribing weaknesses to communism which it does not have, maintain that the Communists could not take China, so need not be opposed. Others have held that the Communists have genuine solutions for Chinese problems, so that communism in China should not be opposed. The two ideas are combined in the argument that China can swallow her conquerors, as if she could take a dose of communism like a beneficent medicament. In either case the conclusion reached is that the United States need feel no concern. The weaknesses of Chinese communism by no means make it a matter of no concern, but they make it possible, though not easy, to defeat it.

Its first visible weakness is the incapacity of communism to win a substantial following in the cities, or even to seize and hold important cities by force. The successes of the Communists have been almost totally limited to the countryside. They have never held a major city for more than a short time. Yet Marxism is, if anything, supposedly a doctrine fit for industrial society, which means cities. There are two main reasons for this paradox, of which the first is the condition of civil war, where even a weaker force may be able to hold inaccessible areas with a remarkable appearance of staying power but cannot hold a city accessible to superior force. The second is the character of the cities themselves.

The social and economic structure of the Chinese cities is the old complex of guilds, with their amazingly complex regulation of economic activities, now overlaid heavily by modern innovations. The guilds are occupational and by status, or rank, for such grades as masters journeymen and apprentices, in many respects similar to medieval guilds in Europe. There are also associations of coprovincials, binding together all men in a city whose original homes were in a certain province. These associations strongly emphasize care for their members along lines of social security, like some American fraternal organizations. The guild system when strong permitted such elaborate transactions as the delivery of goods across distances of hundreds of miles without highways, with insurance, and without documents. Loyalty, honesty, credit, were the basis of dealings as in any country, and graft and fraud and usury were present also, but all of these took specifically Chinese forms.

Cities in which life is so organized have proved most obdurate material for communism. There is little for communism to seize hold of, for labor organization is of a special pattern, more like the railway brotherhoods in America than like industrial unions as we know them. Also, such a society with its strong loyalties and discipline can fight back with remarkable force, can evade and frustrate regulation, can blunt the weapons of a bureaucracy with its forms and rules, whether that bureaucracy is Nationalist or Communist. Communism does not gain a large and powerful following in such cities, and cannot master them by force in any brief tenure.

Its second weakness is its recent loss of the "new democracy" as a front and camouflage. Formerly it could pretend that its incompletely

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Bolshevist tactics were the product of moderation rather than merely of the circumstances of local power without national power. This is automatically weakened also. If events in Europe and elsewhere were not demonstrating the difference between the Communist camouflage of the coalition phase and the Communist reality of full political power, the Chinese Communists might hope to return to the tactics and the propaganda of the first civil war period. But the problems of Red feudalism arising in Yugoslavia on the heels of Red imperialism are exposing the basic nature of the Bolshevik line. It is a simple weakness of world communism that it cannot long pretend to be democratic in some countries and not in others. Also the mere change in scale of communism in China, and of the civil war, brings a new scale of problems and responsibilities, and more and more brings the exposure of its character as a dictatorship.

These weaknesses do not mean that communism cannot win in China. They mean that, as in Russia, it can win only by fire and sword. The idea that the indomitable peasant can baffle communism remains a daydream. The peasant has for centuries survived one dynasty after another. But he has been beaten down for a century or centuries at a time. Communism knows well how to disintegrate all opposing classes and groups. It knows well how to use death as an effective means of eliminating opposition. It knows well how to use all of the tools of a police state, for it created them.

The greatest weaknesses of communism in China relate to the basic problems of China, for which it has no true solutions. China is not, like Russia, rich in open land for a growing population. It cannot solve its food problem by settlement of a frontier. It cannot uproot dissidents and move them into empty space. China cannot afford the sacrifice of present welfare to future war potential that Russia endured in the interwar period. The Communists can maintain power, once they gain it, only by collectivization. That means the smashing of everything that stood before in the economic organization of the country. They must smash and collectivize agriculture, bringing civil war to every village as they did in Russia. The slaughter of the cattle by the Russian peasants facing collectivization in 1931 was so great as to leave the Russian herds smaller to this day. A country with such a population as China's cannot afford such treatment.

The Communists could build Chinese industry only by the Soviet method, capital formation at the cost of civilian welfare. Soviet Russia itself, short of a total reorientation from its arms economy, could never be an adequate source of economic aid. American capital could start China on its way, give it the initial base upon which native Chinese capital could swiftly grow, not for power politics but for a rising standard for the Chinese people.

These weaknesses in no respect mean that communism is barred from winning and holding power. Nor do they mean that if communism won in China it would not also win all southeast Asia. They mean that if communism wins in China the human cost would be beyond calculation. And they mean that there is some ground for hope that it may yet be prevented if enough skill and resolution are brought to bear.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

5. The Significance of China

A. CHINA IN WORLD STRATEGY

> "The storm center of the world has gradually shifted to China. Whoever understands that mighty empire—socially, politically, and economically, and religiously—has a key to politics for the next 500 years."—Secretary of State John Hay, 1899.

The strategic importance of China is sometimes discussed in terms of the command of the China Sea, or of the bombing radii that can be drawn from parts of China to target areas in various countries, or as a mine of military manpower. These terms are too narrow by far.

According to all present assumptions the fate of the world for the rest of this century will take one of several lines of development. There may be, at the end of this century, a universal Soviet. There may be at the end of this century, still a non-Communist world, growing its mastery of the problem of combining peace with freedom. Or there may have been by then a great war.

The strategic importance of any country is to be judged in relation to this over-all situation. There are many approaches to grand strategy that are narrower than this, but insofar as they are narrower they are also logically dependent and derivative in one sense or another. Arabia, for example, is important for its oil: but this only begs the question. Why is the oil important? The oil is important to the evolution of the world economy. The consumption of that oil, burning it in automobile engines, in Diesels, driving ships and locomotives, and oiling machines, is the important thing about the oil. The problem of peace requires, as we know, that the rising material expectations of mankind be met in at least moderate degree, and the oil of Arabia is important because it must enter into the material basis of a progressive world civilization in the coming years.

The future of the world lies between two great systems of life, each represented by one predominant protagonist. What we often forget is that the whole of the number of people who actually live [illegible] in one or the other of these two systems is only about [illegible] people, about 28 percent of mankind. That is all of them it can be said that their system of politics is either Communist or democratic in any reasonably full development. There remain one and a half billions of peoples who are of little weight in the immediate balance of power, whose politics are democratic only in a rudimentary sense, whose economies are at a relatively low level, whose use of physical power is very low, and whose productivity, outside of agriculture, is far behind modern western levels.

This mass of humanity is facing certain common problems, and the ways in which these problems are met will settle which way they go. Communism offers in some ways an easier solution, industrial progress and powerful political organization, while avoiding the most difficult problems of human freedom. In a way this is a more easily reachable solution, a labor-saving solution, an easy way out for minds too often overstrained by the awful dilemmas of the age.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It would be possible for all of the billion and a half to develop into democracies in politics, with a great degree of free enterprise in economics, without threatening the freedom of the Communist community to go its own way. It would not be possible for them to develop along the line of communism without threatening the freedom of the democratic communities to go their own way. The assumption of struggle and war that lies at the basis of communism precludes that. Communism cannot assume peace until communism is universal. Until then it uses a strategy and tactics that seek to weaken and disrupt all independent systems. This difference is of the utmost importance strategically, for it means that the democratic way requires a larger part of the world in order to have a chance of success than the Communist way requires. Any great gain for the Communists increases the vulnerability of the non-Communist world to economic and political and psychological warfare. The balance of forces and skills for the conditions of "cold warfare" is not far from equal as it is. This means that any great gain for the Communists would give them preponderant advantage. That would leave the prospect of slow defeat for democracy without a regular war, or resort to regular war to recoup the disadvantages of cold war.

In the billion and a half of peoples who may become democratic or Communist, China is the decisive area. It represents nearly one-third of all those people. It is free, in the sense that it is not wholly and directly a colony of any power. It is typical, and its choice will have an impact and set an example of overpowering weight. It is accessible to both sides. Its internal balance is easily overturned by any substantial intervention. Its fate will settle the fate of that half of humanity who live in the East.

American Communists have been far quicker than some others to appreciate the strategic place of China. William Z. Foster, in a statement to the national committee of the Communist Party, reprinted in the Daily Worker of December 2, 1945, declared:

> On the international scale, the key task, as emphasized in Comrade Dennis's report, is to stop American intervention in China * * *. The war in China is the key to all problems of the international front and it is here, above all else, where we have to deal the hardest blow to reaction * * *. On the question of China, which is our key concentration, as Comrade Dennis pointed out, we want to hold 500 meetings all over the country to mobilize all the forces of the people that we can reach to put a stop to the intervention in China.

We have already referred to China as the proving ground and pilot plant of communism for all the countries of low industrial development. *It plays the same role for the world of free enterprise and democracy.*

This clear situation is sometimes befogged by the claim that China is too huge to be mastered by communism. The comfortable idea is presented that China would swallow and digest communism with the same ease as that with which she swallowed and made Chinese her old Mongol and Manchu conquerors. To read the lessons of history in this way is simply superficial. The Mongol and Manchu conquerors had military organization and tactics, but they did not have an economic system, a political system, and modern administrative and technical knowledge. Some of those who know most about the past of China are relatively innocent of knowledge on the tech-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

niques of tough modern politics. The modern police state can do many things in the realm of human control impossible for earlier tyrannies.

Chinese communism today has larger cadres of trained and disciplined and intelligent operators than Russian bolshevism had in 1917. Bolshevism in Russia had not only to seize the trappings of power, but to use them and to double and redouble the real power of the state. It had to take a country almost four-fifths illiterate and make it capable of reading propaganda and of learning new trades. Bolshevism proved its ability to use ruthless methods and to get the effect. Russia was less powerful than Britain or Germany when the Communists started. Russia, as measured by performance in the Second World War, had grown in power relative to almost all others, and the hold of communism was unshakable. There is no good reason to assume that they could not do the same in China. To believe that they could not carry out a Communist program in China should be classed as one of the varieties of the "Maginot mind," one of the products of faith in a line of defense based upon wishful thinking. Communism does not fail and lose control of a country merely because it fails to solve temporary economic difficulties. Total national ruin, by our standards, merely helps a police state to shatter opposition, and to cut its way out of troubles at inhuman price. *There is no easy way back from communism for any country that once falls under their power.*

B. THE CHINESE PROBLEM

The problem of China is simply how China can become a prosperous and democratic community, playing a role in a peaceful world. This does not mean the Americanization of China. It cannot mean the bolshevization of China. It does mean in many respects the modernization of China. And it must mean an end of political and military disorder, of economic poverty and misery, of static custom, of closed control of political power. Eventually it must mean genuine democracy, a consensus concerning the basis of the commonwealth within which parties can compete for constitutional power. It must mean a China free of domination by any force lower than the world community, itself a great and humane society.

Such a description of the problem is so broad as to seem idealistic rather than practical, abstract rather than concrete, dreamy rather than positive. It must be restated in more practical terms, and in order to do so it must be broken into subordinate problems, technological, agrarian, economic, internal political order, external political security, social problems, administrative problems, and finally the problem of democracy. The means available with which to meet each problem must also be considered, and these means represent the capabilities of China herself, of communism, and of the United States, insofar as these are relevant and can be brought into play. The separate problems are all related, and any adequate solution to one is intermeshed with the solutions to the others. However we may divide it for discussion, it remains one problem.

The problem of increasing population is soluble ultimately through the creation of a modern industrial civilization and in no other way. This permits the higher level of production in agriculture and industry

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

to support the people and to raise their standards. It also brings the eventual decline of the birth rate that checks the rise of population. The most rapid jump of population comes with the first impact of modernism, cutting the death rate before it cuts the birth rate. This led to the great expansion of population in Europe in the nineteenth century, and is having its effect in other areas, like China, today. But it contains its own cure to some degree. As people live longer, the age distribution of the population changes, and eventually the death rate resumes a stable relation to population. Communism offers no true means to face this problem in this century. It has had no occasion to face it in Russia. It sets too high a value upon cannon fodder to attempt any solution designed at stable human betterment. And it sets too high a value on future war potential to devote the products of industry to human welfare. Only a modern industry devoted to use and not to war can care for the growing population of China. This is the basis of the technological problem.

The technological problem in China is the problem of introducing modern industrial techniques, and modern industrial end products. China needs more telephones, more refrigeration, more radios, more clothes, more housing. In simplest terms, China must have a rising standard of living, and to do so must find ways to increase the productivity of Chinese labor. A basic element in a higher level of productivity is the increased use of physical power, other than human muscular power.

China is able to meet most of the immediate requirements for technological advance from her own resources. For energy and power she has ample coal resources and great possibilities of hydroelectric development. For a bare start she has the enormous manpower resources that permitted such past achievements as the Chinese Wall and the Yellow River embankments, and the more recent feats of building the wartime mountain highways and the Chengtu airfields. She needs engineers, but less than is often supposed, for her native handicraft skills are higher and more widely distributed than in any comparable mass of humanity. For the first stages of a great development much of Chinese industry would be small. One does not begin by building plants like Willow Run or Ford or Boeing or du Pont. The labor and the skills and the energy resources are all present, which, if activated by the restoration of stable economic conditions, would permit industrial and economic development at least to recover and surpass any past level of prosperity in China.

To advance beyond mere recovery will require real improvements, not only in the use of physical power or energy, but also real improvements in Chinese transportation. This means more rails, better roads, more trucks and busses, and better water transport. China will never need rails to the extent that rails were developed in the United States before the automobile. It is sometimes forgotten that more than one-third of all the railroads that existed at the peak of development in the United States have since been abandoned. Nevertheless, China needs more railroads than she has—perhaps twice as many; perhaps much more. To go beyond recovery will also mean a gigantic conservation program in the long run, with forestation, river control, and land use and land salvage beyond any precedent.

All of this will mean steel, and steel is the most unpromising of all the needs of China from the point of view of China's resources. There

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

seems to be little prospect that China could ever equal the United States in the quantity of steel in use in the economy, let alone equal the per capita level of the United States. That, however, remains no bar to very great increases from her present level. Steel for all of Asia, however, requires the establishment of peaceful and stable economic conditions in Manchuria and in Indonesia, and some degree of Japanese recovery. That is a longer range problem than China has to face at the moment, however, and China herself could make or buy several times as much steel as in the past, if normally healthy economic conditions were restored.

The agrarian problem, which is mainly a food production problem, parallels the technological problem in many respects. Chinese agriculture has the ability to meet the normal food requirements of the country whenever the country is at peace. There even remain areas where expansion could occur in Manchuria and the West. But the inability to pool the production of the country, to use local surpluses to make up local deficits caused by lack of transport or political disorders, has hampered the full use of what is produced, and has inhibited production for the national as against the local market.

The landholding system leaves much to be desired also. Tenancy and landlordism is only one side of this and not the major side. The plot system, end product of centuries of inheritance by which all holdings are split among sons, has left an extraordinary condition in which a typical holding of 3 or 4 acres is split in six little pieces spread a mile or more apart. The consolidation of plots into little farms would save the waste of too many fence lines and permit more rational land use generally. The fact that nearly half of the cultivated land is irrigated, almost as much protected also against floods, and nearly a quarter terraced, means, however, that consolidation of holdings will not change the physical arrangement of plots overnight, since in many areas the system of ditches and terraces cannot be erased by legal changes.

The Communist approach to the land problem is to break up and distribute the largest holdings in any region, and to break off the exchange between country and city. Thus the Communists simply have not grappled with the problem on any basis that really faces the facts, and cannot be held to have offered a true solution.

Chinese agriculture cannot be patterned upon American agriculture in any foreseeable future. The average production of food per Chinese farmer is about 3,000 pounds a year, while the average in America is about 44,000 pounds a year. At the same time Chinese yields of basic crops per acre are as high as or higher than in the United States.[15] This points to the tremendous disparity between the two systems in the use of human labor. Further, the simple fact that the Chinese have maintained the fertility of their best land through many centuries of use points to the fact that China has a system of fertilization that cannot be immediately improved by western fertilizers. But there remain many other things that the West could contribute, better seeds and plant varieties, insecticides and fungicides, refrigeration.

The wars have checked all progress with the agrarian problem, and have left an adverse political legacy. The last 10 years have tended to unite the Kuomintang with the landlord class too much, and with the peasants too little. They have left a weakened national

[15] Data are from Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples, ch. V, Farming in China.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

organism in every respect, and a weakened transport system in particular. And they have undermined the basis of economic stability essential to agriculture as well as to business. Finally, in this summer, the floods have stricken a country unprepared to meet them, even in terms of local efforts to hold the dikes in some areas because of the civil war, and unprepared to meet crop losses anywhere unless it can get foreign aid.

But no progress can be made on the technological and agrarian problems of China unless or until her general economic difficulties are straightened out. Years of creeping inflation, gradually accelerating since the war until it has become galloping inflation, have put a stop to almost all long-term commitments by businessmen and have deprived the peasant of any fair exchange for his produce. This condition has been mitigated for some time by the development of a technically illegal "money of account" based upon the combination of three elements: Hong Kong dollars, United States dollars, and gold bars. All of these three are of reasonably stable value, and the exchange between them is also reasonably stable, so that the available supplies of the three can be combined to make a broader security base than any one of them by itself, and permit an expansion of transactions on this base probably several times as great as the total actual supply of all three combined. Such a solution, though practically effective within limits, is of course far from having the effect of a genuinely stable and legal money system. Still more recently the Chinese National Government has attempted a general monetary reform. It was announced on August 19, and its prospect of success is not yet clear.

Behind the inflation lies the disorder of civil and international war. The Chinese economy has not been able to function as a national economy including Manchuria since 1931, and only very briefly since 1912. This has meant that the development of production in any part of the country for more or less remote markets within the country has been hampered or altogether prevented. Local self-sufficiency in China is remarkable, but by no means so remarkable that any substantial rise in general standards can occur without the stabilization of a free-trade area on the national scale.

To solve the economic problem in China means, in short, to create conditions the opposite of those discussed earlier under the heading, "The assets of Chinese communism." This, in its turn, is the problem of political order in China.

The first requisite is a stable national government controlling the entire national area. This is the sole means of abolishing the paralyzing risks of internal warfare and inflation. It must be swift, though it must also be a time-consuming process. It must, probably, rest upon various ideas and groups, as morale rises and as experience teaches a technique of effective reform. The second requisite is an immediate shot in the arm in the form of material aid, some food for the cities, some manufactured goods such as small motors and machines that fit into Chinese needs, some cotton for the Chinese textile industry. These are all needed to back up any stabilization of currency, and to provide incentives throughout the economy for normal economic activity. Given an end to the civil war and the solution of all other problems, China might get along without material aid, though much more slowly at first. There is also the special problem of food

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

shortages due to this summer's floods aggravating the situation. Neither China herself nor the Communists have any means to meet these needs. The United States can contribute to meet them, at least within moderate limits. But political order must come first.

This in turn leads to the military problem, victory in the civil war. It is apparent today that Communist capabilities in the civil war have been vastly increased since the Soviet occupation of Manchuria. It is apparent that China herself cannot now mobilize the capability to quickly defeat the Chinese Communists and establish a non-Communist national order. It is also apparent that with a modicum of military supplies and advice this might be possible. The United States could probably provide what is necessary, in spite of other commitments, for the type of equipment needed is in general simple and rudimentary, rifles rather than tanks, mortar shells rather than jet fighters.

Cheapness and mobility are the all-important characteristics of Chinese domestic warfare. The general grade of equipment is more modern than it was a decade ago, but it is still lower than was required for a pitched battle against the Japanese. Any stubborn transplanting of United States ideas of equipment and supply and training into Chinese military operations can convert a Chinese army from a footloose force into one tied to the apron strings of rail transport. Effective aid must be designed for the actual warfare that must be fought and won.

There is another aspect of the political problem. Thus far it has been discussed as an internal problem. But no state can be internally stable, to the degree of economic confidence in its stability, unless it can be regarded as stable also in its international position. There cannot be full business confidence in a nation subject to intervention or invasion by foreign powers.

The security of a nation in its international position has always hitherto been a function of its own power. Such power, in recent centuries, has been the endowment only of the leading European nations, and more recently of the United States. The British Dominions have rested, until very recently, upon the unassailable power of Britain herself. It would be difficult to name any community which has had great industrial progress and where secure political power was not an antecedent condition. Switzerland, or Belgium, which might be taken as exceptions, were special cases arising out of the balance of other powers, and conditioned by the existence of such other powers and the balance between them.

Such assurance against foreign intervention is a thing that cannot be guaranteed by the autonomous power of China herself for a long time to come. The Soviets are not at present in a position to extend a protecting shade, for they have no present claim to a justifying interest. The United Nations, which should ostensibly offer such security to all, cannot do so until the present degree of conflict of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union is removed, for each holds the power of veto over any settlement on the terms set by the other.

The United States is the sole entity in the world today so endowed with political power that it could conceivably extend to China an effective guaranty of territorial and political integrity. It has actually

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

in the past, for half a century, stated that the integrity of China was one of its important interests. It is the only power that can conceivably extend such a guaranty with even a plausible semblance that the guaranty is not in real fact an imperialist means of domination. The United States has demonstrated in the Philippines that the eventual genuine independence of such an area is not only a verbal promise but also is one that can be kept in political reality. The United States has proven, even by its mistakes, and at great risk and later cost, its reluctance to interfere in China. Britain has proven something of the same sort through the granting of self-determination to India and independence to Burma, but lacks the power to support a guaranty of Chinese integrity. Thus it is difficult to imagine a realistic solution of the economic problems of China without a solution of both the internal and the external political problems, and difficult to imagine practical solutions of these without United States aid. Both the conduct of United States policy, and its public presentation to the world, must be skillful if they are to overcome the adverse effect of Moscow propaganda.

To make such solutions bear fruit, there are also social problems within China herself that must become subjects of progressive solution. China requires mass education as a foundation for increasing modernization of everything from technology to politics. There is a great need for new elements in community life to gradually replace the former role of the family in Chinese society, a role that has been badly disrupted during the wars and which can scarcely be expected to recover its former importance. There is a need for most skillful development of local industries, and for their organization on a viable basis, to avoid the hyperurbanization that accompanied the growth of modern industry in the west.

These problems run over into what may be called the administrative problem. China lacks trained and experienced administrators of all kinds. Her great fund of handicraft skills and of commercial skills does not extend to what we know as administration. The Chinese know how to keep books in a commercial enterprise in such fashion that the owner can tell the state of the business but not so that impartial investigators can probe or appraise the business objectively. Statistics cannot be developed on any such basis, and economic policy cannot exist without statistics. Taxes of any modern type, on business income, for example, cannot be based on such a condition.

This is a problem of prevailing ethics and business custom reaching beyond anything that school courses can teach. It will not be met by merely sending Chinese to American schools, or by sending American instructors to China. But it is closely related to the whole of the foundations of economic and political morale in the Nation, and remains dependent like everything else upon the basic political solution.

China herself has shown that she can bring considerable resources to bear on these social and administrative problems. The efforts to find a basis for general literacy are varied and energetic. The great scholar and former Ambassador, Hu Shih, and the dynamic James Y. C. Yen have played prominent parts in this field. The latter, in particular, has developed an experimental combination of basic literacy, public information materials, and of local reform and democ-

80261—48——5

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

racy which both illustrates the interdependence of literacy and democracy, and points to a promising solution. For China no western parallels offer direct help in this problem. The Chinese language, with its ideographs instead of an alphabet, makes the problem of reading a different one. Also, one may remember, the west developed its present mass communications in the order: Printing, universal education, mass production of paper, high-speed presses, movies, radio. Thus the role of the printed word developed from Gutenberg to the early twentieth century in the absence of any other means of mass communication. Would it develop in the same way in the presence of alternative methods? That is doubtful, and China will offer a testing ground. There is another factor also. China has no visible or probable source of enough pulpwood to support even a fraction of the American level of paper consumption per capita. So the Chinese development of mass communications cannot be by direct imitation of the west. It must be original in many respects; in arriving at such an original solution Chinese ingenuity will be a major factor; and practical ingenuity, fortunately, is one of China's more ample resources.

The basic solutions of each of these partial problems, technological, economic, political, and others, must be preliminaries to the solution of the problem of democracy. The right to vote, and the meaning and effect of voting, rest upon a development of, and respect for, and accepted restraint upon, the capacity of man to approach the truth and therefore to make decisions. It also requires a recognition of imperfection, a tolerance of differing ideas, an acceptance of majority decision even when one disagrees, and a constitutional restraint upon decisions that go beyond the limits of a general consensus. All of this is expressed in a democratic society through the familiar outward institutions of democracy: the suffrage, the party system, the unpredictable change of the majority by the vote of the people, and the acceptance of the will of the majority within the constitution. But it cannot be expressed in these ways alone; it is expressed also in the right to hold and manage property including productive property, in the freedom of investigation in science, in religious tolerance.

One of the greatest errors of the modern mind has been the idea that democracy is a simple system that can be installed overnight by approval of a document declaring its principles. Thus every country that has adopted a "democratic" constitution on paper has been hailed as another democracy. And every country that has not done so has been criticized as wrong-headed, wicked of heart, and laggard of will.

A democratic spirit has never developed in any people in a single generation since the beginning of the world. It has never developed without favorable circumstances. The beginning of democracy is a process of development, not an instantaneous event. In Britain it was the long series of reforms, from 1832, extending for a century, built upon the foundations laid in the power of Parliament and Cabinet rule before that, that made Britain a democracy as we know it. In the United States it was not just the Declaration of Independence, but the growth of democracy from the time of Jefferson, through Jackson and Lincoln to the day of women's suffrage, that produced the democracy we now have. We have been through a long-drawn-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

out course in the school of hard knocks in becoming a democracy, and we have not reached any final goal, and when we demand that others become democratic overnight we show that we have forgotten many of the lessons. China has no magic carpet with which to fly where we had to plod.

China brings to this great task a wealth of native resources that certainly permit optimism. The Chinese culture and the temper of the Chinese man is already individualistic in many respects. Self-respect and a regard for the dignity of others is native to Chinese life. A capacity for enterprise, for pioneering on the land, or for initiative in business, or for originality in thought is already there.

All this is threatened in China as in Europe by the impact of new problems, the challenge to which a response has not yet developed, the pressure of events rushing faster than the pace of adaptation. China needs a capitalism eventually like ours today in its readiness to treat profits as further capital entering into the expansion of production and of general welfare, and far less as the means for private luxury and waste than in an earlier and cruder time. This requires a confidence in enduring order, for capital under political risk can play only for quick return. China needs labor better paid, but also an understanding of the limits that labor's share of the dividend cannot surpass without injury to the economy through inflation, a sophistication that we have scarcely attained ourselves.

China needs power and industries and a high rate of capital formation, with an urgency that makes it difficult to wait for the conditions that would promote private saving, and make it attractive to plunge into state capitalism as the Soviets did in their 5-year plans. China needs legislative decisions in a hurry, and will be attracted by the method of dictatorship that can provide such decisions faster than a constitutional order can be developed or can function after it has been developed.

Whether or not China may grow toward democracy will be a close thing. She can, but she may not. Aid in promoting the conditions that favor democracy will be decisive, for the trend has been the other way for 10 years, and China has not herself the resources to reverse the trend. In terms of urgency, of first things first, military strength and political security must come first, better economic conditions second, and more democratic politics third.

Despair about the anti-Communist forces in China is generally based upon hopelessness about the prospects of the National Government. It is extraordinarily difficult for anyone outside of China to observe or to feel the presence of unorganized vitality if such exists.

That vitality does exist, that it takes forms that fit the meaning of the second of the "three people's principles," that is, of local or regional initiative along democratic lines, is fortunately evident. A prime and recent example though by no means the only one that could be mentioned, is the upswing of morale in north China. Gen. Fu Tso-yi in Peiping is now judged by some good observers to be the most effective anti-Communist leader in China. He has initiated a new move to gain local support for the army in order to strengthen his military effort. He has countered the Communist land reforms with moderate reforms of his own in reoccupied territory. He has trusted the people, and marked this trust by arming the villages for self-defense against

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

the Communists. The leftist tendencies of the students at Peiping have been checked, not by police, but by direct counteraction of angry peasants, and the campuses are now the quietest in China. In spite of inadequate support from the National Government the northern Chinese under such leadership have achieved a spectacular increase of morale, and have greatly improved the prospect of holding the area. *It has become increasingly clear both that the United States cannot afford to write off north China as a loss, and that there is less reason to do so.*

Communism has resources enough to make all Chinese problems very difficult to solve by Chinese means alone. The Chinese Communists have an army that cannot be quickly defeated by any Chinese forces. They have control of rural areas without which Chinese agriculture cannot be organized in relation to the whole of China. They have control, or the power of interference, in industrial areas in the north and Manchuria without which the Chinese economy cannot be reestablished. They have the ability, if they win the civil war, to make the whole country a Soviet system. And they have a doctrine which pretends to offer concise solutions for all problems, solutions that do not impose unrealistic demands upon human nature in facing the problems China faces. For a country facing the impact of developments all in one century that required four centuries in the west, the Communist methods, because they evade the real problems of democracy, seem in many respects easier and more clear than any others that have been offered.

There is, therefore, a deficiency of both military and economic resources to meet the problem in China. China cannot at present mobilize enough military power to establish and guarantee internal political order. China cannot, in the near future, guarantee her own immunity to external interference. China cannot, by herself, make a start toward economic recovery for lack of any margin of material goods. China cannot, by herself, find enough administrative and technical talent to back up a general recovery.

The United States is the only source that possibly has the capabilities to make up the Chinese lack. It has also other commitments, and must husband its resources to balance all commitments. But the balance of commitments and resources will improve if China is salvaged, and decline if China is lost.

It has already been pointed out that Marxism is more appropriate to countries in the stage of development of Europe in 1850 than to any other. For the so-called backward countries, arriving at this same stage in the twentieth century, Marxism is even more appropriate than it was for Europe in the nineteenth, for the crowding together of the problems of progress increase the load, make it more difficult to solve the problems and load the dice more in favor of nondemocratic means. Marxian communism stands ready with a convenient blueprint for the solution of all economic and social and political problems by nondemocratic means. The United States is essentially post-Marxian from this point of view, a country that has passed the most serious problems brought by modern industrial progress without breaking the back of democracy in the process. But it has not worked out for the benefit of others any explanation of how to follow. In this respect China is most clearly a testing ground. If the pre-Marxian countries can learn to overtake the post-Marxian

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

countries without diverging on the tangent of communism, the goal of a peaceful and democratic world will be within reach. The United States must work with them to devise the method. Assistance to China, military, economic, and political, and administrative assistance are unavoidable means to our ends.

But the greatest need of all is intellectual collaboration between the United States and China. There is work to be done. The Communists have worked for a generation in developing the theory and the tactics whereby to bring the backward countries directly to communism, short-cutting the development of capitalism and indefinitely postponing any development of democracy. We also have worked, with intense preoccupation, and have shown how the great and supposedly fatal evils of capitalism can be overcome. But we have hardly yet examined or analyzed or understood our own achievements.

We have reconciled five great economic and political essentials, not perfectly, but with continuing vitality of growth. The first of these is private property as an indispensable foundation for the role of individual initiative in the economy, and of that individual dignity and stature in the face of government which underlies democracy. The second is the continuing expansion of production, far beyond the level at which, by Marxist prediction, capitalism must become sterile. The third is an ever-increasing realization of democracy in politics, of the freedom from control over the channels of information that is necessary to free opinion, and of freedom to vote without fear or favor. Fourth is the maintenance of majority rule, without which government is reduced to the innocuous level at which unanimity can be found. The fifth is respect for the freedom of other peoples as exemplified in the Philippines.

The realization of these principles in America is imperfect; it is not in the nature of this world that it should be otherwise. Completion is not to be expected of it. But in its enduring progress it contains the promise that the Marxist prediction is wrong, for we are accomplishing things which Marx and Lenin held to be impossible. With all our present imperfections, and all the necessity for everlasting effort, we nevertheless have passed half a century of development beyond the fallacious limits set by Communist prophets. *This is not only the negation of Marxism; it is the affirmation of the possibility that peace and freedom can be realized in a society of men.*

Now we must understand fully how it is that we have done it. We must understand it so fully that we can work out with the Chinese and many other peoples the clear pattern that must support the hope that they can do it, too; that they can find a direct and practicable road from where they are toward where we are, free of the meanderings of history through the ills of the older capitalism and imperialism. To compete for men's faith the road must appear, at a minimum, to offer as plausible a short cut toward the future as does communism. But the minimum is not the limit. Though the task is far from done, it is started, and the outlines of a simpler, more direct, and more hopeful line can be seen already. Whether war or peace shall be our common fate we must work with China, and can work with China, to seek the modern democratic and non-Communist way for the peoples of the earth.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Digitized by Google

Original from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

APPENDIX

Appendix A

FROM WAR TO CIVIL WAR IN CHINA

A Chronology of Events Covering the Period, May 9, 1945, to May 25, 1948

May 9, 1945: War in Europe ends.

August 9, 1945: Russia enters war against Japan and launches attack along Siberian-Manchurian border.

August 14, 1945: China and the U. S. S. R. sign 30-year treaty of friendship and alliance.

The text of the treaty was released in Moscow on August 26. By its terms, the parties pledged mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial entity and agreed to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs. Additional agreements concerned joint control over Manchurian railroads, special Soviet rights in Port Arthur and Dairen, Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and the "independent" status of Outer Mongolia.

August 26, 1945: Mao Tse-tung arrives in Chungking for talks with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on China's problems of unity.

The Communist leader ignored the first two invitations of the Generalissimo, but accepted the third. He was accompanied to Chungking by American Ambassador Hurley who had gone to Yenan to urge his acceptance. The talks between Mao and Chiang continued until early October. On October 11 a joint statement was issued containing inconclusive generalizations with respect to the avoidance of civil strife and the need to continue under the leadership of the Generalissimo to work for unity and democracy.

September 2, 1945: Formal surrender of Japan takes place aboard the U. S. S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.

September 9, 1945: At Nanking, General Ho Ying-Chin receives formal surrender of Japanese forces in China.

October 3, 1945: United States marines land in Tientsin, North China, to disarm Japanese in the area on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek.

October 28, 1945: Government-Communist military clashes break out in 11 Provinces.

November 2, 1945: U. S. S. R. announces the beginning of the withdrawal of its armed forces from Manchuria in accord with the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945.

November 8, 1945: Soviet troops withdraw from Manchurian ports of Hulutao and Yinkow leaving Chinese Reds in control, with the result that Nationalist forces in United States transports offshore are unable to land.

November 16, 1945: Shanhaikwan, strategic gateway to Manchuria, is captured by Nationalist forces.

November 27, 1945: Patrick Hurley resigns as Ambassador to China and Gen. George C. Marshall is appointed special envoy.

November 27, 1945: Chungking reports that the Soviet military authorities have agreed to help Central Government forces to take over Manchuria and have ordered Chinese Communists out of Changchun and Mukden.

December 1, 1945: At the request of the Central Government Soviet Union agrees to postpone its troop withdrawal from Manchuria until January 3.

December 15, 1945: President Truman issues policy statement on China.

December 27, 1945: Big Three foreign ministers (Bevin, Byrnes, and Molotov) issue communique on their Moscow Conference December 16–26, 1945).

Section IV of the communique dealt with China. It revealed the general agreement of the Big Three with President Truman's policy statement of

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

December 16, 1945. In addition Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov expressed their accord on the undesirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities."

January 5, 1946: China officially recognizes independence of Outer Mongolian Republic.

January 10, 1946: Generalissimo Chiang announces that Government and Communist negotiators working with General Marshall had reached a cease-fire agreement.

At the same time, the Generalissimo revealed that the government had decided to repeal restrictions on civil liberties, recognize equality of all political parties, promote local, elective self-government, and release political prisoners.

January 31, 1946: People's Consultative Conference passes unanimous resolutions on major internal questions.

The principal PCC resolutions called for (1) reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Yuan on a coalition basis to serve as the supreme organ of government until convocation of a national assembly; (2) nationalization of the armed forces; and (3) establishment of a reviewing committee to revise the 1936 draft constitution.

February 21, 1946: Anti-Russian demonstrations break out in Chungking after revelation of text of Yalta agreements and in protest against delay in withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria.

February 25, 1946: Government and Communist negotiators reach agreement on reorganization and nationalization of all of China's armed forces.

The agreement negotiated by Nationalist Gen. Chang Chih-chung and Communist Gen. Chou En-lai with the aid of General Marshall provided for a progressive reduction in total armed strength from an estimated 5,000,000 men to 60 divisions (40,000 over an 18-month period. Fifty divisions were to be Government, and ten Communist in composition.

March 11, 1946: General Marshall leaves Chungking to report back on progress of his mission to President Truman.

March 12, 1946: Central Government forces enter Mukden, Manchuria, 1 day after withdrawal of Soviet troops.

March 19, 1946: Chinese Communist threaten to bolt unity agreement, charging that Kuomintang has failed to relinquish one-party control of the Government.

April 1, 1946: Generalissimo Chiang states that demands of Chinese Communists for a share in control of Manchuria will not be considered until government completes taking over region from Soviet occupation forces.

April 9, 1946: Chinese Communist newspaper makes violent personal attack on Chiang Kai-shek.

April 18, 1946: Government offers to limit number of its troops in Manchuria if Communists will stay clear of Peiping-Mukden Railroad and permit Nationalist forces to occupy Changchun and Harbin in Manchuria.

April 15, 1946: Communist Gen. Chou En-lai announces state of hostilities in Manchuria and Red forces attack government garrison in the capital city of Changchun.

April 18, 1946: General Marshall returns to China.

May 1, 1946: Seat of central government officially returns from Chungking to Nanking.

June 6, 1946: Generalissimo Chiang orders Nationalist troops in Manchuria to cease fire for a 15-day armistice period.

June 16, 1946: Edwin Pauley's reparations mission reports Manchurian industry has been crippled by Soviet stripping of equipment.

June 20, 1946: Communists extend anti-American propaganda campaign to Shanghai and other areas.

June 23, 1946: Mao Tse-tung demands United States cease all aid to Central Government and withdraw American forces from China.

June 29, 1946: United States State Department announces that American military aid will go to China if and when Kuomintang and Communist armies are united.

July 21, 1946: Government troops launch broad military campaign to clear North China railroads of Communists.

July 22, 1946: Mme. Sun Yat-sen charges reactionaries in America and China are seeking to promote war between Russia and United States over China's internal affairs.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

August 10, 1946: General Marshall and United States Ambassador Stuart issue joint statement declaring that it "appears impossible" for the Kuomintang and Communist to reach agreement.

August 14, 1946: Generalissimo Chiang promises to end one-party rule and inaugurate constitutional government without further delay.

August 14, 1946: Generalissimo Chiang charges Communists with responsibility for break-down of peace and Yenan responds by ordering general mobilization of all forces.

November 4, 1946: United States and China sign treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation.

The Communists bitterly opposed this treaty, labeling it as "imperialist." Subsequently, they sought to make November 4 into a "National Humiliation Day."

November 15, 1946: National Assembly convenes in Nanking in spite of boycott by the Communists who charge that its unilateral summoning by the Central Government is illegal.

December 18, 1946: President Truman issues policy statement on China which, in effect, acknowledges failure of American efforts to secure peace in China.

December 25, 1946: National Assembly at Nanking approves new Chinese Constitution by an almost unanimous vote.

December 30, 1946: University students in China begin mass demonstrations demanding withdrawal of United States troops from China.

The demonstrations, protesting the alleged rape of a Chinese girl by United States marines, began in Peiping and spread to Shanghai and Nanking. On January 4, 1947, Premier T. V. Soong ordered Chinese authorities to act to halt the demonstrations.

December 31, 1946: Generalissimo Chiang states that the Government policy of settlement of the dispute with the Communists by political means remains unchanged.

January 6, 1947: United States State Department reveals that it has requested the U. S. S. R. to permit China to resume control over Dairen.

January 6, 1947: The White House announces the recall of Gen. George C. Marshall from China.

On the following day, Marshall issued a statement in Nanking blaming extremists in both the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party for the failure of his mediation. He declared that the best hope for China "would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties."

January 9, 1947: Nanking makes offer to resume peace talks with Communists.

January 16, 1947: The Central Government named Chang Chih-chung, Governor of Sinkiang, to visit Yenan in an effort to reopen peace negotiations. Two days later, however, Yenan rejected further parleys, and other Government offers to resume talks did not change the Communist position.

January 29, 1947: United States State Department announces the abandonment of American efforts to mediate the internal dispute in China.

February 1, 1947: Fighting breaks out between Communist and Government forces in Shantung Province of North China.

February 23, 1947: Fighting between Government and Communist forces in Manchuria is reported resumed.

February 28, 1947: Central Government orders all Communist negotiators and representatives to leave territories it controls immediately.

March 11, 1947: Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh objects to Molotov's proposal to discuss the Chinese situation at the Moscow conference in which China is not represented.

March 15, 1947: Generalissimo Chiang declares that "the Government * * * cannot sit tight and watch the spread of this (communist) disturbance without taking measures to suppress it."

March 19, 1947: Yenan, capital of Chinese Reds, is taken by Central Government troops.

April 1, 1947: Communists launch offensive in Honan Province of north China.

April 5, 1947: Communists kill several United States marines in raid on munitions dump near Tangku in north China.

April 7, 1947: Russia charges United States has failed to withdraw its troops from China.

April 26, 1947: President Truman orders transfer of unspecified number of surplus naval ships to China.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

May 1, 1947: Premier Chang Chün expresses willingness of Central Government to settle internal conflict through political means.

June 11, 1947: Chinese foreign ministry reveals it has protested to the Soviet and Outer Mongolian Governments concerning over-the-border raids on Sinkiang Province.

June 27, 1947: United States State Department announces sale to China of 130,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition originally manufactured for Chinese Army.

July 6, 1947: Generalissimo Chiang charges Chinese Communists are heirs of Japanese imperialism and urges Chinese people to join war against them.

July 12, 1947: Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer is appointed to head United States fact-finding mission to China (and Korea).

> Wedemeyer issued a statement on his arrival at Nanking on July 22, explaining that his purpose was "to ascertain all facts pertinent to the political, economic, and military situation, favorable and unfavorable." This intent was reiterated in a statement made at Shanghai on July 26. High lights of his remarks on leaving China on August 24, 1947, were: (1) there is one point on which all hearts and minds in China unite * * * a passionate longing for peace; (2) instead of seeking solutions to the problems * * * considerable time and effort are spent in blaming outside influences or in seeking outside assistance; (3) recovery awaits inspirational leadership and a moral and spiritual resurgence which can come only from within China; (4) if the Chinese Communists are truly patriotic and are interested primarily in the well-being of their country, they will stop voluntarily the employment of force in their efforts to impose ideologies; (5) the existing Central Government can win and retain the undivided and enthusiastic support of the bulk of the Chinese people by removing the incompetent and/or corrupt officials that now occupy many positions of responsibility in the government; and (6) it should be accepted that military force in itself will not eliminate communism.

August 14, 1947: U. S. State Department dispatches second note to U. S. S. R. regarding failure of latter to turn back control of Dairen to Chinese.

September 16, 1947: Sun Fo describes United States far eastern policy as one of "vacillation, uncertainty and confusion," so that China has little choice other than to seek closer cooperation with the U. S. S. R.

October 1, 1947: Government troops capture Chefoo, important Communist base in Shantung.

October 5, 1947: Government naval units capture Weihaiwei, last Communist-controlled seaport in northern Shantung.

October 13, 1947: William C. Bullitt, writing in Life magazine, advocates immediate United States economic and military aid to the Central Government of China to stop the rising tide of communism in the Far East.

October 18, 1947: Premier Chang Chun reveals that only 9.2 percent of the area of Manchuria and 39.9 percent of the population remain under government control.

October 20, 1947: United States State Department decides against making public Wedemeyer report on China (and Korea).

October 27, 1947: China and the United States sign agreement concerning use of $30,000,000 in post-UNRRA relief aid voted by Congress.

October 27, 1947: Government outlaws Democratic League on charges of complicity with Chinese Communists.

November 21, 1947: First general election in China's history begins.

December 19, 1947: United States Congress approves $18,000,000 share for China as part of $540,000,000 interim-aid appropriation for Austria, France and Italy.

December 25, 1947: Chinese Communist radio reports that Mao Tse-tung has ordered the elimination of "undesirables" from the party ranks and has called for the formation of a Cominform of the Far East.

January 3, 1948: Central Government reports a budgetary deficit for 1947 totaling C. N. 26.4 trillion dollars (Chinese national currency) which is equal to about United States 296.6 million dollars.

January 11, 1948: Missionaries living north of the Yangtze River are advised by United States officials to withdraw unless prepared to live in Communist-occupied territory.

January 11, 1948: Tangku, the port of Tientsin, falls to Chinese Communists.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

January 16, 1948: Chinese demonstrators burn British consulate and damage several British buildings in Canton.

The anti-British outburst was touched off by the forced removal of some 2,000 Chinese squatters in Kowloon (Hong Kong). Sympathy demonstrations were staged by Chinese in Nanking and Shanghai.

January 18, 1948: Central Yuan urges Government to press Great Britain for the return of Hong Kong to China.

Feburary 1, 1948: Minister for Social Affairs estimates refugees of civil war at 33,000,000.

February 18, 1948: President Truman asks Congress to authorize an aid program similar to ERP for China.

March 13, 1948: Premier Chang Chun states that the government will concentrate on building up Yangtze area and south China to offset loss of industries in north China and Manchuria.

March 18, 1948: Generalissimo Chiang declares that "unless an all-out effort is made to turn the tide of war in central China, the last reservoir of Kuomintang strength faces complete collapse."

March 29, 1948: China's First National Assembly convenes at Nanking.

April 3, 1948: President Truman signs $6,098,000,000 foreign-aid bill. The bill included an authorization for an appropriation of $463,000,000 for China. $338,000,000 of this total was earmarked for relief and reconstruction and the balance of $125,000,000 could be spent for whatever purpose, including military, deemed necessary.

April 9, 1948: Generalissimo Chiang declares that the Central Government will "wipe out" the Communists south of the Yellow River by a new strategy during the next 6 months.

April 14, 1948: Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh mentions four obligations under the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 which had not been fulfilled by the U. S. S. R.

The obligations listed were: (1) Except in Port Arthur no Soviet troops are to be stationed in Manchuria; (2) the U. S. S. R. is to afford moral and material support only to the National Government; (3) the Soviet Union is not to interfere in the affairs of Sinkiang Province; and (4) the independence of outer Mongolia is to be respected.

April 19, 1948: National Assembly elects Chiang Kai-shek President of China.

April 22, 1948: Communists reenter their former capital of Yenan.

April 28, 1948: General Li Tsung-jen is elected Vice President of China despite strong opposition of the Kuomintang party machine.

May 20, 1948: Generalissimo Chiang takes oath as first constitutional president of China.

In his inaugural address, the President stated that "comprehensive political, economic and social reforms" were essential to defeat the Communists and he insisted that the Reds would have to be eradicated as obstacles to "unity, liberty and progress."

May 24, 1948: Dr. Wong Wen-hao, an independent, is named Premier of China.

May 25, 1948: Chinese Communist radio reports that an integrated "north China liberated area" has been established, covering parts of the provinces of Hopeh, Shansi, Shantung, Honan, Jehol, Chahar, and Sinyuan.

Appendix B

CHINA'S NEW DEMOCRACY

(By Mao Tse-tung)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

(The New Democracy was written toward the end of 1940 by Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the party's recognized ideological leader. It is generally regarded as the most authoritative expression of the platform and policies of the Chinese Communist Party. There are a number of translations in English, of which the American edition with an introduction by Earl Browder published by the New Century Co. of New York, has been subjected to considerable criticism as bowdlerized. Lin Yu-tang, in a digest of the New Democ-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

party prepared for the Chinese News Service, a Chinese Government agency in the United States, charges that the American translation omits or plays down the phrases that reveal the strict Communist line, especially all phrases that should be translated as "dictatorship" or related terms. The text reproduced below was printed by Sharaf Athar Ali, New Age Printing Press, Bombay, India. It has been selected as the best available at the time this is [illegible] prepared.

The masterly cleverness with which Mao spelled out the strategy of the Trojan horse tactics, while masking it in the appearance of liberalism, has been discussed in section 3, C, of this report. In this pamphlet on China's New Democracy the basic Communist line in the revolutionary development of colonial and semi-colonial countries has been given its highest expression. It is rarely that any Communist succeeds in avoiding heresy except by painstakingly avoiding any originality. Mao's pamphlet is not in any way heretical, but nevertheless it carries the analysis of the problems of communism in China, and in any other country in a comparable stage, to a more detailed level than any other treatment had done. The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, in September 1, 1928, adopted a resolution on The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and semi-Colonies which laid down the general strategic and political outline of the problem. This Congress, be it noted, was the first held after the expulsion of Trotsky, and its main task was to lay down a line on all major problems free of all taint of the Trotskyist heresies. At the Seventh World Congress, on August 7, 1935, Wang Ming, a Chinese Communist, delivered a speech on the same problem, The Revolutionary Movement in Colonial Countries. Mao has built upon and advanced from the basic line of these earlier documents, but has in no way violated any of their essentials. That the essential line remains as laid down 20 years ago is indicated by the articles of Andre Marty on The National and Colonial Question in L'Humanite for August 11 and 18, 1946, articles which have not been attacked or repudiated by any Communist source, and which maintain the same fundamental position.

INTRODUCTION

Since the war against Japan began in 1937, a very optimistic and buoyant mood has prevailed among the Chinese people. Until recently, when theories of compromise with the enemy and anti-Communist slanders have once again begun to be peddled on the market, we have always been looking cheerfully at the future. But once again our people throughout the country have been plunged into an atmosphere of gloom. Once again such bewildering questions as "What is to be done?" "Where is China going?" are now asked at the front, especially among literary workers and students, who are more alive and display more sensitiveness than others in such matters.

It may not, then, be unhelpful for me here to take the occasion of the publication of the work Chinese Culture, as an opportunity to give a brief view of the outlook and trends of Chinese politics and China's culture, although in the latter field, I should add, I am merely a beginner. I hope that my article will serve as usefully as possible as an introduction to a Nation-wide discussion from which we will be in a position to draw, to our nation's good, proper conclusions regarding the future of Chinese culture.

Let me state at the outset that the only scientific approach is the search for truth through practice while the arrogant attitude of self-praise or self-styled authority helps no investigation. In the disastrous circumstances such as we are in now, nothing short of the adoption of a scientific method and a sense of responsibility on our own part can ever save us and lead us toward emancipation. There is only one truthful answer to any question. The question, what is the truth, however, is not decided by anybody's individual preferences, but by practice on the basis of objective thinking. It is the revolutionary practice of thousands of the people that is the measure of truth.

We Communists of China have for years been engaged in guiding not only political and economic revolutions, but also in directing cultural changes. The aim of all our efforts has been the building of a new society and a new nation of the Chinese people. In such a new society and new nation, along with a new political organization and a new economy, a new culture must arise. That is to say, we

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

have to transform not only the politically oppressed and economically exploited China into a politically free and economically prosperous China, but also the China which is old and backward in civilization into a nation marching forward under the sun of a new culture. In short, we have to build a new China; our aim is to create a new culture. But what kind of a new culture should it be?

Any variety of culture, as it appears in a thought form, is the reflection of the political organization and economy of a specific type of society, the politics of which in its turn is the concentrated expression of the economic relations prevalent in the same. Conversely, the culture of a certain society exerts no small influence over the corresponding political and economic relations.

This is our fundamental viewpoint on the relation between culture, on the one hand, and politics and economy, on the other; as also between politics and economy in relation to each other. Therefore, it is the specific forms of politics and economy that determine the corresponding forms of culture, which in turn exert influence over the very same forms of politics and economy.

"It is not the social consciousness," wrote Marx, "that determines the social being." He further noted: "Philosophers have been trying to explain the universe in one way or another, but what is important is to change it." In formulating the relation between being and consciousness, Marx gave the first scientific explanation known to human history. It was on the basis of this explanation that Lenin outlined his brilliant, revolutionary Theory of Reflection, which was then so profoundly further developed by him. In studying the cultural problem, we ought not to forget this point.

It is, therefore, clear enough for us to see that the old culture of the Chinese Nation that we are to discard must be seen in relation to the old political and economic relations in our country; and also that the new culture that we are to build, must be seen in relation to the new political and new economic organization of our Nation. The old politics and old economy of the Chinese Nation is the basis of its old culture. A new politics and a new economy should be the basis of a new culture of the Chinese Nation.

I. POLITICS—OLD AND NEW

What are, then, the so-called old politics and the old economy of the Chinese Nation and its old culture?

Down from the ancient dynasties of Chou and Chin (1100 B. C.–700 B. C.) the Chinese Nation until the last century was a feudal society, of which the politics was feudal politics, the economy a feudal economy, and consequently, the culture as the reflection of its corresponding forms of politics and economy could be nothing but a form of feudal culture.

But the period since the invasion of foreign capitalism nearly a hundred years ago (Opium War of 1839), down to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, ushered in the gradual growth of capitalism; and China has been emerging into a semi-colonial, semifeudal society. Now we have a colonial society in the occupied areas, a fundamentally semifeudal structure. While under or free of the Japanese rule, the social structure is of a predominantly feudal type. This is the nature of contemporary Chinese society. These are the social conditions of present-day China. As the administration, the politics and the economy of this society are of a semicolonial, semifeudal nature, naturally, as a reflection of this form of politics and economy, the culture is also a semicolonial, semifeudal one.

All these political, economic and cultural forms which prevail are the ones which we aim to destroy by our revolution. What we are to discard are the old forms of politics, economy and culture of this semicolonial, semifeudal society, and what we have to build instead are things of an entirely different nature—i. e., new forms of politics, economy and culture of the Chinese Nation.

What, then, is the new politics and new economy of the Chinese Nation, and what can be its new culture?

Let us first look at the progress of the Chinese revolution. As we know, its course of development is in two stages: (1) The democratic revolution, (2) the socialist revolution. These are stages of a different nature. The above-mentioned democratic revolution is not in the sense of the old democracy, but a new pattern of democracy, or new democracy.

We can consequently declare with conviction that the new politics of the Chinese Nation should be the politics of new democracy, the new economy of the Chinese Nation should be the economy of new democracy, and the new culture, the culture of new democracy.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

This is the historical peculiarity of the present phase of the Chinese revolution. All political parties and people devoting themselves to the Chinese revolution should in no way fail to bear in mind this very historical peculiarity, otherwise they will never be able to lead, to fight and to carry out the revolution to its victorious end and will certainly be brushed aside by the people.

II. TWO STAGES OF THE REVOLUTION

The historical peculiarity of the Chinese revolution, then, is that the course of the revolution must develop in two stages, of which the first stage should be a democratic revolution as is generally known, but the democracy must be of a new and specific kind, born of China's own history—i. e., a new democracy. Here, one would ask, how did the historical peculiarity of China's development assume its present form? Has it been so for the past century, or is it the product of a shorter period?

A glimpse at Chinese and world history shows that this historical peculiarity of the Chinese revolution did not come into being until the end of World War I. Below is a brief description of its origin.

If the nature of the present Chinese society is a semicolonial, semifeudal one, then the progress of the Chinese revolution is determined by it as a two-step one: The first step is to turn the semicolonial, semifeudal society into an independent democratic society; the second step will be to develop the revolution for the building up of a socialist society. The present phase of the Chinese revolution falls obviously within the period of the first step.

The beginning of the first stage of the Chinese revolution can be traced back to the Opium War (1839–42) when China began to emerge gradually from feudal society to semicolonial, semifeudal society. Then followed an endless stream of struggles: The Taiping Rebellion (1850–64), the Sino-French War (1881–85), the Sino-Japanese War (1894), the reform movement (1898), the revolution of 1911, the student movement of May 4 (1919), the anti-imperialist movement of May 30 (1925), the land revolution, the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist movement of December 9 (1935), and the present anti-Japanese war. All these struggles, from one angle or another, and in different periods and degrees, were and have been fights against imperialists and feudal influences for an independent and democratic society, that is to say, for the fulfilment of the first stage of the Chinese revolution. The revolution of 1911, it may be noted, marked the beginning of this revolution in a more complete sense. It was, however, by no means a proletarian revolution, but a bourgeois-democratic one. There is yet a long way to go before this revolution is successfully accomplished because its enemies still remain very strong. It is while referring to the accomplishment of this bourgeois-democratic revolution that late Dr. Sun Yat-sen uttered his famous warning: "The revolution has yet to be fought out; comrades, hold on."

But the circumstances of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution have been changed since the last World War and the establishment of a Socialist state on one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, i. e., after the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Before that time, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution was within the orbit of the world bourgeois-democratic revolution; it was a part of it.

From then on, the old Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution comes within the orbit of, and in its character forms a part of the world proletarian Socialist revolution.

How do we account for this change? It took place because the first imperialist World War and the first victorious Socialist revolution had changed the very direction of the progress of world history and opened up a new epoch.

When the world capitalist front was smashed on the sector of one-sixth of the globe, and when it has already shown itself to be shaking in other parts; when the remaining capitalist part cannot survive except by holding on to colonies and semicolonies; when a Socialist state has come into being and has declared its willingness to help the movement of national liberation of all the colonies and semicolonies; when the working class of the capitalist countries is becoming more and more free from the yoke of the influence of the social-democratic parties, and is supporting the national liberation movements of colonies and semicolonies; when, therefore, during such a time there has grown in any colony or semicolony, any anti-imperialist movement, such a revolutionary movement can no more be within the orbit of the old world bourgeois-democratic revolution but within the new. It forms a part no longer of the old bourgeois and capitalist world revolution, but of the proletarian, Socialist world revolution. The colonies or semicolonies

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

where such revolutionary movements are in existence should no longer be treated as allies of the world capitalist front, but of the world Socialist revolutionary front.

The first stage of this revolution in colonial and semicolonial countries—though according to its social nature, it is fundamentally still a bourgeois-democratic one, of which the objective requirements still basically call for the clearance of the way to capitalist development—yet, despite this, this revolution is no longer the old, wholesale bourgeois-led revolution for the building of capitalist society and a state of the bourgeois dictatorship type, but a new type of revolution, wholly or partly led by the proletariat, the first stage of which aims at the setting up of a new democratic society, a new state of the combined dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. The fundamental character of this revolution will never vary until the arrival of the stage of Socialist revolution, though during its progress, it may pass through several minor stages in accordance with the possible changes in the attitude of enemies and allies.

Such a form of democratic revolution, because it is thoroughly against the interests of the imperialists, is bound to be hated and opposed by the imperialists; yet, at the same time, welcomed and helped by the Socialist country and the socialistic international proletariat.

It is inevitable that this revolution becomes a part of the proletarian Socialist world revolution.

The correct thesis that the Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution, was first put forth during the period of the Great Revolution of 1924–27, by the Chinese Communists and accepted by all those who then engaged in the anti-imperialist and antifeudal struggle, though at that time, it was still a concept rather in its outline, still to be developed. Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, I can recall, when staying at Samtau, Canton, during the anti-Chen campaign in 1926, also said in a public meeting: "The Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution."

The "world revolution" to which I have referred is not the world revolution in its old sense. The period of the old bourgeois world revolution has passed long ago; it is the new world revolution, the Socialist world revolution. Naturally, our revolution is a part of the new Socialist world revolution, not that of the old bourgeois one. This is an exceedingly great change, unprecedented in Chinese or world history.

It is the revolutionary thesis of Stalin upon which the Chinese Communist built this correct thesis.

This is what Stalin wrote as far back as 1918. In his article on the first anniversary of the November Revolution he said: "The great international significance of the October Revolution chiefly consists in the fact that—

"(1) It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular question of combating national oppression into the general question of emancipating the oppressed nations, colonies, and semicolonies from imperialism.

"(2) It has opened up vast possibilities and revealed the proper way of achieving emancipation, and thereby greatly helped the cause of emancipation of the oppressed nations of the west and the east, having drawn them into the common channel of the victorious struggle against imperialism.

"(3) It has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist west and the enslaved east, having created a new line of revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the west, through the Russian revolution, to the oppressed nations of the east."

Since the publication of this article, the theory of the colonial and semicolonial revolutions has been freed from the old category, and has become a part of the theory of proletarian Socialist revolution, which has time and again been developed by Stalin.

But it was most distinctly and precisely explained by Stalin in his article entitled "On National Problems Again" of June 30, 1925, arguing against the Yugoslavian nationalists. In that article he wrote:

"Comrade Semich refers to a passage in Stalin's pamphlet Marxism and the National Question, written at the end of 1912. It is stated there that 'the national struggle * * * is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves.' By this he is evidently trying to hint that his own formula defining the social meaning of the national movement in the present historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, at a time when the national question in the eyes of Marxists had not yet assumed world significance, and when the basic demand of the Marxists, the right to self-determination, was judged to be not a part of the proletarian revolution, but a

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be absurd to ignore the fact that the international situation has radically changed since that time, that the war in the one hand and the October revolution in Russia on the other, have converted the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As early as October 1916, Lenin in his article The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up, said that the fundamental point of the national question, the right to self-determination, had ceased to form part of the general democratic movement and that it had become converted into a component part of the general proletarian-socialist revolution. I will not mention later works of Lenin and of other representatives of Russian communism on the national question. In view of all this, what interpretation can be placed on Comrade Semich's reference to a certain passage in a pamphlet by Stalin written in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia? How that, as a result of the new historical situation, we have entered a new era, the era of the world proletarian revolution? The only interpretation that can be placed on it is that Comrade Semich is quoting without reference to space and time and without reference to the actual historical situation, and that he is thereby violating the most elementary demands of dialectics and failing to take account of the fact that what is correct in one historical situation may prove to be incorrect in another historical situation."

From the above it is clear for us to see that there are different categories of revolution. One is a world revolution of the bourgeois and capitalist category, which ceased to prevail after the outbreak of the first imperialist World War, or more precisely, after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Since then, a world revolution of another category was born. It is the proletarian Socialist world revolution, in which the proletariat of the capitalist countries is the main force; and the oppressed nations in the colonies and semicolonies—their ally. Those classes, parties, or individuals of the oppressed nations engaging in the revolution, notwithstanding what kind of classes, parties, or individuals they are, or whether or not they are subjectively conscious of the fact, inasmuch as they stand against imperialism—their revolution is bound to become a part of the proletarian Socialist world revolution, and they themselves are bound to become allies of the proletarian Socialist world revolution.

But the Chinese revolution assumes even more significance today when World War II is being waged in the fiercest manner, when the Soviet Union is passing from socialism to communism, and has emerged as a force capable of leading and helping the proletarian, the oppressed nations and revolutionary peoples all over the world in their struggle against imperialism and capitalist reaction; when the proletariat of the capitalist countries is preparing to overthrow capitalism and to build up socialism; and when today, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese proletariat, peasantry, intelligentsia, and the petty bourgeoisie have united and formed a strong and independent political force, then under such circumstances, is it not proper to attach the highest importance to the Chinese revolution in estimating its world significance? I should say, yes. The Chinese revolution is indeed a glorious and important part of the world revolution.

Such is the analysis of the first stage of the Chinese revolution (it may still be divided into several minor stages), the social nature of which makes it a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the new type. Although it is no proletarian socialist revolution of the newest type, certainly it has already formed a part, an important part of it and has been a great ally of it. The first step, i. e., the first stage of the revolution does not, and cannot at all build up a capitalist society under the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Its aim, in the very course of this first stage, is the setting up of a new democratic society of the united dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. The first stage thus accomplished, the development of the Chinese revolution will be carried forward into the second stage, viz, the building up of Chinese socialist society.

This then is the most fundamental peculiarity of the present phase of the Chinese revolution. Such is a brief description of the path traversed by the new revolution in the past 20 years (1919—40), since the May 4 student movement. This is the living and concrete content of the Chinese revolution of today.

III. ROLE OF THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE PROLETARIAT

We see that the Chinese revolution can be divided into two stages, of which the first one, the new democratic, is the new historical peculiarity of the Chinese revolution. But how does this new peculiarity express itself in the internal political and economic relations of China?

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Before the May 4 movement in 1919 (note its taking place after the imperialist World War and November Revolution of 1917), the political guiding force of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution were the Chinese petty bourgeois and bourgeois classes (both of them made up the intelligentsia). At that time, the Chinese proletariat, not being strong enough as a conscious and independent force, engaged in the revolution only as a follower of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. That was the practice of the Chinese proletariat in the revolution of 1911.

However, after the May 4 movement, the political guidance of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution in essence no longer rested solely upon the bourgeois class, but upon the proletariat also. The Chinese proletariat of that time, through its own growth and through the influence upon it of the Russian revolution, rapidly became a conscious, independent political force. The slogan, "Down with imperialism" and the very thorough anti-imperialist program, were laid by the Communist Party of China, while later, the land revolution was put into motion solely on the initiative of the Communists.

The Chinese bourgeoisie, being the bourgeoisie of a colonial and semicolonial nation, and suffering inevitably from imperialist oppression, still possesses, during the imperialist period, in certain situations and to certain extent, a rebellious instinct toward foreign imperialism and the regime of politicians and war lords. This makes possible the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie against those the bourgeoisie have to fight. This was precisely what took place during the period of the revolution of 1911 and the anti-Nanking expedition—i. e., periods when the bourgeoisie still did not possess state power.

This is the difference between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Russian bourgeoisie. In the case of the Russian bourgeoisie, there was no revolutionary element in it, for Czarist Russia was itself a semifeudal militarism which was marching to foreign conquest in which the bourgeoisie shared. The task of the proletariat there was to oppose it, not to unite with it. Here in China, the task of the proletariat is not to disregard the conditional revolutionary nature in certain situations of the bourgeoisie and hence there is the possibility of setting up a united front with it against imperialism and the governments of militarists and warlords.

But, in the struggle, it is precisely its colonial and semicolonial nature that makes the Chinese bourgeoisie very weak politically and economically and thus imparts to it another kind of nature, viz, the trend to compromise with the enemies of the revolution.

The Chinese bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, even when in our camp, do not like to say a final goodby to imperialism, and are still closely connected with landlord exploitation in the village. Therefore, they would never and could never be determined to overthrow imperialism utterly; and more, they would never and could never overthrow utterly the feudal forces. This being so, the Chinese bourgeoisie has been unable to solve the two fundamental problems of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution. During the long period of 1927–36, they betrayed their own revolutionary line and the revolutionary people by going into the arms of imperialism and forming an alliance with feudal forces.

The present war against Japan has seen once more a new betrayal on the part of a section of the bourgeoisie as represented by Wang Ching-wei and the gang of capitulators. This is the difference between the Chinese bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist countries, in England and the United States of America, in particular.

The Chinese bourgeoisie has not even the comparative revolutionary thoroughness which the bourgeoisie in America and Europe had during their respective bourgeois-democratic revolutionary periods.

Thus there is:

One side of the shield: The face of revolution.

The other side of the shield: The face of compromise.

This is the twofold nature of the Chinese bourgeoisie. This twofold nature, contrives to deny to the Chinese bourgeoisie even the historical revolutionary role, once played by the bourgeoisie in America and Europe. When strong enemies stand before them, they want to unite with the workers and the peasants in order to fight against the enemy. However, as soon as the working class and the peasantry become politically conscious, they again go and unite with their enemies in oppressing the workers and peasants. This may be regarded as a common role of the bourgeoisie all over the world. What we have to stress is that the Chinese bourgeoisie has inevitably displayed this tendency to a greater degree.

80261—48——6

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It is simple enough for us to see in China that those who are really capable of leading the people for the overthrow of imperialism and the feudal interests, especially imperialism, will be trusted by the people because imperialism and the feudal interests are the two main enemies of the people. Today those who are able to defeat Japanese imperialism and put democracy into practice will be regarded by the people as their saviors. If the Chinese bourgeoisie is capable of fulfilling this duty, it certainly deserves every praise. Otherwise, the task inevitably falls on the shoulders of China's proletariat.

Anyhow, the Chinese proletariat, peasantry, intelligentsia and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie are the main force upon which the fate of China depends. These classes, either have come or are waking to this consciousness, and are bound to be the basic parts of the State framework of the coming democratic Republic of China, which should be nothing other than a democratic republic of the dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and antifeudal sections of the people, i. e., a new democratic republic. In other words a republic of the Three Principles of the people in their true revolutionary sense as put forward by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, i. e., that of China's great political heritage of unity with the Soviet, with the Communists and for the interests of the workers and peasants.

Such a new democratic republic differs, on the one hand, from the old, western, bourgeois-democratic republic, which because it belongs to the old category of democracy is out of date; it differs, on the other hand, from the newest, Soviet proletarian dictatorship of the Socialist Republic, or the newest democratic republic, which has already been consolidated in the U. S. S. R. and which will be established in the capitalist countries, and will unquestionably be the state and governmental form of all advanced countries, but which is not practicable, during a certain historical period, for the colonial and semicolonial countries. Therefore, the state form of all revolutionary colonial or semicolonial countries, for a certain historical period, can be nothing but the third form, viz, the new democratic republic. Being the state form of a certain historical period, it is a transitional one; but it is all the same an inevitable and necessary form of state.

IV. THE NEW DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The forms of state in the world can be classified according to their social nature, into the following:

(1) Republic of bourgeois dictatorship;
(2) Republic of the proletarian dictatorship;
(3) Republic of united dictatorship of several classes.

(1) This prevails in the old democratic countries.

(2) This is the present form of state of the Soviet Union and is to be adopted in the course of time by the advanced capitalist countries.

(3) This is the transitional form of the state of revolutionary colonies and semicolonies. There may be some different features among different colonies and semicolonies, but the state and governmental formations are basically alike, i. e., a new democratic republic of the united dictatorship of all anti-imperialist classes.

This form of state in present-day China is expressed in the form of the anti-Japanese united front. As it is anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist, it is the dictatorship of all revolutionary classes and of the united front.

It is most dangerous for our nation that after years of war, the task of democratizing the nation is yet to start, thus exposing our weak points to the Japanese invader who seeks every chance to paralyze us. We hope that the movement toward democratic functioning may do something toward solving the crisis which has recently developed.

This "state form" problem, which has been the topic of dispute ever since the last days of the Manchu dynasty, is, in fact, nothing more than a question of how to adjust the relations between the different social classes with a view to eliminate the desire on the part of any one of them to assume the role of sole dictator.

Here we ought to point out that in order to achieve the role of sole dictator the bourgeoisie used to deceive the masses by employing the word "citizen" to hide the actual domination by one class, the bourgeoisie itself.

The use of the word "citizen" would be all right provided it meant exclusion of all antirevolutionary individuals and traitors and the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary people and classes against them.

Here we recall the solemn declaration made by the first all China representative conference of the Kuomintang held in 1924:

"The so-called democratic system of certain countries was often abused by the bourgeoisie, and consequently the state machine was converted into a means for

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

oppressing the masses. The principle of people's sovereignty proclaimed by the Kuomintang, however, means rule by the people and not by a chosen few."

In the past 16 years, the Kuomintang has failed to keep to this declaration and thus is responsible for our national disasters. This has meant the commission of an exceedingly grave mistake which, we trust, will be duly corrected by them under the stress of war and struggle.

As to the question of the form of government, it may be interpreted to mean the form of state structure, or more precisely, the form of state organization with which a certain social class builds strength to defend itself against its enemies. A state does not actually exist if there is no specific form of governmental organization.

Here our aim is to see the election of a Chinese Government through the system of a series of national people's meetings; provincial people's meetings, Hsien (district) people's meetings, town people's meetings, right down to village people's meetings. At the same time it is only through an election based on a real popular and equal suffrage irrespective of differences of sex, belief, property, and education, that an adequate representation of the revolutionary classes, a full expression of public opinion and the proper guidance of the revolutionary struggle and the spirit of "new democracy" can be attained and suitably achieved. Such a system is the system of democratic centralism. It is a Government of democratic centralism alone that can express in full measure the will of the revolutionary people and is most capable of defending itself against our enemies.

In a real democratic system, the very spirit of "denial to the chosen few" must be the core of the method of the formation of the government and the armed forces. Otherwise, it will give rise to a contradiction between the governmental form and the state form.

The thesis that the state form is the dictatorship of all revolutionary classes, and the governmental form is the system of democratic centralism, is the political foundation of the "new democracy." This is what we would call the republic of the "new democracy"; the republic of the anti-Japanese united front; of the people's three principles, of the famous "three policies." This is, in name and in fact, the Republic of China, which it is our responsibility to build.

This is the internal political relation which a revolutionary and anti-Japanese China ought and must in no way fail to establish. This is the only correct course to adopt to accomplish our present task.

In such a republic as mentioned above, our economy must be the economy of the "new democracy," just as the politics is the politics of the "new democracy."

All big banks, big industries, and big commercial establishments must be state-owned. In order to ensure the freedom of people's livelihood from the influences of private profit, all native-owned or foreign-owned enterprises, either monopolist or of a dimension too large for private efforts—for instance, banks, railroads, airways, etc.—will be managed and controlled by the state alone. This is the essence of the theory of the "control of capital." This also was a solemn statement made by the Kuomintang in the declaration of its first all-China representative conference. This should be regarded as the correct course for the economic foundation of the new democratic Republic.

However, in the meantime, the state will not confiscate other forms of private property and will not forbid the development of capitalist production, so long as it is taken for granted that it "does not affect the people's livelihood." The reason for this procedure is that Chinese economy is still in a very backward state.

The new democratic Republic will adopt certain necessary measures in taking over the land previously owned by the big landlords and distributing it among peasants without or with very little land. Dr. Sun's idea, "The cultivator to own the land" is to be promoted and the feudal relations in the villages to be smashed. But the ownership of land is to be readjusted, not with a view to building up Socialist agriculture, but only in order to turn the land into the peasants' own property. The economy of the wealthy peasantry will also be allowed. This is the object of the policy of "the equalization of landownership." The correct slogan when carrying it out, must be, "The cultivator to own the land."

Chinese national economy must travel along the road of "control of capital" and "equalization of land." It should not be "owned by a chosen few," in which case it is likely to be used as a means to undermine "the people's livelihood." It should not be built on the same lines as those of western capitalist society, nor should it keep intact the land relations of the old semifeudal society. Whoever dares to turn it into the opposite course will surely fail to do so and get his head broken against a wall.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

This is the internal economic structure a revolutionary and anti-Japanese China must, and inevitably must, come to build.

Such a kind of economy is the economy of the "new democracy."

And the politics of the "new democracy" is but the concentrated expression of this economy of the "new democracy."

V. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SITUATIONS

Such a republic with its politics and economy of the new democracy conforms to the best desires of over 90 percent of the Chinese people. It conforms, as Dr. Sun Yat-sen once foresightedly stated, "to human desire, the demands of historical development, the needs of the people, and is bound to be built as many people resolve to fight for it." This is the only way out for China.

Do not some of the elements in it suggest the path taken by capitalist society with a state of a bourgeois-dictatorship type? Surely, his ground was once traversed by the western bourgeoisie. But it is impracticable for China to adopt exactly the same course both because of the international as well as national situations.

It is impracticable first from the viewpoint of the international situation. As we know, the dominating feature of the international situation of today is the clash of declining imperialism and rising socialism. Therefore, it is imperialism that will not allow China to develop its own capitalism.

The modern history of China is nothing but a history of the imperialist invasion of China, of obstruction by it of the path of China's independence and of the hindrances placed by it in the growth of Chinese capitalism. The previous Chinese revolutionary attempts, which cost the lives of thousands of patriots, were all crushed by imperialism. Now a strong and barbarous Japan has invaded China with the purpose of colonizing her. It is her own capitalism, and not Chinese capitalism that Japan is now making every effort to develop. It is the dictatorship of the Japanese bourgeoisie and not of the Chinese bourgeoisie that the Japanese aim to set up. Surely we are today witnessing the last death struggle of imperialism: It is on the point of death.

"Imperialism is the dying form of capitalism," as Lenin once stated. But just because of its approaching end, it is feeding more and more upon the colonies and semicolonies, and is in no way likely to permit the existence of any other capitalist society with a bourgeois dictatorship state. It is just because Japanese imperialism found itself faced with a serious economic and political crisis, i. e., was on the point of death, that it resolved to invade and colonize China and thus block up the road to the establishment of bourgeois dictatorship and the development of national capitalism in China.

In the second place, we have the growth of socialism. With all the imperialist countries as its enemies. China's struggle for independence cannot but base itself on the policy of taking the hand of friendship offered by the socialist country, the Soviet Union, and the international proletariat. The course of Chinese capitalism cannot, in other words, be kept apart from the victorious march of the proletariat of Japan, Britain, America, France, Germany, Italy, and other countries in their struggle against capitalism in their respective countries. Their victory is our victory. Though one cannot forecast that a Chinese victory must follow the victory of the revolution in one or other of those countries, but it undoubtedly seems that it can achieve success only with their help. Final victory in the present war of resistance against Japan will not be achieved without clasping the outstretched hand of friendship of the Soviet Union. The refusal to take help from the U. S. S. R., inevitably leads to disastrous consequences to the revolution. Can there be any doubt about this if one looks back at the outcome of the anti-Soviet campaign launched in China after 1927?

This is a time of revolution and war, a time of certain death for capitalism and of certain growth of socialism. It is then nothing but an illusion to assume that China can begin to build a capitalist society of the bourgeois-dictatorship type after its victory over imperialism and feudalism.

If it was possible for Turkey to set up a bourgeois dictatorship after the first imperialist war and the November revolution, under special conditions (the strength of the bourgeoisie after the defeat inflicted upon Greece and the comparative weakness of the proletariat), then the end of this war and the victory of socialism will see no other Turkey, than a "Turkey" of 40,000,000 people. Owing to its special conditions (the compromising nature of the bourgeoisie and the strength of the proletariat), China did not have so simple a task to tackle as Turkey had.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Didn't the Chinese bourgeois shout loudly about Kemalism, after the set-back of the Chinese revolution in 1927? But where is the Kemalism of China? Where do we see Chinese society of the bourgeois-dictatorship type and the corresponding kind of capitalism? For even the real Turkey of Kemalism has finally slipped into the very arms of British and French imperialism, and is becoming more and more semicolonial, a part of the imperialist reactionary world. For all such heroes or big guns who shout about Kemalism in the colonies and semicolonies in the international situation that exists in the forties of the twentieth century, there are but two ways open. Either they go over to the side of the imperialist front as a part of world reaction, or come over to the side of the anti-Japanese front as a part of world progress. There is no third way.

The Chinese bourgeoisie should have learned a lot of necessary lessons from the internal affairs of our country.

In 1927, immediately after the victory of the revolution, which was won due to the combined efforts of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie, the Chinese bourgeoisie at once broke away from the people and started to monopolize the harvest of revolution. Moreover, this was followed by 10 years of "exterminating the Communists" campaigns which nearly exhausted them. But what was the result?

Are then the out-of-date rotten methods used by the western bourgeois dictatorship still to be copied after 2 years of war against the Japanese, who have already penetrated deep into our soil? Do they think it is still worth while to try once more the "10 years' Communist exterminating" campaign, which failed so miserably and only led to the "extermination" of the capitalist theory of bourgeois dictatorship? Yes, a "mono-party dictatorship" did emerge at the cost of 10 years of destruction, but it was nothing other than the dictatorship of a semicolonial and semifeudal nature.

What was worse was that the first 4 years of the campaign (from 1927 to the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931) had made it possible for a "Manchukuo" to occur, while the next 6 years of the notorious anti-Communist campaigns invited the Japanese invaders onto the Chinese mainland. If there is anyone who makes up his mind to start again another "10 years of extermination," he must be an anti-Communist of a new type who differs in some aspects from the old.

But then has not someone already taken up this role swiftly and bravely? He is called Wang Ching-wei. It is this man who has become the much-famed anti-Communist leader of the new type. There may be some who may feel the urge to join Wang Ching-wei, but the trouble for them would be that it would then be much more difficult for them to shout about the "bourgeois dictatorship," "capitalist society," "Kemalism," the "Modern state," the "Mono-Party Dictatorship" and the theory of "mono-principles," etc. So if now that road is barred and if he who is now on the side of anti-Japanese groups instead of on the side of Wang Ching-wei, still thinks of repudiating the anti-Japanese forces, of monopolizing the fruits of victory and of establishing a one-party dictatorship, such a one will indeed find himself thoroughly unable to grasp what the future holds for him.

The war against Japan, let us be clear, cannot be taken even one step forward without the efforts of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. Is it not an insult to common sense to find yourself being beaten back when in fact you want to kick out the Japanese? Unfortunately, the Chinese bourgeois die-hards (I emphasize the word "die-hards") seem to have learned practically nothing from the bitter lessons of the past 20 years. Do we not know that they are still shouting of "restricting the Communists" and of "opposing the Communists"? Do we not note that they are adding another chapter of the "treatment of the opposing party" to the old story of the "treatment of the opposing party" which is none other than the previous "bill of restriction of the opposing party"? Goodness, do we not know what they are going to do with the destiny of our nation by imposing one "restriction" after another "treatment"? Also, we are doubtful if they know what they may expect for themselves out of all this.

What we sincerely wish to advise you, gentlemen, is that you need to open your eyes and have a look at China and the world, have a look at the present situation, internally and externally. Then you would not repeat your own mistakes; otherwise, not only would the Nation be injured, but your own business would not go well either. Events have decided surely and precisely that the Chinese bourgeois die-hards, if they insist on what they are doing, will find themselves in course of time in the most difficult situation and end by destroying themselves. We used to hope that the anti-Japanese United Front of China would hold out to the victorious end in a spirit of cooperation, that it would not

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

result in power monopolization. That was the only and the best path to follow. We Communists fervently appeal: "Do not say this is no true forecast."

There is much truth in the saying of the first President of the Republic of China, Mr. Lee Yuan-hon:

"Eat together, if any" (i. e., share what you have). Fighting shoulder to shoulder, as we are, let us eat together, if there is rice; let us work together, if there is anything to do; and let us learn together when there is anything to learn. The monopolist attitude of "eating alone" was the rotten way of the feudal masters. Obviously it is not practicable during the forties of the twentieth century.

We Communists do not repudiate any section of the revolutionary people who take a stand against capitulation and who are not anti-Communist. We are going to cooperate to the end with the various classes, strata, parties, political groups and individuals who are resolved to be anti-Japanese and to hold together the United Front. But we shall not have anything to do with those who want to exclude the Communist Party and to disrupt the united front. China must hold on and fight, united and progressive. Any attempts from any quarters to capitulate, to disrupt or to go backward we consider intolerable.

VI. NOT YET THE TIME FOR SOCIALISM

The question may be asked: Is it possible for China to follow at this stage the road of socialism, of proletarian dictatorship, if she is not to take that of capitalism, of bourgeois dictatorship?

It is not possible.

Though it goes without saying that the first step of the revolution which we are contemplating today will one day inevitably develop into the second step, i. e., socialism, and only in the realm of socialism can China become prosperous, yet the present is no time to practice it. Socialism is out of the question before the tasks of the present revolution, the tasks of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, are fulfilled. The Chinese revolution can only be achieved in two steps: (*a*) New democracy; (*b*) socialism; and we should point out that the period over which the first step will extend will be a considerably long one. We are not idealists. We cannot place ourselves above the conditions of present-day life.

Some malicious propagandists often intentionally mix the two different revolutionary stages into what they call the theory of accomplishing the "revolution in one stage," whereby they try to prove that the content of all revolutions consists of the three people's principles; therefore, they say, that the reason for the existence of communism has disappeared. They are using this theory as a platform whence to wage their campaign against the eighth route and new fourth armies and the Shansi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region. Their intention at bottom is to eliminate any revolution, to knock out with reactionary thoroughness the forces of the people in their struggle for democratic rights and against Japanese imperialism, resulting in paving the way to capitulation to Japan.

This has the systematically planned backing of the Japanese. It is a part of the political offensive Japan decided to launch side by side with the economic bait offered to China after the occupation of Hankow, and when it had become clear that military force alone can never beat China. The political offensive aims at winning over the vacillating elements in the anti-Japanese camp, at paralyzing the united front, at undermining Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, while the economic bait is presented in the form of "joint enterprises."

Under this scheme, Japan would allow Chinese capitalists to invest their capital in enterprises in central and south China; their share will be 51 percent of the total capital while the Japanese share will be 49 percent. And in north China, the Chinese share will be 49 percent in comparison to the 51 percent of the Japanese. The Japanese have also promised to give back to the Chinese capitalists their former properties, now in Japanese hands. This has attracted a handful of shameless capitalists who seek profit, not caring how they get it.

A section of the Chinese capitalists headed by Wang Ching-wei has been won over to this arrangement; while some others, still hidden inside the anti-Japanese camp, are dreaming of it. But what they are afraid of is the certain opposition of the Communists to such a move, and also of the title of "Han Traitor" which will inevitably be given to them by the common people. In view of the above difficulties, they, therefore, have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to work their way into public favor.

As soon as this plan was worked out, in order to cheat the people, a few Trotskyites as well as several literary hacks were summoned to shout about the thesis

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

of the "one-stage revolution," the unsuitability of communism to China, the superfluity of the existence of the Communist Party of China, about the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies' obstruction of war activities and their hoax of guerrilla warfare—all in terms of the so-called feudal partition, the disobedience, disunity and alleged conspiracies and uprisings of the Communist Party, etc., etc.

They engage in this business with the purpose of first making the ideological preparation before they carry out the act of capitulation, i. e., to desert to the Japanese for the sake of the 51 or 49 percent of the shares, sacrificing the interests of the nation. For these gentlemen the enthusiasm they seem to show for their "theory of one-stage revolution" and their opposition to the Communist Party amounts at bottom to nothing other than the very same "49 percent" and "51 percent" of the shares which they seek to gain by their "theory of no-revolution." That is the point.

There are in the meantime, another kind of people who, though they may not be malicious, often get taken in by the so-called "theory of one-stage revolution" and the entirely subjective thesis which purports to "complete the political and social revolution in one stroke," in utter disregard of the development of the revolution, i. e., the necessity of a period of transition between one revolution and another; and then permit themselves the nonsense of the talk referred to viz, "to complete the political and social revolution, in one stroke." Such talk, by confusing the two stages of the revolution, tends to injure the cause of revolution by diminishing the importance of the democratic tasks to be carried out at the present juncture.

It is correct then to say that the two stages, of which the first should form the groundwork of the second, must not be interrupted by a stage of bourgeois dictatorship. This alone is the proper Marxist method of understanding the course of development of our revolution. It is to suffer from the worst illusion to assent to the suggestion that the democratic stage of the revolution has not its own specific tasks and timetable and that it is possible to accomplish in one stage tasks which belong to an entirely different stage, a later stage: for instance, to try to accomplish the tasks of the socialist stage simultaneously with those of the democratic. Such is the face of the thesis "All in one stroke"—which is pure idealism. It is not the proper way in which any true revolutionary could think.

The bourgeois die-hards may object here and argue: "Well, you Communists have postponed your program of socialism. You have declared also that to practice the three people's principles is the need of present-day China. That your party is determined to fight for their thorough fulfillment. Haven't you?" they will ask.

"Then, why not pack up communism for the time being?"

This has become the stock argument of those who wildly shout about the thesis of so-called mono partyism. The very nature of this wild shouting, or we may call it utter nonsense, if you like, shows the autocratic views of the reactionary die-hards.

The Communist outlook is the outcome of the whole ideological development of the world bourgeois period, and communism is, at the same time, a new kind of social system. The Communist ideological system and social system is different from any other; it is the most scientific ideological and social system of any; it is the most comprehensive, the most progressive, the most revolutionary. As we know, the ideological and social system of feudalism has been relegated to the museum of history. The ideological and social system of capitalism, too, has partly gone to the museum of history (in the U. S. S. R.) and the remaining edifice in other parts is crumbling down rapidly.

Only the ideological and social system of communism is going strong in full bloom, throughout the world. The advance of scientific socialism in China has widened the people's views; it has changed the face of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese "democratic" revolution can never be achieved without the guidance of communism, apart from the second stage of the revolution, viz, the Socialist stage. That is why the bourgeois die-hards are shouting so hard, asking us to "pack-up" communism. But you just cannot have communism "packed up." Once it is "packed up," China will exist no more. The whole world looks upon communism as its saviour. So also does the China of today.

It is known to everybody that, both in the field of ultimate forms in social organization and in the matter of practical working programs, the Communist Party has developed its outlook, i. e., it has a maximum and minimum program. The new democracy of the present and the socialism of the future are its two component parts to be carried out under the guidance of the whole ideology of communism.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Is it not utterly absurd then to raise the cry that communism must be "packed-up" when the principles of the minimum immediate program of the Communist Party are fundamentally and consistently the same as these of "the three people's principles"? On the part of the Communists, it is this consistency that makes possible their considering "the three people's principles as the political basis of the anti-Japanse united front." That is why they recognize that the three people's principles conform to the needs of present-day China, for the fulfillment of which the Communist Party is determined to fight. If we did not think so, then there would be no such possibility of agreement.

This then is what is meant by united front between communism and the three people's principles during the period of the democratic revolution. It is of this united front that Dr. Sun Yat-sen spoke in his famous saying, when he said that, "Communism is a good friend of the three people's principles." To deny communism is, in fact, to repudiate the united front.. It is precisely the die-hard's belief in the "one-party system" and his denial of the united front that has produced the absurd argument of the liquidation of communism.

The one-party thesis itself is also absurd. As we know, as long as there are classes, each class will have its own doctrine and theory. Sometimes even different groups inside one class have doctrines of their own. There is the outlook of feudalism for the landlord class, of capitalism for the bourgeois, Buddhism for the monks, Christianity for the Christians, polytheism for the peasantry * * * and the recently sponsored doctrines of Kemalism, fascism * * * and the doctrine of distribution-according-to-labor, etc. Then why no communism for the proletariat? Then why the shouting about "pack up" communism when there are so many "isms"? Frankly speaking, this idea—"pack up" communism—is an impossible one. But what about putting it to the test? If communism is beaten in the test, we Communists will have nothing to complain of; we shall have only ourselves to blame. In the alternative, we shall have to think that is the antidemocratic "one-partyism" that must be "packed up" without delay.

VII. THE THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNISM

In order to avoid misunderstanding and to enlarge the views of the die-hards, it is necessary to point out clearly wherein lie the differences and wherein the similarity and consistency between the three people's principles and communism.

Fundamentally speaking, the political programs of both "the three people's principles" and communism for the period of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution are consistent with each other. More precisely, the three people's principles are, revolutionary nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood, as reinterpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924; these are basically consistent with the political program of communism during the period of China's democratic revolution. It is due to this consistency and the practice underlying the three principles that make possible the united front, which consists of two doctrines and two parties. It would be a mistake to disregard this point.

Then, let us look at where they differ:

(1) They differ in certain aspects of their respective programs during the democratic revolutionary period. For instance, included in the Communist program of the period of democratic revolution, there is the demand for the establishment of the 8-hour-day working system and of a thorough land revolution; these aspects are not to be found in the case of the three principles. Hence, if the same are not incorporated into the three principles and put into practice, we should then say that even though the democratic programs of the three principles and of communism coincide in fundamentals, they do not do so entirely.

(2) They differ also in their division of the Chinese revolution into stages. For communism, there is the stage of the socialist revolution which goes beyond the minimum one of the democratic revolution; a maximum program which is other than the minimum program, i. e., a program designed to realize socialism; while the three people's principles postulate no socialist revolutionary period other than the democratic revolutionary one, nor do they contain a maximum program for the building of socialist society.

(3) They differ in their respective doctrines. The ideology of communism is dialectical and historical materialism; while the ideology of the three people's principles is the history-view of livelihood or livelism. They are the opposite of each other.

(4) The thoroughness with which the revolution must be carried out differs in degree between the two. Communism, finding in itself the unity of theory and practice, possesses the quality of real revolutionary thoroughness while in the camp of the three principles, with the exception of a few gifted patriots, there

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

always prevails the contradiction between theory and practice, between words and deeds. Hence lack of revolutionary thoroughness.

All the above points constitute the differences between the three principles and communism. Consequently there is a difference between a "San Min Chu-ist" and a Communist. Any attempt to disregard such differences, any overlooking of the contradiction which lies beneath the fundamental unity of the two viewpoints would be a mistake.

Bearing in mind what we have discussed above, one thing inevitably emerges clearly: our ability to understand fully well what the capitalist die-hard cry of "packing up" of communism really means. If it does not mean that the reactionaries want to set up an autocracy, then it would mean that they were indulging in pure nonsense.

The bourgeois die-hards utterly ignore the way in which history moves. Their knowledge of its course drops even below zero point. They choose not to know the difference between communism and the three people's principles nor the difference between the new three people's principles and the old.

We Communists have considered "the three people's principles" as the political basis of the anti-Japanese National United Front, we consider them to be a necessity for present-day China and our party will struggle for their thorough realization.

We also state that there is a fundamental consistency between the minimum program of communism and the three principles. What is it in more precise words? It refers to nothing else than the "three principles" as reinterpreted by Dr. Sun himself in his declaration to the first plenary session of the all-China Kuomintang meeting. We, therefore, sincerely wish that the die-hard gentlemen will still find the time to refer to that declaration after their daily routine of shouting about "restricting the Communists," "liquidation of communism" and talk of "anticommunism." Notice must be taken of what Dr. Sun emphasized in that declaration. From that statement, we can safely conclude that only the three principles thus interpreted are the proper ones, and that any other must be regarded as false.

In order to avoid the accusation again of "spreading wrong notions," I ought to remind you that many Kuomintang members together with myself witnessed in person the passing of that declaration.

It was that declaration that clearly divided the three principles into two categories corresponding to two historical phases. The ones which prevailed before the declaration fall into the old category, the phase of the old colonial, semicolonial bourgeois-democratic revolution, of the old democracy; and they may be called the old "three principles."

After that declaration, the "three principles" were transformed into the three principles of the new category, of the phase of the new colonial, semicolonial bourgeois-democratic revolution, of new democracy and a new kind of three principles, which are the revolutionary three principles of the new period.

These may be called the three principles of the new period, the new, genuine three principles—the three principles guided by the three doctrines of "Alliance with the Soviet," "Alliance with the Communists," "Alliance with the workers and peasants." Deprive the doctrine in its new form of any one of the three elements and the three principles will be destroyed in the course of the new period as false.

Let me explain the three principles further.

Firstly, the revolutionary, or new, genuine three principles must be based on the policy of alliance with the Soviet. It is becoming exceedingly clear now that without the policy of unity with the Soviet, any holding back from alliance with the one socialist country in the world, is bound to lead one down to the policy of alliance with the imperialists, with imperialism. Is this not what happened in the period immediately after 1927?

In the first 2 years of war when the second imperialist war was yet to come, there existed contradictions between Great Britain and America, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other, which could be utilized. Since the outbreak of the second imperialist war, though these contradictions have not yet ceased to exist, yet they have become somewhat limited in scope. If there is not proper understanding of our tasks, China might become engaged in a war against the Soviet Union through the provocation of Great Britain and America.

(Mao was writing before the out-break of the Soviet-German War and the new world alinement—Trans.)

If such turns out to be the case, China will find herself at once on the side of the reactionary front of imperialism; it would result in a tragic outcome for the course of our struggle for national independence. As the struggle between the socialist

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

country and the imperialist countries is becoming sharper and sharper, it becomes absolutely necessary that China makes her choice between the two camps. It may be asked: Is it not possible to remain neutral? No. From now on, to use the word "neutral" is to do nothing but cheat oneself, for into these two camps, all the countries will be drawn.

For China which is at war with an imperialist power that has already penetrated deep into her territory, the help of the Soviet Union is even more indispensable now in order to achieve final victory. If China were now to choose the path of alliance with imperialism instead of the path of alliance with the Soviet, the very word "revolution" will have to be canceled and the three principles will be turned into a reactionary doctrine.

In short, there can be no neutral position but either a revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary position.

Wang Ching-wei once proposed a position of neutrality "between two fronts." But unfortunately, the inventor Wang himself has since given up (has "packed up") such a position and taken up another one, that of alliance with imperialism. Further, there are two imperialisms, the eastern and the western; it is with the former that Wang has allied himself. Well, you may regard it as not a bad idea to unite with some of the western imperialist countries to fight the enemy in the east. But in doing so, you would have to march northward under the command of the western imperialists, and your revolution would become impossible. These circumstances thus dictate that the revolutionary, new or genuine position must be a position of an alliance with the Soviet. Conversely, it must not be a policy of alliance with imperialism, or an anti-Soviet alliance.

Secondly, the revolutionary, new or genuine three principles must be based on the policy of unity with the Communists. This is the very opposite of the policy of anticommunism. The anti-Communist policy is the policy adopted by Japanese imperialism and Wang Ching-wei. If you decide to follow the anti-Communist policy, then go ahead to join up with the anti-Communist gang. But would not that look like the conduct of a traitor?

In that case, what about the desire to follow others, but not the Japs, in promoting the anti-Communist policy? Obviously that sounds equally ridiculous. So that, no matter whomsoever you follow, you are a traitor if you are an anti-Communist. For by being so, you can fight the Japs no more.

A third idea is the one which suggests: Why not take up the anti-Communist task independently? This would only produce a nightmare. For how can one promote such a counterrevolutionary task amidst all the worries of a semicolonial existence and without the support of imperialism? Is it feasible for anyone to oppose "independently" the very communism which was opposed in vain by the efforts of almost the whole imperialist world over a long period of 10 years? People say: "It is nice to oppose the Communists, but it is a difficult job to carry the business through." This saying is partly false and partly true. It is partly wrong, for how can it be "nice" to "oppose the Communists"? It is partly true, for the anti-Communist task is really "difficult to fulfill." The reason for this is to be found fundamentally not in the doctrine of communism itself, but among the people. For the people like communism, and do not like that which sets itself up in opposition to it. The people will become ruthless in their reaction when they come to know that you are going to oppose the Communists instead of the enemy of the nation, who has penetrated deep into our land.

It is then certain that those who plan to kill communism will kill themselves. It is better not to try to start the campaign if you are still able to resolve not to be killed. This is the advice we sincerely want to give to all anti-Communist warriors. Therefore, it is extraordinarily clear that the three principles of today must be the three principles of unity with Communists. Otherwise, it will be death of the three principles. The policy toward the Communists has become a question of the very life or death of the three principles. In unity with Communists the three principles will live; in opposition they will vanish. Who will dare to prove that this is not true?

Thirdly, the revolutionary, new or genuine "three principles" must be based on the policy of alliance with the workers and peasants. To cast aside the policy of alliance with the workers and peasants, to ignore the needs of the workers and peasants and to disregard the task of "awakening the people" as put forth in Dr. Sun's will, is to insure the failure of revolution, or to be more exact, the failure of those who reject this policy. Stalin once said: "The problem of the colonies and semicolonies is in essence a peasant problem." That is to say, that the problem of the Chinese revolution is in essence a problem of the peasantry, that the present resistance against Japan is in its essence the nature of a peasant war against

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Japan. The politics of "new democracy" is in essence the politics of the transfer of power to the peasantry. The new, genuine three principles are in their essence principles of a peasant revolution. The idea of a popular culture is in essence the question of raising the culture of the peasantry to a higher level. The anti-Japanese war is in essence a peasant revolution.

Now, how true this characterization is may be proved by all that goes amongst us, in all our activities, by the name of "going into the mountains." In everything that we do we show that we are basing ourselves on the forces of the peasantry: Our meetings, schooling, editing, writing, staging of dramas is all being done in the mountains. Everything in this war, in all our daily life, it is the peasantry that is giving us all. Here the phrase "in essence" means "fundamentally" as explained by Stalin himself. It certainly does not mean the overlooking of other problems and other forces.

It is the most commonplace knowledge of every primary schoolboy, that over 80 percent of the Chinese population consists of peasants. The percentage has become even higher after the occupation of our large cities by the Japanese. Therefore, the peasant problem becomes the fundamental problem of the Chinese revolution, and the peasantry becomes the main force of revolution.

Besides the peasantry, the second largest section of the Chinese population consists of workers, among whom several millions are industrial workers; handicraft workers and agricultural laborers number tens of millions. Without the workers, China would not be able to live on, for it is they who run the industrial part of the nation's economy. Without the workers, the Chinese revolution would not be able to succeed, for it is they who are the most revolutionary section of the people and the vanguard, the leaders of the revolution. We may say then that the revolutionary, new or genuine three principles should be ones that look to the needs of workers and peasants. If there be a doctrine of the three principles which does not serve their interests and is not intended to "awaken the people," then, it is bound to decay.

From the above, one can draw the conclusion that a doctrine of three principles that divorces itself from the policies of alliance with the Soviet, of unity with the Communists, and of service of the workers and peasants, is one that is useless. Every conscious follower of the three principles must take serious notice when considering this point.

The three principles based on these three policies form the content of the revolutionary, new and genuine three principles—the three principles of "new democracy," the three principles which are developed forms of the old—a great masterpiece of thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, they are a historic product of the Chinese revolution as part of the Socialist world revolution. It is such three principles and such only that the Communist Party of China has regarded as suiting the needs of present-day China and for the thorough realization of which it will fight. It is such three principles and such only that are fundamentally consistent with the program of the Communist Party of China during the period of democracy, or, to be more precise, with its minimum program.

As to the old three principles, they were the product of the old period of the Chinese revolution. In them, there was no place for the policy of Soviet alliance, because there still existed only Czarist Russia; there was no unite-with-the-Communists policy in them, as the Communist Party was yet to be founded; there was no policy of alliance with the workers and peasants as the importance of the labor and peasant movements in politics was, at that time, not so obviously noticeable.

Therefore, the three principles before the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 were the three principles of the old category, the out-of-date three principles, which, if they were not to be developed in a new way, would certainly obstruct the progress of the Kuomintang. It was Dr. Sun, the prophet who foresaw this, and together with the help of the Communist Party of China imparted a new historical content to the three principles, by giving a new interpretation in the light of a new situation.

A united front of the three principles and communism was forged, for the first time Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was worked out and later, on this basis, the first great revolution was launched with the support and sympathy of the people.

The old three principles had been revolutionary during the old period, as they reflected the historical peculiarity of the old period. But they became reactionary after the advent of the new period; any attempt to restore the old form of three principles after the advent of the new period and the emergence of the new three principles, any attempt to oppose the policy of alliance with the Soviet after the

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

founding of the Socialist country, to oppose the policy of unity with the Communists after the establishment of the Communist Party, or to oppose the policy of alliance with the workers and peasants after the workers and peasants have already awakened and shown their political consciousness—any such attempt is reactionary and inconsistent in the face of historical development. The counter revolution after 1927 was the very result of this lapse.

I wish that all should bear in mind when applying in today's situation the three principles, the ancient Chinese saying which reads; "those who are alive to the course of historical development deserve the title of heroes."

The three principles of the old category have nothing in common with the minimum program of communism because they took form in the old period, which has now passed away. If there still remain any variety of three principles which stand in opposition to the Soviet, to communism, and to the workers and peasants, they must be reactionary, having not only nothing in common with the minimum program of communism, but must be regarded as the enemy of communism. This is a fact too that remains to be pondered over by certain advocates of the "three people's principles."

Let us also clearly assume that the new three people's principles are not going to be brushed aside by any conscious section of the people. At least, not before the anti-imperialist and antifeudal tasks are basically fulfilled. They could be discarded only by Wang Ching-wei and his ilk. But notwithstanding the fact that Wang Ching-wei and company have been shouting so loudly about their own variety of three principles consisting of slogans of an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and anti-worker-and-peasant nature, Dr. Sun's genuine three people's principles are still being followed by all politically conscious and just-minded people. If we have found that there have been genuine "three people's principle-ists" who have uninterruptedly upheld them in the course of the Chinese revolution since the reaction of 1927, then undoubtedly there must be hundreds of thousands of them today, when the enemy is sitting right on top of us. We Communists are resolved to fight side by side to the end with all genuine "three people's principle-ists" in an enduring cooperation. We shall not forsake anybody except the traitors and anti-Communist die-hards.

VIII. THE NEW CULTURE VERSUS THE OLD

We have explained above the historical peculiarity of Chinese politics in the new period and the problem of the new democratic republic. We are now in a position to approach the cultural problem.

A certain culture is the reflection in a thought form of the politics and economics of a certain society. In China, there is the imperialist form of culture, which is the reflection of the means by which imperialism rules China. This kind of culture is inculcated through the medium of the cultural institutions run directly by the imperialists and by a section of utterly shameless Chinese. In them all kinds of slavish thoughts are taught. There is also semifeudal culture in China, which is the reflection of semifeudal politics and semifeudal economy. All those who propose to inculcate respect for Confucius and concentrate on the study of the ancient ethics, who stand for the old social relations and thought against the new culture and new thought—are its spokesmen. And imperialist culture and semifeudal culture are like twins who have for long worked together in a reactionary cultural alliance to oppose the new culture of China. These two cultures should be fought and overcome as they serve the interests of imperialism and the feudal class.

As long as these cultures stand in the way, no new culture is capable of springing up. The struggle between them is a life-and-death struggle.

As to the new culture, it reflects in a conceptual form the new politics and economy, those new interests which it serves. As we have mentioned in chapter III, since the advent of capitalist economy, Chinese society has emerged gradually from a wholly feudal society into a semifeudal one, though the feudal elements in the economy still predominate. In relation to feudal economy, capitalist economy is progressive. Along with development of capitalist economy, there have grown and are growing new political forces—they are the forces of the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Speaking for the awakened elements among these classes are different revolutionary parties, among which the two most influential are the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Hence without the capitalist economy, without the bourgeois class, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, without their respective parties, the new conceptual form, i. e., the new culture, is impossible.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

These new political, economic, and cultural elements constitute China's revolutionary forces. They are opposed to the old politics, economy, and culture which are a combination of two elements, one of which consists of Chinese native semi-feudal politics, economy, and culture and the other of imperialist politics, economy, and culture (the latter being the stronger of the two)—these older forms are reactionary and have to be done away with completely.

China's social struggle takes the form of a struggle between the new forces of the masses (i. e., the revolutionary classes) on the one hand, and the old forces of imperialism and the feudal elements, on the other. This struggle, i. e., a struggle between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution, has gone on for the last 100 years from the opium war up to the present, or, if we take it in its conscious aspect at least, for about 30 years since the revolution of 1911.

But as stated above, the character of the revolution itself changes from time to time. What was new in a certain historical period may prove old in another. The whole century of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution, as we have seen, may be divided into two parts: The respective historical peculiarities in each period demarcating the one from the other. In the first 80 years, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution belonged to the old type of revolution, while during the last 20 years it has become transformed into something different, as a result of the changed political developments within and without the country. The old form of democracy was the hallmark during the first 80 years. The new democracy has become the new peculiarity in the last 20 years. This distinction is true both in the political as well as in the cultural sphere.

As to how the new peculiarity has expressed itself in the field of culture is what we shall dwell on below.

In the field of culture or ideology, the May 4 movement of 1919 marked the dividing line between the two historical periods.

Before the May 4 movement, the struggle in the field of culture was the struggle between the new culture of the bourgeois class and the old culture of the feudal class. This conflict took the form of the pre-May 4 struggles between the school and the Literary Examination system, between the new knowledge and the old, between western knowledge and the native forms of thought.

As against the teachings of the so-called school of those times and other poisonous forms of thinking of feudal times, the new knowledge, the western knowledge, was fundamentally the demand of the bourgeoisie for the spread of knowledge of the natural and social sciences. Darwin's theory of evolution, Adam Smith's classical economics, Muller's ethics, and Montesquieu's sociology were introduced by Yen Fu, a Chinese scholar of those times together with other works on natural science. These constituted the ruling thought of those who upheld the banner of "new" knowledge before the May 4 movement. At that time, such forms of new thought did play a revolutionary role in fighting against the feudal forms of thought, and therefore were in the interests of the bourgeoisie of the old period.

But bourgeois thought proved too weak during the period of imperialism; it was unable to hold its own against the reactionary alliance of the enslaving thought of foreign imperialism and the back-to-antiquity thought of Chinese feudalism. It was defeated at once in the very first round of the counteroffensive launched by the reactionary alliance. The old bourgeois-democratic culture, precisely because the old bourgeois-democracy had deteriorated in the period of the onslaught of imperialism, was bound to be defeated.

But the situation after the May 4 movement is quite different. From this time on, an entire new cultural force was born. It was the Communist cultural thought which arose under the leadership of the Chinese Communists, i. e., the Communist world view and its theory of social revolution. The Chinese labor movement began in 1921. The fact that the May 4 movement (1919), the founding of the Communist Party of China (1921) and the actual beginning of the Chinese labor movement (1921) all took place after the World War and the November revolution, that is to say, after the national problem and the colonial movement have entered a new higher stage of world development—shows very clearly how the Chinese revolution itself is closely connected with world changes. Because of the appearance on the political stage of a new force—the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party—reinforcing China's development, the new culture which otherwise was going down became suddenly in a position to arm itself with new weapons and arms, and began to wage with help from its new allies a new bold offensive against the combined imperialist-feudal cultures.

This new powerful force, though it still has not yet been able to gain sufficient ground and has thus had to leave the field of natural science, generally and

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

temporarily occupied by bourgeois thought, yet has won, in the field of the social sciences, the most important vantage points and has served to carry through a great transformation. During the recent 20 years of our revolution, it has displayed vast revolutionary development, unprecedented both in scope and in extent, in the spheres of philosophy, politics, economics, military science, historical science, literature and the arts (drama, films, music, sculpture, and painting). Among the fighters in the sphere of the Chinese cultural revolution, Lu Hsun was the greatest and bravest and was its leading figure. Lu Hsun was not only a great littérateur but also a great thinker and revolutionary. Lu Hsun's tenacity was a reflection of one of the most valuable virtues of colonial and semicolonial people; his qualities of a fighter were an indication of the unconquerable will of the vast majority of the people. He deserves to be known as the most honest, the bravest, most resolute, most faithful, most enthusiastic national hero ever known to our history. Lu Hsun's way is the way of the new culture of the Chinese Nation.

Before the May 4 movement, the new culture of China was the culture of the old democracy, a part of the cultural revolution of the world bourgeoisie. After the May 4, the new culture has developed as a culture, that expresses the new democracy, a part of the Socialist cultural revolution.

Prior to the May 4 movement, China's new cultural movement was under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, who at that time were still capable of leading it. After May 4, however, the cultural thought of this class fell behind even its political thought, thus depriving this class of its role of leadership. What they have been able to do in the recent period of our revolution, inside the camp of the revolutionary alliance, is to serve no more than as participant. This time the leadership inevitably has fallen on the shoulders of proletarian culture and thought. This is an indisputable fact which no one can deny.

The culture of the new democracy is the anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture of the people, or, in terms of present-day China, the culture of the anti-Japanese United Front, whose leadership is bound to be in the hands of proletarian culture, i.e., of Communist thought; it cannot be guided by the thought of any other class. The culture of the new democracy, in short, is "the proletarian-led, anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture of the people."

IX. STAGES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The cultural revolution being the reflection in thought forms of the political and economic revolution serves as a weapon of the latter. In the Chinese revolution there is a basis for a united front in the cultural sphere just as in the political sphere.

The United Front in the cultural revolution has undergone four stages during the past 20 years: (1) the 2 years between 1919–21; (2) the 6 years from 1921 to 1927; (3) the 9 years from 1927 to 1936; (4) the 3 years from 1937 up to the present.

The first stage extends from the May 4 movement in 1919 to the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921, during which time the influence of the May 4 movement is the main feature.

The May 4 movement was an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement.

The main historical significance of the May 4 movement lay in its thoroughness and its uncompromising character, a feature which the revolution of 1911 lacked in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism. What made these qualities possible was that Chinese capitalist economy had been further developed during the previous period and that the revolutionary Chinese intelligentsia of that time saw new hope of national emancipation in a series of events that shook the world: First, that the three most powerful empires of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary had been destroyed and that British and French imperialisms had sustained severe injury; that the Russian proletariat had already consolidated its Socialist country and that the proletariat in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy was rising up in a flood of revolution.

It was at the summons of this world revolutionary upheaval, of the Russian revolution, and at the call of Lenin, that the "May 4th" movement actually took place. The "May 4th" movement formed a part of the world-wide revolutionary upsurge. Though there was no Communist Party in China at the time of the movement, there were a great many among the intelligentsia, who welcomed the Russian revolution and possessed some elementary knowledge of communism. The "May 4th" movement from its very inception was a revolutionary movement of the united front consisting of the Communist intelligentsia, the revolutionary petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and the bourgeois intelligentsia (the last-mentioned forming the right wing of the united front). The weakness of this stage of the

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

movement was that it lacked the participation of the workers and peasants. In contrast, later on when the vast masses of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie were drawn in it became a revolutionary movement on a nation-wide scale.

The "May 4th" movement was so great and so thorough a cultural revolution that it was unprecedented in Chinese history. Much was done under the two slogans of the cultural revolution: (a) against the old ethics for the new ethics; (b) against the old literature for the new literature.

However, this cultural revolution was not wide enough to go down to the masses of workers and peasants; for instance, the "people" referred to in the ideas of "people's literature" were defined as the masses of the city petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia, i. e., the so-called citizen class. Despite this limitation, the "May 4th" movement did prepare the ground both in ideology and in cadres for the formation of the Communist Party in 1921, and also blazed the trail for the movement of "May 30th" and the northern expedition. On the other hand, the majority of the bourgeois intelligentsia, which at the time formed the right wing of the "May 4th" movement began to go over to the reactionary camp of compromise with the enemy as soon as the movement advanced into its second stage.

The second stage of China's cultural revolution was marked by the founding of the Communist Party, the "May 30th" movement and the northern expedition, during the course of which the united front formed by the three classes continued to develop, and got consolidated in the practical field of politics as the first Kuomintang-Communist united front.

The greatness of Dr. Sun Yat-sen lies not solely in his leading the revolution of 1911 (though it was a revolution of the old bourgeois democratic type) to victory; but also in his being able to readjust to the main current of world development and of the demands of humanity by giving a new orientation to the three principles and building up the new three principles of the three great policies of alliance with the Soviet, of unity with the Communists, and of satisfying the demands of the workers and peasants.

Till then, the three principles had very little to do with educational, institutional, and youth circles, for these had never found in them any slogans which gave the call to do away with feudal culture. Heretofore the three principles had been the three principles in their old form and had generally been regarded as an opportune means used by the ambitious few in their political maneuvers to gain power and high position. From the opening of the new period the three principles were developed into the three principles of the three policies and as a consequence, were widely popularized all over the country, and took firm root in many educational and university circles and gripped a vast majority of the youth, through the united efforts of the patriots of all parties. This was made possible only because the old three principles had been developed into the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal new democratic three principles of the three policies. Without this development, the transmission of the ideas of the three principles was impossible.

During this period, these revolutionary three principles became the political basis of the united front of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other parties. The three principles and communism also formed a united front as expressed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his famous saying, "Communism is a good friend of the three principles." According to its class composition, the united front was a triple one (the proletariat, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie). With the Kuomin Daily News and other papers serving as their organs, the patriotic parties launched upon joint action in spreading anti-imperialist ideas; they opposed the old type of feudal education of Confucius-worship and of going back to the classics; they defended the anti-imperialist and antifeudal new literature against reactionary attacks and stood up for the language as spoken by the people, as against the old literature and the abstruse classical language.

In the Canton campaign and the northern expedition, they inculcated, for the first time and jointly, antiimperialist, and antifeudal ideas into the ranks of the army, and thus created a new type of army. They took up the slogans of "Down with infamous bureaucratic rule and landlord exploitation," and thus inspired the great peasant revolution. Owing to the above and, moreover, due to the help rendered by the Soviet Union, the northern expedition was successfully carried out, and as a consequence, enabled the bourgeoisie to achieve power with the aid of the workers and peasants. But no sooner had that happened when the bourgeoisie turned round to shackle the proletariat and brought into being a new political situation.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Then came the third stage; a new revolution developed from 1927–36. As a result of the Chinese bourgeoisie deserting to the counterrevolutionary camp of imperialism and of the feudal interests, the previous stage of the revolution came to a close; the composition of the revolutionary camp underwent a great change. Now only two of the original three classes remained: The proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasantry, the revolutionary intelligentsia, and other groups).

Now the Chinese revolution entered a new phase, which was destined to develop under the sole leadership of the Communist Party of China. During this period, there were two marked features: on the one hand, the reactionary attempt to exterminate the Communists, and on the other, a deepening of the revolutionary movement. For each, there were two aspects—the reactionary extermination campaigns took two forms—military and cultural; at the same time the revolutionary deepening also went on in two ways: the revolutionization of the villages and a vast cultural upsurge.

The policy of extermination had the constant backing of imperialism, together with the support of the reactionary forces both inside China and all over the world; it extended for a period of no less than 10 years, with its unprecedented barbarities, in consequence of which, hundreds of thousands of Communists and students were massacred and millions of workers and peasants were crushed and destroyed. If those who were in command of the forces of extermination had had their way it seemed certain that communism and the Communists would be wiped out once for all. But the reverse was the result. Both forms of the campaign ended in miserable failure. The outcome of the military extermination campaigns was that the Red Army undertook the march northward with a view to fight the Japanese.

The outcome of the cultural extermination campaign was the outbreak of the "December 9th" revolutionary movement of the youth. And the net result of the two parts of the policy of extermination was the awakening of the whole nation. These were the positive results.

There were also negative results, in that a powerful enemy began his intrusion on our soil. This was the main reason why even to this day the people have not ceased to deplore the 10 years of anti-Communist campaign. A very "curious" fact, in view of the defenseless positions the Communists held in the cultural organization, was that the fierce cultural campaign against the Communists should have failed. Is not this fact worth pondering upon? It should be noted in this connection that it was from this very "extermination" campaign that Lu Hsun, the Communist, emerged as a leading figure of China's cultural revolution.

During the struggle in this period, the revolutionary camp held firmly together the antiimperialist and antifeudal new democracy and new three principles of the people while in the counterrevolutionary camp there grew up an autocracy born of the landlord-bourgeois alliance under the dictates of imperialism. This autocratic regime killed, in politics as in culture, Dr. Sun's three policies, or new three principles. It is this same autocratic regime that must be held responsible for the most severe national disasters China suffered.

The fourth period of China's cultural revolution falls in the period of the present war of resistance against the Japs. This period sees a new zigzag curve of the Chinese revolution, another united front of three classes. But this time the scope of the united front has been much widened. All classes—the upper class including the ruling class, the middle class including the petty bourgeoisie and the lower classes including the proletariat—have joined in the front as allies in their resolute fight against Japanese imperialism.

The first stage of this latest period counts from the beginning of the war to the fall of Hankow. During this stage, the outlook was encouraging in every aspect. We witnessed a growing democratization of our country's politics; we saw a general upsurge in culture.

However, the situation has greatly changed after the second stage, which was marked by the fall of Hankow. A part of the big bourgeoisie had capitulated to the enemy; while another part was planning to bring about the end of the war of resistance too. As a reflection of this changed situation, there is the reactionary movement set up by Ye-Ching (a Trotskyite) and Chang Chuen-Mai (leader of the Chinese National Socialist Party); while the free press was suppressed.

To overcome this internal crisis that has overtaken us, we must wage a resolute struggle against all antiresistance, antiunity, and antiprogressive ideas, without the complete defeat of which, our victory is impossible. What will be the outcome of the struggle has become the main concern of the whole people. However, we can still say that because of the favorable internal and external conditions of today,

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

notwithstanding the countless obstructions put in our way, the victory of the Chinese people is certain. The progress registered in the 20 years after the "May 4" movement exceeds in proportion not only the previous 80 years but, we may say, even the previous 1,000 years of Chinese history. On this basis, what China will look like after a further 20 years of progress is easy to forecast. Even though the evil influences without and within have produced the present crisis, yet this situation only speaks of the desperate straits to which our enemies have been brought and of the approach of people's victory. This is true for the East as of the whole world.

Nothing is achieved except as a result of hard struggle; so also in the case of the new culture. During the 20 years of the zigzag path followed we have tasted every form of good and evil.

The bourgeois die-hards are utterly wrong in their manner of dealing with the cultural problem, as in their manner of dealing with the problem of political power. They are ignorant of the historical peculiarity of the new period; they disregard the people's culture of the new democracy or the new three principles. The starting point of their view is bourgeois autocracy.

A section (I refer to it as only "a section") of the so-called American-European educated, who had helped in the Communist-extermination campaign in culture, are now trying their hand at the policy of so-called "restricting the Communists" and "liquidating of communism." They do not like to see a cultural and politcal upsurge taking place among the workers and peasants. But this dictatorial attitude of the die-hards in the actual field is proving barren just as is their political attitude because it lacks the support of circumstances both in China and outside. Therefore, it were better if it was their cultural autocracy that was "packed up."

On the other hand, it is also improper to go so far as to demand a national culture based on socialism. This outlook is born of a confusion which fails to understand that the Communist outlook must not be mixed up with the practical immediate program. The Communist standpoint, its method of investigation, serves to study and to guide the process of national education and the building of national culture during the democratic revolutionary period.

As we know a national culture with a Socialist content must have for its basis, must be the reflection of, a Socialist economy and a Socialist political organization and that is something which we still have to erect in the future. A national culture with a Socialist content is impossible, for the time being.

It is very true at the same time that since the present Chinese revolution forms a part of the world proletarian Socialist revolution, so Chinese culture, is a part and great ally of the world proletarian Socialist cultural movement. But then this is not to say it is a Socialist culture; it is on the contrary a new people's culture with an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal content. Owing to the inseparability of the Chinese revolution from proletarian leadership, present-day China's new culture cannot but rise under the leadership of the cultural thought of the Chinese proletariat, i. e., under the leadership of communism. But it is the leadership of the people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal political and cultural revolution at the new democratic stage, not that of the political and cultural revolution of the stage of socialism.

Therefore, the content of the new culture is still of the new democracy, not of socialism. However, it goes without saying that it is all the more necessary today to spread the Communist outlook, to speed up the study of Marxist-Leninist teachings; for, without the two, not only the guiding of the Chinese revolution in the socialist stage, but the very success of the democratic revolution of the present-day itself will be impossible.

So then, since the content of our national culture of the present is not of socialism but of new democracy, since it is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the people, and not the anti-capitalist culture of the proletariat, we must be able to distinguish, between our task in developing a Communist outlook and explaining the ideal of socialism, and the practical immediate tasks of establishing the new democracy; between Communist methods of investigation, study and work and the national enlightenment policy to be followed to establish the new democracy. To mix up these different approaches would undoubtedly be wrong.

X. CONTENT OF THE NEW CULTURE

From the above, we have come to know that the content of the present new Chinese culture means neither the cultural domination of the bourgeoisie, nor the imposition of the Socialist culture of the proletariat but it means the building up of a people's culture, with an anti-imperialist and antifeudal content, carried out

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

under the guidance of proletarian thought, or in other words, under the inspiration of the Three Principles in their new form.

This new democratic culture is to be a possession of the whole nation. It stands against imperialist oppression; it stands for the honor and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to our own nation, and bears the peculiarities of our own nation. At the same time, it marches forward in a developing and mutually interacting relation with the proletarian and progressive democratic cultural movements of other nations, it forms a part of the world progressive cultural movement.

China should absorb on a great scale the progressive culture of foreign countries. This refers not only to the proletarian and progressive democratic culture, but also the classical culture of foreign countries, that is useful to us; for instance, the cultural heritage of the capitalist countries in their earlier period of growth. However, we should in no way blindly accept everything foreign without criticism, but should deal with it just as in metabolism; we first chew our food, then finally our system separates it into two portions, the one that is to be absorbed to nourish us and the other which is to be thrown out.

The thesis of "wholesome westernization" is a mistaken viewpoint. To import things foreign has done China much harm. The same attitude is necessary for the Chinese Communists in the application of Marxism to China. Marxism should not be applied subjectively and dogmatically. Such Marxism is useless. The point is to grasp the general truths of Marxism and apply them to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, i. e., to first achieve the Sinonization of Marxism; subjective and dogmatic Marxism is to caricature Marxism and the Chinese revolution. For Marxists of this type there is no place in the revolutionary camp. Chinese culture must have its own form, that is, a national form. A national form and a new democratic content—this is our new culture of today.

This new democratic culture is scientific. It opposes all forms of feudal and superstitious thought and stands for the pragmatist attitude, an attitude of getting at objective truth and the unity of theory and practice. In this respect, the scientific thought of the Chinese bourgeoisie has been able to assimilate the materialist and natural scientific outlook of certain progressive bourgeois thinkers and has succeeded in building up an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and anti-superstitious joint front of the forces of progress; but care must be taken to avoid including any form of reactionary idealism.

We Communists may work in a united front for political action with people who profess religious or idealistic beliefs but should have nothing to do with philosophical idealism or religion in themselves. During the long period of its feudal stage of development, China built up for herself a glorious ancient culture; therefore, as a necessary precondition for developing an effective new culture today we must absorb all the democratic elements of the old while leaving behind the feudal rubbish it contains. In order to achieve this, we must first carefully sift out the rubbish heaped up by the old feudal ruling class on the splendid popular culture of our ancient past, i. e., take for ourselves what is really democratic and revolutionary in it.

The new politics and new economy of present-day China arise out of the old politics and old economy. Therefore we should respect our past and never deny our history. But to respect our history is to give it a certain scientific esteem; to respect our cultural past is not to negative our present with a view to praise everything in the old including the poison of feudalism. Therefore, it is important for us to teach the people and the young student, in the main, not to look backward, but to look forward.

This new democratic culture is of the people. It should be used in the service of the workers and peasants who represent more than 90 percent of the whole population; it must gradually become their own culture.

Practically speaking, therefore, the task that faces us is of a twofold nature; on the one side, we must provide for the education of revolutionary cadres and on the other, the education of the masses; at the same time linking up the two forms of our activity so as to raise the entire standard both of national culture and of the means whereby we convey it to the people. For the people, the cultural weapon is to be wielded as a powerful weapon of the revolution.

Before the revolution, the weapon of revolutionary culture served as a means to prepare the people ideologically; during the revolution the cultural front forms a part of the general front of revolutionary struggle, in which the cadres of the revolutionary culture become field-commanders leading the people's ranks. "There can be no revolutionary practice without revolutionary theory," said Lenin. It is clear then how important is the revolutionary cultural movement

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

for revolutionary practice, and its importance for the service of the people. Therefore, in the war against Japan, all progressive cultural workers must be formed into special cultural detachments. If the cultural workers keep their culture to themselves and away from the people, they remain but commanders-in-name and will never achieve anything. In view of this, we have in specific conditions to reform the written language, and simplify it to make it conform as closely as possible to the spoken language of the people, who are the very source of all culture.

To sum up: Our national culture is anti-imperialist and antifeudal in character; such is our new democratic culture, the culture of the new three principles of the Chinese Nation.

The combination of the new democratic politics, new democratic economy and new democratic culture constitutes the edifice of our new democratic republic—the Republic of China, in appearance and in reality. Such is the new China we are struggling to build up.

The new China of today stands before the gaze of all; we welcome it. The sun of the new China appears over the horizon, we clap our hands and hail it.

Raise your fists, new China will be ours!

Appendix C

LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES—COMMUNISTS

Chen I

Commander in Chief, former New Fourth Army; Standing Member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party.

Born 1898, Szechuan Province, of wealthy landlord parents. Studied in France shortly after World War I. Organized a branch of the Chinese Communist Party in France with Chou En-lai. Chief, Political Department, Chu Teh's forces, 1927; organized local guerrillas in Fukien Province, 1929; remained in Kiangsi to command guerrilla forces during the Communist Long March to northwest China, 1934. Acting Commander, New Fourth Army, 1941, following the arrest of the Commander, Yeh Ting. Reported killed, March 1947; however recently reported commanding troops in central China.

Chen Shao-yu (alias Wang Ming)

Member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party; head Research Department.

Born 1907, Anhwei Province, of wealthy farming family. Graduate of Chungshan University, Moscow, 1927. Speaks Russian. Former member of the Kuomintang; joined CCP in 1925. Worked for Communists in Wuchang and Hankow. Visited Moscow in 1929 and following return became Director, Information Department of the Chinese Professional and Labor League, Shanghai. Member, Political Bureau, 1931. Became CCP representative in Moscow in 1931. His speeches made before the 13th plenary session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International were published by him in 1934. Returned to China in 1938 working for the United Front. Director of the United Front Department of the CCP until March 1944. Member, Central Executive Committee. Representative to 4th People's Political Council, 1945. Delegate to Political Consultative Council, 1946. President, Yenan Girls University. Director, CCP Research Department.

Ch'en Yun

Member, Central Executive Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; secretary, Communist Northeastern Politburo.

Born 1901, Shanghai. Former member of the Kuomintang; joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924 and made the Long March. One time Director of the Department of Organization of the Party. Has never been abroad. Elected to membership in the Central Executive Committee, April 1945. Now in Manchuria.

Chou En-lai

Member, Central Executive Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; chairman, United Front Line Department of the Secretariat.

Born 1898, Huaian, Kiangsu; descendent of old Mandarin family. After a middle school education in Tientsin, went to Japan in 1917, studied at Waseda

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

University for a year and a half. Returning to China, studied at Nankai University. Went to France under Mao Tse-tung's Worker-Student plan in 1920; studied in France for two years and worked for a time in the coal mines of Lille and in the Rhineland. Became a member of the Communist Youth in France; one of the founders of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. Spent some time in England, a year in Germany. Returned to China in 1924, joined the Chinese Communist Party as Secretary of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee and later taught in the Whampoa Military Academy. Active in the Nanchang Uprising, being captured there, later escaping. Spent the years 1928–1931 in Moscow studying in the Chungshan University and serving as a delegate to the 6th Congress of the Comintern. Joined the Kiangsi Soviet, 1931. Participated in the Long March. Headed the Communist delegation at Sian at the time of the Generalissimo's kidnapping and was instrumental in securing Chiang Kai-shek's release. Acted as the chief liaison officer between the Chinese Communist Party and the National Government until break-down of negotiations in 1947.

Chu Teh

Commander in Chief of all Chinese Communist Armies since 1931; member, Central Executive Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party; vice chairman, Central Revolutionary Military Council.

Born 1886, Szechuan Province. Received higher primary and middle school education before going to the Yunnan Military Academy. From the outbreak of the revolution in 1911 until 1921, fought with Republican troops in Yunnan and Szechuan. Studied in Europe, mostly in Berlin. Here met Chou En-lai and joined the Communist Party in 1922. Founded the Berlin branch of the Kuomintang in 1924. Returning to China in 1926, he organized Kuomintang troops in Szechuan. In Nanchang in 1927 Chu and other military leaders led an open revolt against Chiang Kai-shek. Defeated at Nanchang, they attacked Canton and Swatow without success; fled through southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. In May 1928 Chu joined forces with Mao Tse-tung at Chingkanshan on the Kuangsi-Hunan border. Chu directed military tactics on the Long March; had his headquarters in Yenan from 1937 until 1947.

Ho Lung

Commander, Communist forces in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region; member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party; member, Central Revolutionary Military Council.

Born, 1897 in Tayung, Hunan. Received no formal education and is today unable to write, although he can read a little. His military career began in 1913 when he led a peasant revolt. His forces were incorporated into the Kuomintang armies in 1918 and Ho was then made a regimental commander. After participating in the northern expedition, he was sent to Kiukiang where he joined forces with Yeh Ting. After the failure of the Nanchang Uprising, joined the Communist Party. Participated in the Long March. During the war, Ho was commander, 120th Division, 8th Route Army. He was incorrectly reported killed in action in the fall of 1945. At present in command of troops in northern Shansi.

Hsiao Ching-kuang

Reserve member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; Deputy Commander, Northeast People's Liberation Army in Manchuria.

Born 1901 in Hunan of a military family. Finished middle school in Hunan; went to Moscow in 1919 where he studied at the Far Eastern University; speaks Russian. Returned to China in 1924; studied at the Whampoa Military Academy until 1927, at which time he again went to Russia. At one time, member of the Kuomintang; joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Returned to China in 1931; was appointed commander of the 7th Army Group. Participated in the Long March and was active in the Kansu Soviet. Garrison Commander, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region in 1943. Elected as a reserve member of the Central Executive Committee in 1945.

Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien

Standing member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party; Commander, Shansi-Anhwei-Shantung-Honan Area.

Born 1902, Shansi Province, of small landowning family. Father was a scholar. In 1924, entered the first class of the Whampoa Military Academy and subsequently participated in the expedition against northern warlords. Was an instructor at the Wuchang Military and Political Academy in 1926, joining the

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Communist Party in the same year. Worked covertly as a Communist in Chang Fa-kuei's Ironsides Army in 1927. Led a detachment of factory workers in the Canton Commune of December 11, 1927. Became a vice commander of the 31st Division of Communist Forces in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet in 1939. With Chu Teh, Hsu established a Communist base in northwest China, 1932–1935.

Jao Shu-shih

Member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; deputy commander of the former New 4th Army.

Born 1901, Kiangsi. Joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 while a student at a Shanghai university; speaks some English. Has visited both the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. Political Commissar of the New 4th Army, 1945. Was the chief Communist representative on the Truce Team in Mukden in early 1946 and later was senior adviser to the Communists in the Peiping Executive Headquarters. Elected to the Central Executive Committee in April 1945.

Jen Pi-shih

Member, Central Executive Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party; member, Secretariat in charge of finances and taxes.

Born 1899, Hunan, of a rich farming family. After finishing primary and middle-school education in Hunan, studied at the University of Peking and in 1919 went to Moscow where he studied at the Far Eastern University. Returned to China, became one of the founders of the Communist Youth League in 1921 and served as secretary of its Central Committee. Sent to Hankow as secretary of the Hupei Provincial Party Headquarters in 1929; carried on Communist activities for two years under the disguise of a portrait painter. Became Secretary of the Central Bureau of the Kiangsi Soviet in 1931. Appointed political commissar to Ho Lung's 2nd Front Army in 1933. Jen became director of the Political Department of the reorganized 8th Route Army in 1937. In the U. S. S. R. for medical treatment, 1939–1940 and upon return to China, became head of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Executive Committee and concurrently Chief Secretary of the Committee. Elected Secretary of the 7th National Congress, Yenan, April 1945 and reelected to membership in the Central Executive Committee and also elected a member of the Politburo.

K'ang Sheng

Member, Central Executive Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party.

Born 1899, Shantung. Former member of the Kuomintang; joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. In Moscow in the mid-1930's; spoke before the 13th plenary session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1935. Chairman, Agriculture Department of the Secretariat of the Party, 1943. Elected to membership in the Central Executive Committee at the 7th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Yenan, April 1945. Now chief, Central Political Security Board of the Chinese Communist Party.

Kao Kang

Member, Central Executive Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; Commander in Chief of the Military Region of Kirin and Heilungkiang.

Born 1902, Shensi, of a peasant family. Former member of the Kuomintang; joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. One of the leaders of the revolt in north Shensi, which created a Soviet in that area long before the main Red Army arrived following the Long March. Became Chairman of the Party's Northwest Bureau after the establishment of the Communist headquarters in Yenan and occupied several posts in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. Elected to the Central Executive Committee in April 1945. Now in Manchuria. Has had no formal education and has learned to read and write since 1935. Has had no training abroad.

Li Li-san

Member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party; political adviser to Lin Piao in Manchuria.

Born 1900, Hunan Province. Received an elementary education in China after which he studied in France under Mao Tse-tung's Worker-Student plan; one of the founders of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Expelled from school, 1922, and deported from France for participation in a student demonstration. Returned to China, worked in the Chinese labor move-

80261—48——8

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ment then being actively supported by the Chinese Communist Party. After the split between the Communists and the Kuomintang in 1927, played a prominent part in the activities of the Communist Party. His policies were opposed to Mao Tse-tung. The two became leaders of opposing factions within the party. After Li's policies had proved unsuccessful he fled or was sent to Moscow; attended the Lenin Institute for two years after which he was associated with the Profintern. Established and edited the National Salvation Times, 1934, and from 1938 to 1945 was associated with Moscow's foreign language publishing house. Returned to Manchuria with the Soviet Army in September 1945 and became adviser to General Lin Piao.

Liao Ch'eng-chih

Reserve member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party, elected April 1945.

Born 1908, Tokyo, Japan, where his parents were students. His father was the late Liao Chung-K'ai, close friend of Sun Yat-sen, who was assassinated by rightists elements of the Kuomintang in 1925. Studied at Lingnan University in Canton and Waseda University, Japan. Joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Went to Germany in 1928 where he studied at Berlin and Hamburg Universities; speaks English, Russian, Japanese, French, and German. Was asked to leave Germany and went to Moscow where he remained until 1932. Returned ot China that same year and was arrested. Released shortly thereafter; went to Szechuan and joined the Red Army. Made the Long March, and after the establishment of the Communists in Yenan, became editor of the Red China News Agency and the Emancipation Daily newspaper. Communist Party representative in Hongkong from 1937 to 1942. Was smuggled out of Hongkong after the Japanese capture of the city, but was immediately arrested by the Central Government. Remained in custody until January 22, 1946. Served as the Communist member of a Subcommittee of Three which took part in the negotiations for settling the East River problem. Went to Yenan in the fall of 1946 and for a while served as a party spokesman. Now in Hongkong.

Lin Feng

Member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, elected in April 1945; chairman, United Democratic Government in Manchuria.

Born 1909, Liaoning. Joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1930. Held several posts in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region Government prior to the Japanese surrender.

Lin Piao

Commander, Northeast People's Liberation Army; member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party; commissioner and concurrently head, Military Department, Communist Northeastern Political Bureau.

Born, 1908 at Huangan, Hupei; attended a preparatory school and the Whampoa Military Academy, graduating, 1925. Joined the Socialist Youth and the Kuomintang in 1924 and the Communist Party in 1925. Colonel in the 4th Kuomintang Army in 1927. After the Nanchang Uprising, his regiment joined the Communist 20th Army. Participated in the Long March. Founded and became president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College (K'ang-Ta) in Yenan, 1936. Commander of the 115th Regiment of the 8th Route Army from 1937 to 1945. Along with Chou En-lai, represented the Communist Party in Chungking, from 1942–1943. Has been in Manchuria since the fall of 1945.

Lin Tsu-han (Lin Po-chu)

Member, Central Executive Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party; chairman, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

Born 1885, Hunan, of a rich landlord family. After graduation from a normal college in Changtefu, went to Japan where he studied at Chuo (Central) University Tokyo. In Japan, met Sun Yat-sen and later joined the T'ung-Men-Hui. Leader of this organization in Hunan and helped to overthrow the Manchu dynasty in 1911. Became a charter member of the Kuomintang and was elected to the Central Committee of that party in 1924. Had joined the Communist Party in 1922. During the period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, held several important posts. Served in the Wuhan government as Minister of Finance. Expelled from the Kuomintang after the Nanchang Uprising and fled first to Hongkong and then to the U. S. S. R. where he studied four years and attended the 6th Congress of the Comintern. Returned to China in 1930; went to Kaingsu, where elected Commissioner of Finance in the Kiangsi Soviet. Participated in the

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Long March and was elected Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in 1937. Participated in negotiations with the Central Government following the Sian Incident in 1936 and from 1939–1941 was one of the Communist representatives on the People's Political Council, first in Hankow and later in Chungking. Returned to Chungking in 1944 to assume again a position on the 4th People's Political Council, but refused to attend many of the later meetings. Also served for several years as the Sian representative of the 8th Route Army.

Liu Ning-i

Chairman and international representative, Liberated Areas Trade Union Federation.

Veteran labor organizer; worked among miners in Hupei prior to World War II. Became party's chief labor expert following death of Teng Fa, April 1946. Represented Communist China at Executive Committee meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU, "Profintern"), Moscow, June 1946. Chairman Shanghai Communist Labor Committee until returning to Yenan, November 1946. Attended WFTU Conference, Prague, June 1947. Received by Marshal Tito, July 7, 1947.

Liu Po-ch'eng

Commander, Communist Forces for Central China; standing member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party.

Born 1900, Szechuan Province; father was a piper in Chinese rituals. Joined the Communist Party in 1926. Shortly after the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, went to Moscow and studied at the Red Army Military Academy. Returned to China four years later and became Chief of Staff to Chu Teh. Led vanguard troops in the Long March from Kiangsi to northwest China in 1934. An experienced military leader, Liu has translated a Russian book on modern weapons. At present engaged in military operations in eastern Honan.

Liu Shao-ch'i

Member of the Central Executive Committee, deputy chairman of the Political Bureau, and member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; director, National Labor Union.

Born in Hunan Province and studied in Moscow. A member of the Chinese Communist Party by 1922 at which time he was also a member of the Secretariat of the China Labor Organization; held several positions in the Kiangsi Soviet and later participated in the Long March. Since 1937, has been head of the National Labor Union; one time chairman of the Southeastern Political Bureau of the party. Concurrently vice-commissar and Chief of Staff of the 5th Division of the New 4th Army, 1945. Immediately after the Japanese surrender was reported in Shanghai as political adviser and labor leader of the Communist Party.

Lu Ting-i

Member, Central Executive Committee and head, Publicity (Propaganda) Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

Born c. 1905, Wushih, Kiangsu; father owned land and a small weaving factory. Married; first wife killed by Nationalists. Speaks English well and Russian. Graduate of Nanyang University in electrical engineering; also studied at University of Moscow. Jointed Communist Party in 1924. Head, Publicity Department, CCP Youth League and ran magazine. China's Youth until 1927. Chief delegate, World Communist Youth League, Moscow, 1928. Head, Publicity Department, Kiangsi Soviet's Youth League and editor of the paper Red China until time of the Long March in which he participated. Director, Information Department, 1st Army Command, 1937. Editor in chief, Emancipation. Elected member, CCP Central Executive Committee by 7th Party Congress, 1945. Delegate to the Political Consultative Council in Chungking; made member of CCP Steering Committee, April 1946. One of three leading CCP negotiators during first seven months of Marshall Mission; returned to Yenan, June 1946. Operated in both Communist- and Nationalist-held areas until final expulsion by the Central Government, March 1947.

Mao Tse-tung

Chairman, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party; chairman, Political Bureau; secretary general of the Secretariat; chairman, Central Revolutionary Military Council; director, Research Bureau; president, Party School in Yenan.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Born 1893, Shaoshan, Hunan. Primary education; studied under several teachers while working and travelling through the countryside. Attended the Hunan Normal School, Changsha, 1912–1918. Led a group of students to Peiping to prepare them for study in French universities in 1918. Although co-sponsor of this "Worker-Student" plan, Mao did not go to France, but remained in Peiping where he worked in the library of the University of Peiping; joined the Communist Party in October 1921. During the period of Kuomintang-Communist collaboration, worked in the Shanghai headquarters of the Kuomintang and later as acting-commissioner of Information in Kwangtung Province. As a member of the Central Executive Committee of both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, was assigned the task of coordinating the activities of the two. After 1926 he worked in the peasant movement of the Communist Party and founded the All China Peasants Union. After the Nanchang Uprising, became the political commissar of the 4th Red Army under Chu Teh. During the period from 1927 to 1931, opposed the policy of the Chinese Communist Party led by Li Li-san, maintaining that the party's power lay in the organization of the peasants rather than in the industrial proletariat of the large cities. When Li Li-san's policies proved unsuccessful, Mao's theories were recognized by the party and the Comintern. Founded the Kiangsi Soviet in February 1930 and became head of this government, 1931. Participated in the Long March and organized the Communist Government in Shensi. Chairman of the Central Executive Committee since 1936.

Nieh Jung-chen

Member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; Commander in Chief, Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military District.

Born 1899, Szechuan, of a wealthy farming family. Went to Europe in 1919 under Mao Tse-tung's "Worker-Student" plan and studied chemical engineering in France and Belgium. Joined the Communist Party Youth Corps while in France. Went to Moscow in 1924 where he studied both in the Eastern Laborer's University and in the Red Army Academy. Returned to China in 1925, assumed post as instructor in the Whampoa Military Academy. After the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, joined the First Red Army of Lin Piao and was active in the Kiangsi Soviet. Participated in the Long March. Was appointed Deputy Commander, 115th Division of the 8th Route Army in 1937, and throughout the Sino-Japanese war served as a guerrilla commander. At present commander of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military District. Speaks both French and Russian.

P'eng Chen

Member, Central Executive Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; chairman, Northeast Politburo in Manchuria.

Born 1899, Shansi. Former member of the Kuomintang who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. At one time director of the Party School in Yenan; now chairman of the Northeast Politburo and Political Commissioner of the Northeast People's Liberation Army in Manchuria. Has never been abroad.

P'eng Teh-huai

Deputy Commander, Chinese Communist Armies; member, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Communist Party; member, Central Revolutionary Council.

Born 1900 in Hsiangtan, Hunan; joined the army at the age of 18; studied at the Hunan Military School. Joined the Communist Party, 1927 and in 1928 established the first Hunan Soviet government. Led the Communist forces that attacked and captured Changsha in 1930; forced to withdraw a few days later. Participated in the Long March. Has been deputy commander of the Communist Armies since 1937.

Teng Tzu-hui

Member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, elected April 1945; chairman, East China Politburo.

Born c. 1900, Fukien Province. At one time member of the Kuomintang; joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. Was a former Political Commissar of the New 4th Army.

Ts'ai Ch'ang (Miss)

Member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; chairman, Liberated-Areas Women's Union.

Born 1900, Hsianghsiang Hsien, Hunan. Sister of the late Ts'ai Ho-sheng, early Chinese Communist who was executed in 1928. Married to Li Fu-chun,

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

vice director of the Department of Organization of the Party. Went to France to study under Mao Tse-tung's "Worker-Student" plan in 1919. Joined the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party in 1923 and joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924. Was the Chinese Communist Party delegate to the 6th Meeting of the Communist International in Moscow in 1928. Returned to China in 1932; became active in the Kiangsi Soviet and later participated in the Long March. Has been in charge of women's organization since 1937. Attended the First Session of the International Women's Federation in Prague, 1947. Speaks French.

Tseng Sheng

Member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, elected April 1945; commander of the Communist East River Column, Kwangtung Province.

Born c. 1914, Kwangtung. Joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Attended Sun Yat-sen University in Canton. During the Sino-Japanese conflict after 1937 led Communist guerrillas in Kwangtung.

Tung Pi-wu

Member, Standing Committee, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; member, Politburo.

Born 1887, Huangan, Hupei Province of landlord family. Graduate of a university in Japan. Speaks some Russian and Japanese, can read English. Engaged in revolutionary activities in early years; associated with Kuomintang headquarters in Hupei. Joined Chinese Communist Party and attended 1st Party Congress, Shanghai, 1921. Concurrently Secretary, CCP, and member of the KMT Hupei Provincial Committees. Went to Russia, joined Lenin Academy, 1928. Elected member, Central Executive Committee, 1934. In Long March; president, Communist Party School, 1936. CCP representative at "Sian Incident", December 1936. Appointed member, People's Political Council, 1937. CCP representative to Central Government, 1937–45. Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945. Member, Political Consultative Council, 1946. Member, Committee of Five, discussing coalition government, 1946. Chief Communist representative in Nanking after departure of Chou En-lai, November 1946. Chairman, China Liberated Areas Relief Association, 1947. Ordered to leave Nanking in March 1947.

Yeh Chien-ying

Chief of Staff, Central Military Council, Chinese Communist Party; member, Standing Committee, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Born 1903, Kwangtung Province of a merchant family. Studied at the Yunnan Military Academy; later spent three years at the Red Army Military Academy in Moscow. Was Chief of Staff of the 4th Division of the Nationalist Army under Chang Fa-kuei in 1926. Participated in the abortive Canton Commune of December 1927. Fled to Moscow, returning to China in 1931, when he became Chief of Staff to Chu Teh. Remained in Kiangsi Province during the Communist Long March in 1934, later joining the Communist forces in northwest China. Was prominent in peace negotiations to resolve Kuomintang-Chinese Communist differences in December 1945. Became chief Communist representative of Peiping Executive Headquarters to administer truce agreements between Kuomintang-Chinese Communist forces in February 1946.

Yun Tse (alias Ulan Hu; Tumut)

Reserve member, Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; chairman, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government.

Born 1904, Tumet Banner, Suiyuan Province. Attended Peiping Mongolian-Tibetan School; graduate of Chungshan University, Moscow. Does not speak Mongolian. In U. S. S. R. from 1925 to 1930 studying at and working for Chungshan University. Joined Communist Party in 1927. Onetime secretary to Fu Tso-i. Organized Mongolian Anti-Japanese Army, which was later dissolved, in 1933. Rebelled against Japanese in 1935 and led troops after 1937. President, Min Tsu Hsueh Yuan (Race College), Yenan, 1941 concurrently director, Mongolian Cultural Association and Committee of Racial Affairs, Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Established a Democratic Anti-Japanese Government, Niao Shen Banner (sic), 1944. Elected Governor of Suiyuan, 1945. Elected reserve member, CCP Central Executive Committee, April 1945. Chair-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

man, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Movement Association, 1945–1946. Chairman and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government, May 1947. Commander, Inner Mongolian People's Defense Army Headquarters, November 1947.

Appendix D

LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES—NON-COMMUNISTS

Chang, Carson (see *Chang, Chun-mai*)

Chang Cheng

Lieutenant General; army officer, native of Hunan, born in 1899; graduate, Whampoa Military Academy, 1925, Sun Yat-sen Univ., Moscow, 1927; Staff College, 1945; deputy commander of gendarmerie, 1937–44; commandant, Gendarmerie School, since 1940; commander of gendarmerie and concurrently deputy director of courts-martial, since 1944; member, Supervisory Board, *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps; elected member, Central Executive Committee, Kuomintang, 1945; air defense commander for Nanking Area since 1947; commander, Nanking Garrison Headquarters, March to December 1947; address, Gendarmerie Headquarters, Chungking.

Chang, Chih-chung

General; army officer, native of Anhwei, born in 1890; graduate, Paoting Military Academy, 1916; as commander of Fifth Army defended Shanghai area in cooperation with 19th Route Army, 1932; commandant, Central Military Academy, 1929–37; garrison commander, Nanking-Shanghai area, 1937; commander of all Chinese forces fighting Japan in Shanghai-Woosung area, 1937; governor, Hunan Province, 1937–39; chief aide-de-camp to Generalissimo, 1940; minister, Political Training Board, National Military Council, and secretary-general, *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps, 1940–46; member, Central Executive Committee, since 1935; director, President's Northwest Headquarters, since 1946; representative, Three-man Truce Commission (for settlement of a truce between the Nationalist Government and the Communists), February-March 1946; governor of Sinkiang, 1946–47; address, Political Training Board, Chungking.

Chang, Chun

General; government official, native of Szechwan, born in 1888; graduate, Tokyo Military Cadets' Academy; member, National Military Council, 1926–28; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1928; mayor of Shanghai, 1930–32; governor, Hupeh Province, 1933–35; minister of foreign affairs, 1935–37; secretary-general, Kuomintang Central Political Council, 1937; vice-president, Executive Yuan, and director, Generalissimo's Provisional Headquarters in Chungking, 1938–39; secretary-general, Supreme National Defense Council, and secretary-general, Central Planning Board, 1939–40; director, Generalissimo's Provisional Headquarters in Chengtu; and governor, Szechwan Province, 1940–47; Kuomintang delegate to the Political Consultative Conferences (between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists), January 1946; member, Three-man Truce Commission, January–February 1946; acting director, Generalissimo's Headquarters in Chungking, 1946; member, State Council and concurrently President, Executive Yuan, April 1947–May 1948; address, Szechwan Provincial Government, Chengtu.

Chang, Chun-mai (prefers Carson Chang)

Jurist, native of Kiangsu, born in 1886; educated in Japan, Germany, and England; member, People's Political Council, since 1938; member, presidium, same council, 1940–42; leader, Chinese National Socialist Party; member, Chinese Delegation to San Francisco Conference, 1945; delegate, Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Hot Springs, Virginia, January 1945; leader, Democratic Socialist Party (formerly Chinese National Socialist Party); member, reorganized State Council, March 1946; elected to Presidium of the 4th People's Political Council, May 1947; address, c/o People's Political Council, Chungking.

Chang, Hsueh-liang

General; retired army officer, native of Liaoning, born in 1898; graduate, Northeastern Military Academy; attended Japanese autumn maneuvers, 1921;

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

state councillor, National Government, and chairman, Northeastern Political Council, 1928; commander-in-chief, Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces, 1929; deputy commander-in-chief, National Land, Sea, and Air Forces, 1930; military affairs commissioner, Peiping, and acting chairman, Peiping branch, National Military Council, 1932; toured Europe, 1933–34; deputy commander-in-chief, Bandit Suppression Forces in Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei, 1934; deputy commander-in-chief, Bandit Suppression Forces in Shensi, 1935–36; leader of Sian Coup, 1936; dismissed from all posts and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment but later pardoned; has been in retirement since 1937.

Chang, Li-sheng

Government official, native of Hopei, born in 1901; graduate, Paris Univ.; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1931; minister, Kuomintang Board of Organization, 1936–39; secretary-general, Party and Government Work Evaluation Committee, 1941–42; secretary-general, Executive Yuan, 1942–45 (June); secretary-general, National General Mobilization Council and minister of interior, 1944–45; secretary-general, Executive Yuan, May-June 1945; Minister of Interior, 1945–1948; member, Five-man Committee to discuss coalition government with the Chinese Communists, August 1946; member, Political Commission for Pacification Areas, October 1946; member, Board of Directors, Farmer's Bank of China, November 1947; Vice President, Executive Yuan, June 1948; address, Ministry of Interior, Chungking.

Chen, Cheng

General; army officer, native of Chekiang, born in 1897; graduate, Paoting Military Academy, 1922; commander, 27th Division, 1927; commander, 11th Division, 1928; commander, 18th Army, 1929; commander-in-chief, 3rd Route Army, Bandit-Suppression Northern Route Force, 1933; commander-in-chief, Northern Route, Kiangsi-Kwangtung-Fukien-Hunan-Hupeh Bandit-Suppression Force, 1934; director, Army Reorganization Department, Generalissimo's Provisional Headquarters, Wuchang, 1935–36; frontline commander, 3rd War Area, 1937; vice-minister of war, 1937; garrison commander, Wuchang Hankow Area, and commander-in-chief, 9th War Area, 1938; minister, Political Training Board National Military Council, and secretary-general, *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps 1938–40; governor, Hupeh Province, 1938–44; commander-in-chief, 6th War Area 1940–44; commander-in-chief, Chinese Expeditionary Force, 1943–44; commander-in-chief, 1st War Area, 1944; minister of war, since November 1944; minister of War, November 1944–46; member, Central Executive Committee, Kuomintang; dean, Central Training Corps, 1945; secretary-general, *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps, 1946–47; member, Three-man Truce Commission, April 1946; Chief of General Staff, Ministry of National Defense, 1946–48; director, President's Northeast Headquarters, 1947–48; address, Ministry of War, Chungking.

Chen Chi-t'ien

Born 1895, Huangpei-, Hupeh province; graduate of Chunghua University, Wuchang, where he majored in political science and economics; editor in chief, Chung Hua Book Company, 1924; professor, National Wuhan University; professor, Chunghua, Wuchang, and Szechuan Universities; 1936, editor, *National Affairs Monthly*; member, People's Political Council, 1938–47; member, Central Committee, China Youth Party, 1925–date; Youth Party delegate to Political Consultative Conference, January 1946; member, State Council, 1947; Minister of Economic Affairs, May 1947–date.

Chen Kuo-fu

Kuomintang and government official, native of Chekiang, born in 1892; vice president, Control Yuan, 1928–32; state councillor, National Government, 1928–33; governor, Kiangsu Province, 1933–37; vice-chairman, Hwai River Conservancy Commission, 1932–39; vice-chancellor, Central Political Institute, 1938–41; member, standing committee, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1929; minister, Kuomintang Board of Organization, 1944; director, 3rd department, Generalissimo's Headquarters, since 1939; member, Board of Directors, Joint Board of Four Government Banks, *c.* 1945–date; chairman, Central Cooperative Bank, 1947; member, Water Conservancy Commission, 1946; member, Board of Directors, Farmer's Bank of China, 1947; address, c/o Generalissimo's Headquarters, Chungking.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Chen, Li-fu

Kuomintang official, native of Chekiang, born in 1900; B. S. in mining engineering, Peiyang Univ., 1923; M. S., Pittsburgh Univ., 1924; Hon. LL. D., Fordham Univ., 1943; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1929; secretary-general, Kuomingtang Central Executive Committee, 1930–31; minister, Kuomintang Board of Organization, 1932–37; minister, 6th Board, National Military Council, 1937; dean, Central Political Institute, 1937; minister, Kuomintang Board of Social Affairs, 1938–41; minister of education, 1938–44; minister, Kuomintang Board or Organization, 1944–48; member, Central Political Council, Kuomintang, since 1947; vice chairman, National Economic Council, 1947; Vice President, Legislative Yuan, May 1948; address, Board of Organization, Chungking.

Chiang, Chung-cheng (Chiang Kai-shek)

President, Generalissimo; president of National Government, born at Chikou in Fenghua, Chekiang, Oct. 30, 1887; attended Paoting Military Academy, 1906, and Japanese Military Cadets Academy, 1907; participated in 1911 Revolution; appointed president, Whampoa Military Academy, 1923; appointed commander-in-chief, Revolutionary Forces, 1926, to lead Northern Punitive Expedition, resulting in unifying China in 1928; elected president, National Government, 1928; and in that capacity assumed the post of commander-in-chief of Land, Naval, and Air Forces of China; between 1928 and 1931, held at different periods the posts of President of the Executive Yuan and minister of education; retired in December 1931, but returned to Nanking in January 1932; appointed president National Military Council, 1932, a post which he has since retained; at certain periods between 1932 and 1937 was chief of General Staff, chairman of National Economic Council, member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and of Kuomintang Central Political Council; since the war broke out, his duties have increased enormously; he is the acknowledged leader of the nation; elected President, National Government, September 1943, to succeed the late President Lin Sen; now *Tsung Tsai* (director-general) of Kuomintang, president of National Military Council, chairman of Supreme National Defense Council, besides other responsibilities; elected President of the Republic of China by the National Assembly, April 1948, address, National Government, Chungking.

Chiang Kai-shek (see Chiang, Chung-cheng)

Chiang Kai-shek, Madame (Mayling Soong Chiang. See Chiang, Sung Mei-ling)

Chiang, Sung Mei-ling (Madame Chiang Kai-shek; prefers Mayling Soong Chiang)

Woman leader, native of Kwangtung, born in Shanghai, 1896; B. A., Wellesley; married President Chiang Kai-shek, 1927; member, Legislative Yuan, 1929–32; principal, School for Orphans of the Revolutionaries, 1929–37; secretary-general, Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, 1937–38; director-general, Women's Advisory Council, New Life Movement Association, since 1938; directs the care of war orphans and women's wartime service; visited U. S. A., 1942–43; recuperated in U. S. A., 1944–45 (August); elected member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, May 1945; Kuomintang delegate to the National Assembly, November 1946; address, Generalissimo's Headquarters, Chungking.

Chou, I-chun (prefers Y. T. Tsur)

Government official, born in Hankow, 1883; B. A., Yale 1909; M. A., Wisconsin, 1910; Hon. Litt. D., St. John's; executive director, China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, 1924–28; president, Yenching Univ., 1933–34; vice-minister of industry, 1935–37; finance commissioner, Kweichow Provincial Government, 1937–45; adviser, National Government, since January 1945; appointed Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, August 1945; Minister of Health, April 1947–date; member, Board for Development of Export Trade, 1947; member, Political Committee, Executive Yuan; address, National Government, Chungking.

Chu, Chia-hua

Kuomintang and government official, native of Chekiang, born in 1893; Ph. D., Univ. of Berlin; chancellor, National Central Univ., 1931; minister of education, 1932; minister of communications, 1932–35; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1929; chairman, Board of Trustees for the Administration of Indemnity Funds Remitted by British Government, since 1931; governor, Chekiang Province, 1936–37; secretary-general, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, 1938–39; minister, Kuomintang Board of Organization,

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

1939–44; acting president, Academia Sinica since 1940; vice president, Examination Yuan, 1941–44; state councillor, National Government, 1941; minister of education, since November 1944; address, Ministry of Education, Chungking.

Feng, Yu-hsiang

General; army officer, native of Anhwei, born in 1880; participated in many battles and held many important posts such as military governor of Honan, Shensi, and the Northwest prior to Northern Expedition; commander-in-chief, 2nd Group Army, National Revolutionary Forces, 1926–28; elected state councillor, National Government, 1928; elected member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, 1929; vice president, Executive Yuan, and minister of war, 1928–29; re-elected member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, 1931: re-elected state councillor, National Government, 1932; vice chairman, National Military Council, 1935; member, National Military Council, 1938–47; member, People's Political Council, 1945; touring United States speaking publicly against Chiang Kai-shek, 1946–date; expelled from the Kuomintang, January 1948; announced self as spokesman of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee of Hongkong, 1948; address, National Military Council, Chungking.

Fu, Tso-yi

General; army officer, native of Shansi, born in 1895; graduate, Paoting Military Academy, 1918; garrison commander, Tientsin, 1928–30; commander, 10th Army, 1929–30; commander, 35th Army, 1930–32; commander-in-chief, 7th Group Army, 1933; governor, Suiyuan Province, since 1931–46; deputy commander-in-chief, 8th War Area, 1939–45; commander-in-chief, 12th War Area, since June 1945–47; governor of Chahar, 1946–date; director, Kalgan Pacification Headquarters, 1947; commander-in-chief, North China Bandit Suppression Headquarters, 1947–date; address, Suiyuan Provincial Government, Shenpa, Suiyuan.

Ho, Ying-chin

General; army officer, native of Kweichow, born in 1889; graduate, Tokyo Military Cadets' Academy; commandant, Whampoa Military Academy, 1924; commander-in-chief, Eastern Route Army, National Revolutionary Forces, 1926; governor, Fukien Province, 1926; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1926; chief of staff, National Revolutionary Forces, 1927; inspector-general of military training, 1929; minister of war, 1930–44; director, Peiping Branch, National Military Council, 1933; chief of staff, National Military Council, 1937–46; member, standing committee, Kuomintang C. E. C., since 1937; commander-in-chief of Chinese Ground Forces, 1944; chief, Chinese Military Mission to the United States and Chinese delegate to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, 1946–48; member, Central Political Council, Kuomintang, 1947; director, Strategy Advisory Council, 1947; Minister of National Defense, 1948; address, General Headquarters, Chinese Ground Forces Kunming.

Hu, Shih

Philosopher, diplomatic official, native of Anhwei, born in 1891; B. A., Cornell, 1914; Ph.D., Columbia, 1917; holder of a number of honorary degrees from American and British universities; leading figure in "Literary Revolution," 1917, and advocate of use of spoken language in writing; professor of philosophy and later dean, department of English literature, National Peking Univ., 1917–27; president, China National Institute, 1928–30; dean, College of Arts, National Peking Univ., 1930–37; member, People's Political Council, 1938; ambassador to U. S. A., 1938–42; adviser, Executive Yuan, since 1942; member, Chinese Delegation to San Francisco Conference, 1945; author of a number of books on philosophy, literature, and politics, including *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (Vol. I); president, National Peking University, September 1945–date; member, National Research Council, April 1947; vice chairman, China Commission of UNESCO, 1947; advisor, Board of Directors, U. S. Educational Foundation in China, 1948; address, c/o Chinese Embassy, Washington, D. C.

Ku, Meng-yu

Government official, native of Hopei, born in 1888; graduate, Berlin Univ.; minister, Kuomingtang Publicity Board, 1927; minister of railways, 1932–35; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1931; chancellor, National Central Univ., 1941–43; chancellor, National Central Univ., 1945; Vice President, Executive Yuan, for short time, June 1948; address, c/o Kuomintang Central Headquarters, Chungking.

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Kung, H. H. (see Kung, Hsiang-hsi)

Kung, Hsiang-hsi (prefers H. H. Kung)

Government official, native of Shansi, born in 1881; a lineal descendent of Confucius of 75th generation; B. A., Oberlin, 1906; M. A., Yale, 1907; minister, of industry and commerce, 1927–30; minister of industry, 1930–32; special industrial commissioner to Europe and America, 1932–33; governor of Central Bank of China, 1933–45; vice president, Executive Yuan, 1933; minister of finance, 1933–44; special envoy and chief delegate of the Chinese Government to the coronation of King George VI of Great Britain, 1937; president, Executive Yuan, 1938; vice president, Executive Yuan, 1939–45; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1931; state councillor, National Government, since 1943; chief Chinese delegate, United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, 1944; chairman, Bank of China; in United States since 1947; address, Fan Chuang, Kuo Fu Road, Chungking. Kung holds no official position in the Chinese Government other than positions in various banks.

Li, Huang

Political leader, native of Szechwan, born in 1896; M. A., Paris; one of organizers of Chinese Youth Party, a minority political party organized in 1927; member, People's Political Council, since 1938–47; member, presidium, People's Political Council, since 1943–47; member, Commission for the Promotion of Constitutional Government, 1943; member, Chinese Delegation to San Francisco Conference, 1945; chairman, Organization Committee, Democratic League, 1944; Minister of Economic Affairs, April–May 1947; member, Central Committee, China Youth Party, since 1927; address, c/o People's Political Council, Chungking.

Li, Tsung-jen

General; army officer, native of Kwangsi, born in 1890; graduate, Kweilin Military Academy; commander, 7th Army, National Revolutionary Forces, 1926; commander-in-chief, 4th Group Army, National Revolutionary Forces, 1928; governor, Anhwei Province, 1938; commander-in-chief, 5th War Area, 1937–45; director, Hanchung Field Headquarters, National Military Council, since February 1945; director, President's Peiping headquarters, 1945–48; member, Central Political Council, Kuomintang, 1947–date; 1948, elected Vice President of China by the National Assembly; address, Hanchung Field Headquarters, Hanchung, Shensi.

Liu, Wei-chih

Kuomintang official, native of Kwangtung, born in 1892; graduate, Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu; minister, Kuomintang Board of Overseas Affairs, 1940–43; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1935; chairman, Economic Committee, Supreme National Defense Council, 1946; member, Political Committee of the Executive Yuan, 1947–date; chairman, Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, 1947–date; address, Kuomintang Central Headquarters, Chungking.

Lo, Lung-chi

Educator, journalist, native of Kiangsi, born in 1896: M. A., Wisconsin, 1925; Ph. D., Columbia, 1928; former professor, National Southwest Associated Univ.; former editor, *Yi Shih Pao*, Tientsin; managing director, *Peiping Morning Post;* member, People's Political Council, 1938–42; now director and editor, *Democratic Weekly;* member, Central Standing Committee, Democratic League, 1945–47; member, delegation of the Democratic League to the Political Consultative Conference, January 1946; reportedly out of politics at the present time due to illness; address, 1 Sheng Ping Hsiang, Kunming.

Mai, Ssu Wu Teh (prefers Masud)

Moslem leader, native of Sinkiang, born in 1888; now member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee; state councillor, National Government, since 1942–47; member, People's Political Council; supervisory commissioner for Sinkiang, 1946–47; governor of Sinkiang, May 1947–date.

Pai, Chung-hsi

General; army officer, native of Kwangsi, born in 1893; graduate, Paoting Military Academy, 1916; commander, 13th Army, and garrison commander, Shanghai and Woosung area, 1927; deputy commander-in-chief, 4th Group Army, 1931; deputy commander-in-chief, 5th Route Army, 1937; deputy chief-of-staff, National Military Council, until 1946, and member, National Commis-

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

sion on Aeronautical Affairs, since 1937; minister, Military Training Board, National Military Council, 1937–46; member, standing committee, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1937; deputy chairman, Political Commission for Pacification Areas, 1946; director, Central China Bandit Suppression Headquarters, November 1947–date; member, Political Committee, Executive Yuan, 1947–48; Minister of National Defense, April 1946–May 1948; address, National Military Council, Chungking.

Shao, Li-tze

Government official, native of Chekiang, born in 1882; for ten years managing editor and publisher of *Republican Daily News*, Shanghai; chief secretary, Generalissimo's Headquarters, 1927–31; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1926; governor, Kansu Province, 1932; governor, Shensi Province, 1933–36; minister of information, 1937–38; ambassador to U. S. S. R., 1939–42; secretary-general, People's Political Council, 1943–47; secretary-general, Commission for the Inauguration of Constitutional Government, November 1943; chairman, Economic Committee of the State Council and, concurrently, member of the State Council, 1947–48; address, People's Political Council, Chungking.

Sheng, Shih-tsai

Lieutenant general; army officer, native of Liaoning, born in 1894; governor, Sinkiang Province, and commander, Sinkiang Border Defense, 1940–44; minister of agriculture and forestry, 1944–45 (July); no official position now.

Sun, Ke (prefers Sun Fo)

Government official, native of Kwangtung, born in 1895; son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; B. A., Univ. of California, 1916; M. A., Columbia, 1917; LL. D., National Fuhtan Univ., 1935; mayor of Canton, 1921–22, 1922–24, and 1926; minister of finance, 1927–28; minister of railways, 1928–31; president, Executive Yuan, 1932; member, standing committee, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, and president, Legislative Yuan, since 1932; author, *The Future of China, China and Postwar World, and China Looks Forward;* Kuomintang delegate to the Political Consultative Conference, January 1946; member, Central Political Council, Kuomintang, 1947–date; member of the State Council and Vice President of the National Government, 1947–48; address, Legislative Yuan, Chungking.

Sun, Li-jen

Lieutenant.-general; army officer, native of Anhwei, born in 1900; B. S., Purdue Univ., U. S. A.; graduate, Virginia Military Institute; commander, New 1st Army, Chinese Army in India, since 1943; fought in Burma, 1942–45; commander, New 1st Army, 1943–47; member, Chinese delegation to United Nations Chiefs of Staff Meetings, London, January 1946; garrison commander of Changchun and concurrently commander, 4th Pacification Zone, 1946–47; vice commander, Northeast China Command, 1947; deputy commander, Army Ground Forces in charge of training, 1947-date.

Sun, Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen)

Kuomintang official, native of Kwangtung, born in Shanghai, 1892; B. A., Wesleyan College; married Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 1915; state councillor, National Government, 1939; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since May 1945; advisor to the National Government, 1947; address, 3 New Villa, Chung Shan 3rd Road Chungking.

Sun Yat-sen, Madame (see Sun, Soong Ching-ling)

Sung, Tze-wen (prefers T. V. Soong)

Government official, native of Kwangtung, born in Shanghai, 1894; B. A., Harvard, 1915; minister of finance and vice president, Executive Yuan, 1928–31 and 1932–33; acting president, Executive Yuan, 1932–33; chief delegate, World Economic Conference, London, 1933; chairman, board of directors, Bank of China, 1935–43; acting chairman, National Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, 1938; personal representative of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940–42; minister of foreign affairs, 1942–45 (July); member, standing committee, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, since 1942; state councillor, National Government, November 1944; acting president, Executive Yuan, December 1944–May 1945; president, Executive Yuan, since June 1945; vice chairman, Joint Board of Four Government Banks, since July 1945; head, Chinese Delegation to San Francisco Conference, 1945; chairman Supreme Economic Council and concurrently, acting chairman, Joint Board of

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Four Government Banks, 1945; resident, Executive Yuan, 1945–47; governor of Kwangtung province and, concurrently, director, President's Headquarters in Canton, 1947–date; member, Control Yuan, 1947; address, Executive Yuan, Chungking.

Tong, Hollington, K. (*see Tung, Hsien-kuang*)

Tsur, Y. T. (*see Chou, I-chun*)

Tung, Hsien-kuang (*prefers Hollington K. Tong*)

Journalist, publicity director, native of Chekiang, born in 1887; B. J., Missouri; Hon. Ph. D., Park College; editor and managing director, *China Press*, Shanghai, 1931–35; managing director, *China Times*, *Ta Wan Pao*, and Shun-Shih News Agency, 1935; managing director, China Publishing Co., Shanghai, 1936; vice minister of information, 1938–45 (Aug.); adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since 1942; director, Post-Graduate School of Journalism, Central Political Institute, since 1943; elected member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, May 1945; authorized biographer of Chiang Kai-shek, in both Chinese and English; director, Bureau of Information, 1947–date; member, Commission for the Disposal of United States Relief Supplies, 1948; address, c/o Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chungking.

Wang, Chung-hui

Government official, native of Kwangtung, born in 1882; D. C. L., Yale, 1905; barrister-at-law, Middle Temple, 1907; minister of justice, 1912; delegate to Washington Conference, 1921–22; minister of justice, 1922; deputy judge, Permanent Court of International Justice, The Hague, 1923–30; minister of education, 1926; minister of justice, 1927–28; president, Judicial Yuan, 1928–31; judge, Permanent Court of International Justice, The Hague, 1930–35; minister of foreign affairs, 1937–41; member, Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee, since 1926; secretary-general, Supreme National Defense Council, 1942–47; member, Chinese Delegation to San Francisco Conference, 1945; member, State Council, 1947–48; reported to be appointed President of the Judicial Yuan, June 17, 1948; address, Supreme National Defense Council, Chungking.

Wang, Shih-chieh

Government official, native of Hupeh, born in 1891; B. S., London, 1917; Docteur en Droit, Paris, 1920; member, Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, since 1928; chancellor, National Wuhan Univ., 1929–34; minister of education, 1933–37; secretary-general, People's Political Council, 1938–43; minister of information, 1939–42; secretary-general, Central Planning Board, 1940–43; chief counsellor, National Military Council, since 1938; member, presidium, People's Political Council, 1943–47; minister of information, November 1944–August 1945; minister of foreign affairs, since August 1945; author, *Comparative Constitutions;* Kuomintang delegate to the Political Consultative Conference, January 1946; delegate, Paris Peace Conference, July 1946; member, Political Committee of the Executive Yuan, 1947–date; member, State Council, 1947–48; address, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chungking.

Wang, Yun-wu

Publisher, writer, native of Kwangtung, born in 1888; managing director and editor-in-chief, Commercial Press, since 1930; editor, *Wan Yu Wen Ku on the Complete Library*, consisting of 4,000 volumes of standard works in all branches of knowledge, sufficient to furnish a small library; inventor of a system of Chinese lexicography known as the "four-corner numeral system"; member, resident committee, People's Political Council, 1938–45; member, Chinese Goodwill Mission to Great Britain, 1943; elected member, presidium, People's Political Council, July 1945; chairman, Board of Directors, China Textile Development Corporation, 1946; Minister of Economic Affairs, 1946–47; Vice President, Executive Yuan and, concurrently, member, State Council, 1947–48; chairman, Rehabilitation Affairs Committee, 1947; member, National Economic Council, 1948; appointed Minister of Finance, June 1948; address, Commercial Press, Pai Hsiang Street, Chungking.

Wong, Wen-hao

Government official, geologist, native of Chekiang, born in 1889; D. Sc., Louvain Univ.; Hon. LL. D., Univ. of British Columbia, Canada; Hon. D. Eng., Berlin Engineering College; director, National Geological Survey of China, since 1922; acting chancellor, National Tsing Hua Univ., 1931; secretary-general, Executive

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

)5

ng
:er
tl;
ve
or,
yes
es
il,
ral
ed

te,
eh,
nt,
rd,
ity
al,
il,

ese
in-
28;
of
47;
ad-
ss,

:al,
or,
ce,
er,
rd,
. of
nic

ard
rice
: of
om-

45.
30

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Fou
Kw
Car
Chu

Tor

Tsa

Tur

J
Hor
193
Age
min
sinc
Ins
Ma
Eng
Dis
Aff

Wa

G
bar
Wa
nen
192
Per
affa
192
Chi
194
add

Wa

G
Doc
Hag
edu
min
194
sidi
194
par
fere
Poli
1947

War

P
edit
Com
of k
lexi
com
Miss
Cou
Cor
Exe
Reh
1948
Pai

Wor

G
Uni
Engi
actir

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Yuan, 1935–36; secretary-general, Chinese Delegation to Coronation of King George VI, 1937; minister, 3rd Board, National Military Council, 1937; minister of economic affairs, 1938–46; president, Chinese Engineering Society, since 1941; director, War Production Board, since December 1944; vice president, Executive Yuan, 1945–47; and state councillor, National Government, 1945–48; author, *Mineral Resources of China, Earthquake Regions of China,* and *Mountain Ranges of China;* director, War Production Board, 1945; chairman, National Resources Board, 1938–48; vice chairman and secretary-general, Supreme Economic Council, 1946; member, Central Executive Committee, Kuomintang; member, Central Political Council, 1947–date; member, National Research Council, 1947; elected President, Executive Yuan, May 1948; address, Executive Yuan, Chungking.

Wu, Ting-chang

Government official, banker, native of Chekiang, born in 1884; graduate, Japanese Commercial College, 1909; chairman, Banking Syndicate of Yen Yeh, Kincheng, Continental, and China and South Sea Banks, 1922–35; president, *Ta Kung Pao,* 1926-39; minister of industry, 1935–37; minister of 4th Board, National Military Council, 1937; governor, Kweichow Province, 1937–45; deputy pacification commissioner of Yunnan and Kweichow, 1939–45; secretary-general, National Government, since 1945; member, Supreme National Defense Council, 1947; address, National Government, Chungking.

Yen, Hsi-shan

General; army officer, native of Shansi, born in 1883; graduate, Japanese Military Cadets' Academy: governor, Shansi Province, 1912–27; commander-in-chief, 3d Group Army, 1928; garrison commander of Peiping and Tientsin, 1928; state councillor, National Government, since 1932; pacification commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan, 1932–37; commander-in-chief, 2nd War Area, 1937–47; governor, Shansi Province, since 1943; director, Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, 1947–date; member, Central Political Council, 1947–date; address, Shansi Provincial Government, Hsingchi.

Yu, Hung-chun (prefers O. K. Yui)

Government official, native of Kwangtung, born in 1898; secretary-general, 1928–37, and mayor, 1937, Greater Shanghai Municipality; managing director, Central Trust, 1937–41; vice minister of finance, 1941–44; minister of finance, 1944–48; appointed governor of Central Bank of China, July 1945; member, Central Executive Committee, Kuomintang; member, Export-Import Board, 1947; member, Political Committee, Executive Yuan, 1947; chairman, Board of Directors, International Bank and Fund, 1947; member, National Economic Council, 1948; address, Ministry of Finance, Chungking.

Yu, Ta-wei

General; army officer, native of Chekiang, born in 1898; studied at Harvard and Berlin; director, Ordnance Administration, Ministry of War, 1933–44; vice minister of war, 1944–46; awarded U. S. Legion of Merit, 1943; British Order of the Bath, 1944; Minister of Communications, 1946–date; member, Political Committee, Executive Yuan, 1947; address, Ministry of War, Chungking.

Yui, O. K. (see Yu, Hung-chun)

(Source: A large part of the above data are from "China Handbook," 1937–45. Chapter XXIII, *Chinese Who's Who,* by permission of Chinese News Service, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York.)

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Digitized by Google
Original from HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Digitized by Google

Original from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google


Digitized by Google

Original from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Digitized by Google

Original from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY



Generated at University of Guelph on 2024-08-27 12:40 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044057331357
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Digitized by Google

Original from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY